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ABSTRACT
“NOW THESE THINGS HAPPENED AS EXAMPLES FOR US” (1 COR. 10:6):
THE BIBLICAL-NARRATIVE DEPICTION OF HUMAN SINFULNESS

Stephen F. Jenks, B.A., M.Div., Th.M.
Marquette University, 2014

For several decades voices from various sectors of Christianity have decried the
loss of compelling language for sin. The atrophying of sin language is of no small
moment due to the organic connection between theological loci. Sin talk relates to
salvation-talk, human-talk, and Christ-talk. Further, the loss of compelling sin language
threatens to silence the church’s voice in the culture.
Both classic and contemporary theologies of sin, pursuing the essentialist methods
of the past, attempt to define sin and derive the fullness of the doctrine of sin from these
distillations. However, many of these renderings of sin are insufficiently attentive to the
importance of narrative modes of thought in theologizing. Specifically, they often almost
completely ignore the witness of the biblical narrative—both individual narratives and
the Bible’s overall narrative structure. Furthermore, they tend to appropriate the
narratives, and especially the narrative of the fall in Genesis 3, in ways that actually
subvert the narratives’ narrativity through historicizing, mythologizing, and
decontextualizing. They therefore provide thin descriptions of the human condition and
consequently offer distorted depictions of redemption, humanity, and the divine-human
relationship. These patterns can be seen in both feminist theologies that build their
definitions of sin from particular views of the human and evangelical theology which
derive their definition from biblical propositions.
In this dissertation we seek to begin to offer a narrative theology of sin by
providing a reading of Genesis 1-11 that attends to its literary character and seeks to
identify the reference point for sin and discern its development in the narrative. We will
discover that both the reference point for sin and the axis of its development relates to the
depiction of the human as the imago dei.
We will conclude by demonstrating that indexing the doctrine of sin to a
narratively construed imago dei offers a more robust language for sin and in particular,
offers a more natural bridge to Christ. Indeed, in the story of redemption, Christ becomes
the ultimate reference point for describing sin.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
SIN AND NARRATIVES IN THEOLOGY

In 1973 Karl Menninger posed a now famous question in the title of his book
Whatever Became of Sin?.1 There Menninger traced what he saw as the decline of sinlanguage in popular thought. The concept of sin, he noted, had given way to the ideas of
“crime” and “sickness.” These moves in turn shifted the burden of dealing with “sin” to
the state (crime) or to the clinic (sickness). As a psychiatrist, Menninger regarded
somewhat positively the dissipation of puritanical notions of sinfulness that focused so
heavily on the sexual. In that same capacity, however, he was eager to recapture the
category of sin for religious and therapeutic purposes. In addition to providing his own
definition of sin, Menninger surveyed and modified the existing traditional categories of
sin and proposed the addition of a few more culturally relevant modes of sinfulness that
he felt were missed by the standing definitions. Two sins in particular that exercised him
were those involving corporate complicity: the mistreatment of the environment and the
injustice of the penal system. Twenty years later Andrew Delbanco came to a similar
conclusion by means of an historical survey of the “death of Satan”.2
While Menninger’s treatment was not especially theological, his point about the
loss of culturally relevant ways to talk about human sinfulness was well-taken. In 1993,
1. Karl A. (Karl Augustus) Menninger, Whatever Became of Sin (New York: Hawthorn
Books, 1973).
2. Andrew Delbanco, The Death of Satan: How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995). Delbanco offers a history of the demise of
meaningful talk of Satan and evil in the American experience. The prescience of Delbanco’s
lament can be seen in Susan Neiman’s assessment of the lack of compelling language for evil in
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History
of Philosophy [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002], 283).

2
the journal Theology Today approached the issue of sin in a decidedly more theological
vein. In an assessment strikingly similar to Menninger’s, Thomas Long lamented that
“the word ‘sin’ has all but disappeared from the landscape, covered over by the kudzu of
bureaucratic speech and the seemingly more pertinent and positive language of therapy.”3
Sin’s homelessness extends beyond the popular culture. In the same issue of that journal,
David Kelsey traced the movement of sin from one theological locus to another; it can be
found in theological anthropology, Christology and soteriology.4 Kelsey further remarked
that the disappearance of sin from theology would be serious because “the doctrine of sin
is one of those doctrines in which Christian life-forming is held closest to Christian truthclaiming, practical theology closest to dogmatic theology.”5
Other evidence of the decline of the language of sin and evil could be adduced.
But the above is sufficient to prompt the question: Why has the topic of sin so atrophied
at a time when it is needed as much as ever to address the human situation at all levels:
personal, corporate, national and even ecclesial? While the historical surveys offered by
Menninger and Delbanco are helpful, part of the answer may be found in the definitions
of sin that have been offered and the theological methodologies that occasioned them. In
short, theologizing about sin has failed to speak relevantly and freshly to a changing
culture and by failing to speak clearly, theology has lost its voice. This is no small matter.
Due to the organic nature of theological topics, Christof Gestrich asserts, “If we could
once again speak about sin in an understandable and definite way, theology could also

3. Thomas G Long, “God Be Merciful to Me, a Miscalculator,” Theology Today 50, no. 2
(July 1993): 166.
4. David H Kelsey, “Whatever Happened to the Doctrine of Sin,” Theology Today 50,
no. 2 (July 1993): 169–78.
5. Ibid., 169.

3
win back all the other subjects of Christian doctrine for our time.”6 The erosion in sin-talk
is devastating because it is so tightly related to other central theological languages: selftalk, salvation-talk, and ultimately Christ-talk.

DEFINING SIN

In spite of the widely recognized need to express theology in keeping with
changes in human understanding, discussions and definitions of sin have changed little
throughout church history. Most genealogies of the doctrine of sin trace the roots of
today’s sin-talk to Augustine’s classic equivalence of sin and pride. “When we ask the
cause of the evil angels’ misery, we find that it is the just result of their turning away
from him who supremely is, and their turning towards themselves, who do not exist in
that supreme degree. What other name is there for this fault than pride? ‘The beginning of
all sin is pride.’”7 Augustine’s definition reveals the two main features of a classic
understanding of sin: it is a turning away from God that is motivated by pride. The
turning away, often exhibited in the flaunting of divine law, is the fruit of the root of
pride.

6. Christof Gestrich, The Return of Splendor in the World: The Christian Doctrine of Sin
and Forgiveness (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1997), 11. Gestrich later raises an
even more frightening possibility regarding the loss of sin language. He asks, “Is sin no longer a
distinct word in our era; or is the actual problem the fact that God is no longer a distinct word? If
the latter is true, what meaningful path can be followed to renew the theological doctrine of sin?”
(43, emphasis original). Alistair McFadyen ponders something similar when he writes, “Losing
our ability to speak of the world’s pathologies in relation to God represents a serious, concrete
form of the loss of God that is a general characteristic of contemporary, Western culture. The
doctrine of sin is not so much an isolated case of Christian embarrassment concerning
anachronistic aspects of Christian faith, as a crucial test of our ability to speak of God in relation
to the world at all.” Alistair McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian
Doctrine of Sin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4.
7. Augustine, trans., Henry Bettenson, City of God, a new translation by Henry
Bettenson, with an introduction by John O’Meara, Penguin Classics (London, England: Penguin
Books, 1984), XII.vi.477 Augustine himself is quoting Ecclesiasticus 10:15.
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While Augustine’s discussion of sin and evil extended beyond this cryptic
statement (one thinks of his influential description of evil as privatio boni and the role of
concupiscence) his distillation of the essence of sin to pride has enjoyed particular
longevity and influence. Though certainly more nuanced, one can see the influence of
Augustine’s thought as recently as Reinhold Neibuhr’s treatise on human nature. Niebuhr
summarized sin as “pride and will to power.”8
Though not all theologians have followed Augustine on the matter of sin’s nature,
they have followed his impulse to name sin’s essence. For Anselm, “sin [was] nothing
else than not to render to God his due.”9 Luther spoke of sin as pride, self-will, the flesh
and self-righteousness, but ultimately stated that the essence of sin was unbelief.10 For
John Calvin, sin was essentially unfaithfulness.11 For Tillich, sin is essentially
“estrangement.”12 Cristof Gestrich applies aspects of psychology to propose that sin is
fundamentally “self-justification.”13 Each of these definitions, though expressed
differently and arrived at variously, shares the desire to define sin’s essence. And
frequently the principal manifestation of the pride, self-will, or unfaithfulness is violation
of the divine law.

8. Reinhold Niebuhr, Human Nature, vol. 1 of The Nature and Destiny of Man: A
Christian Interpretation (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1945), 179.
9. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?, XI.
10. Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic
Development, translated and edited by Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
1999), 249–50.
11. Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), II.i.4.
12. Paul Tillich, Existence and the Christ, vol. 2 of Systematic Theology (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1957), 44–47.
13. Gestrich, Return of Splendor, 26 Marguerite Shuster suggests that self-justification
was also identified by Luther as a significant component of sin. (The Fall and Sin: What We Have
Become as Sinners [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub., 2004], 115).
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These definitions are more than mere quibbling. Entire systems of theology and
church practice hinge on some of these definitions of human sinfulness. Due to the
organic nature of theology, how one understands sin shapes not only one’s view of
salvation but also depicts the nature of the human person and the nature of the divine–
human relationship a certain way. Furthermore, these descriptions of sin, salvation, and
the human person are formative for one’s ethics and pastoral care. More devastatingly, as
Menninger, Delbanco and Gestrich attest, the neglect of a robust understanding of sin
threatens Christian theology’s relevance in the public square.

Problems with Defining Sin

A perpetual problem that definitions of sin suffer is reductionism. As even the
distillations above attest, definitions of sin must negotiate a variety of polarities: sin as
act vs. sin as disposition; sin as personal vs. sin as corporate/systemic; sin as primarily
against God vs. sin as primarily against the other; sin as active vs. sin as passive; sin as
positive reality vs. sin as negative unreality or lack; sin as spiritual vs. sin as physical;
sins of commission vs. sins of omission. Critics of any definition of sin or of the essence
of sin often fault the definition for overemphasizing one or more of the polarities. While
there has been some recognition of sin’s two-sidedness, perhaps most notably
Kierkegaard’s summary of sin as both weakness and defiance,14 this observation has not
been widely applied.15

14. See especially his discussion of the various types of “despair” in Søren Kierkegaard,
The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition of Edification & Awakening by
Anti-Climacus, ed. and trans. Alistair Hannay (Penguin Classics, 1989).
15. For instance, though Niebuhr acknowledges Kierkegaard’s idea of sin’s dual
character, he ultimately decides in favor of pride as definitive.
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That definitions of sin struggle to hold together these tensions may in itself
suggest that the approaches used to define sin or even the effort to define sin at all may be
misdirected. As Menninger and others demonstrate, definitions of sin have atrophied or
disappeared in recent years. But even in places where sin is still being talked about the
definitions, old and new, suffer the same deficiencies.

Two Examples: Evangelical and Feminist Theology

For two examples of theologies where one-sided definitions of sin hold sway, one
may consider evangelical and feminist theologies. Sin is an important piece of both of
these theological strains though for different reasons. Additionally, as we will investigate
more closely later, theologians in these traditions arrive at their understanding of sin via
distinct theological methodologies. However, perhaps ironically, the net result is
similar—a too narrow definition of sin.

Sin in Evangelical Theology
For much of evangelical16 theology, sin is captured in the Johaninne phrase “sin is
lawlessness” (1 John 3:4).17 Their focus is more on the “turning away from God” portion
of Augustine’s definition than his isolation of pride as the root. This trend can be clearly
16. I am aware that the term “evangelical” may be waning in its usefulness as a
descriptive category of theologian. For the purposes of this dissertation, I subscribe to David
Bebbington’s enumeration of the features of evangelicalism: conversionism, biblicism, activism,
and crucicentrism. Other similar lists have been offered. For more on this see especially Alister
McGrath, Evangelicalism & the Future of Christianity (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press,
1995), 196, n. 4.
17. This is not to suggest that many evangelical theologians cite this phrase from 1 John
as the basis for their definitions of sin (although see Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An
Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Pub. House, 1994), 491). Rather,
upon surveying many evangelical definitions of sin (various names given below), one encounters
the pattern of sin being primarily defined as the violation of divine law. Thus the Johannine turn
of phrase aptly summarizes the position even if it itself is not used to support it.
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seen in the work of A. H. Strong, an influential theologian of the early 20th century. He
defined sin thus: “Sin is lack of conformity to the moral law of God, either in act,
disposition or state.”18 Sin is failure to obey God’s law; sin is essentially disobedience.
One can hear the echoes of Strong in two authors of later systematic theologies. Wayne
Grudem defines sin as “any failure to conform to the moral law of God in act, attitude or
nature.”19 Once again, sin is failure to keep the moral law. Millard Erickson sees at the
heart of sin “any lack of conformity, active or passive, to the moral law of God. This may
be a matter of act, of thought, or of inner disposition or state.”20 These definitions, of
course, have as distant relative the response to the Westminster Shorter Catechism’s
question “What is sin?”: “Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law
of God.”21
With reference to the aforementioned polarities, sin thus construed is primarily as
act, personal, and theocentric—against God. In Evangelical theology this issues forth
soteriologically in an atonement theory heavy in forensic language. The divine-human
relationship seems to be primarily one of law giver-law breaker or Judge-criminal. On

18. Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology: A Compendium and CommonplaceBook Designed for the Use of Theological Students (Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press,
1907–9), 549.
19. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 490.
20. Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1998), 596.
21. There are, of course, other evangelical voices. Theissen prefers to speak of sin as
“selfishness” at its base (a move akin to Augustine’s “pride”) (Henry Clarence Thiessen,
Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1949], 246. Earlier
Thiessen describes sin as “want of conformity to God’s law” (242)). Donald Bloesch sides with
Calvin on “unfaithfulness” (Donald G. Bloesch, God, Authority, and Salvation, vol. 1 of
Essentials of Evangelical Theology [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978], 92). Two other voices
which we will have cause to consider in more detail later are Stanley Grenz and Cornelius
Plantinga. Grenz attempts a more relational definition of sin: “sin is essentially both the lack of
and the loss of community.”(Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God [Nashville:
Broadman & Holman, 1994], 187) Plantinga summarizes sin as “culpable shalom-breaking”
(Cornelius Plantinga, Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin [Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1995], 14).
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this model, salvation is achieved through the outpouring of divine wrath upon an innocent
victim, Jesus, whose sacrifice appeases divine wrath and pays for human sinfulness—the
so-called penal substitution theory of atonement. Though this telling does draw together
several themes and texts in Scripture it has been faulted by many (and especially feminist
theologians) for overemphasis on the death of Christ as the salvific moment. It is asserted
that salvation through divine violence sanctions human violence and leads toward a view
of submission to violence and self-abnegation as the core of the Christian response to
redemption. This theology of self-abnegation, so tightly linked to a view of sin as pride,
serves to further oppress the downtrodden rather than liberating them.22
Many of these evangelical studies begin their inquiry into sin from the diverse
biblical vocabulary for sin and attempt to distill a definition of sin and its essence from
this data. Oddly, though some recognize the obvious metaphorical character of the
vocabulary for sin (sin as “missing the mark,” “bearing a burden”, “stain”) the
methodological relevance of the biblical authors’ resort to metaphorical language for sin
is rarely considered nor is their penchant for depicting sin in narrative.
While the notions of pride and lawlessness are rooted in biblical thought and
stress the aspect of personal culpability in sin particularly well, they have been attacked
for paying insufficient attention to other biblical imagery and for providing little ground
for the consideration of sin’s corporate and systemic aspects. It is also argued that the
overemphasis on forensic language for sin and salvation distorts the biblical presentation.
For instance, as Gordon Fee has pointed out, images for sin and salvation are typically
22. These ideas can be found in many feminist theologians. Two examples suffice:
Nicola Slee, Faith and Feminism: An Introduction to Christian Feminist Theology, Exploring
Faith. (London: Darton Longman and Todd, 2003), and Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann
Parker, Proverbs of Ashes: Violence, Redemptive Suffering, and the Search for What Saves Us
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).
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linked. The particular language of salvation that Paul uses (redemption, resurrection,
reconciliation) depends upon what image of sin Paul has in mind (bondage, death,
estrangement).23 Restrictive definitions of sin flatten these rich metaphorical contours.
Additionally, many have reacted against the cross-and-suffering heavy version of
atonement that this emphasis on forensic language leads to.24 Indeed, much of the
discussion has focused on theories of the atonement without extensive consideration of
the depictions of human sinfulness they entail. This, of course, speaks to the ineluctable
link between understandings of sin and salvation.

Sin in Feminist Theology

Like the evangelicals, the concept of sin is important to feminist theology, though
for different reasons. For some, the doctrine of sin is point of departure for critiques of
traditional theology. Many feminist theologians take issue with both the implications of
the narrative of the so-called “fall” and the definitions of sin supposedly derived from it.
In an article that some point to as the beginning of the feminist theological
movement, Valerie Saiving critiqued Reinhold Niebuhr’s treatment of human sinfulness

23. Gordon Fee, “Paul and the Metaphors for Salvation: Some Reflections on Pauline
Soteriology,” in The Redemption, Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, O’, and Gerald O’Collins
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 51.
24. For example, see Stephen J. Patterson, “Beyond the Passion,” in Beyond the Passion:
Rethinking the Death and Life of Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2004) and Denny J. Weaver,
The Nonviolent Atonement (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001). There are voices within
evangelicalism raising similar questions. See Joel B. Green & Mark D. Baker, Recovering the
Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament & Contemporary Contexts (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2000). These discussions have resulted in a retrenching on the penal
substitution theory of the atonement in certain sectors of evangelicalism as can be seen in Mark
Dever’s Christianity Today article “Nothing but the Blood,” Christianity Today 50, no. 5 (May
2006): 28–33. At the same time, others are seeking to appropriate the diversity of biblical
atonement language for pastoral use. See Mark Driscoll and Gerry Breshears, Death by Love:
Letters from the Cross, Re: Lit (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2008).
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as reductionist because it failed to take into consideration the female experience of sin.25
She claimed that the sin of pride is “male sin”, whereas the female tendency is toward
insufficient self-actualization.26 That is, males sin due to a surfeit of self-estimation and
females due to a shortage.27
In response to the traditional definitions, feminist theologians have offered
definitions of sin such as “dualism”, “false naming”, “struggle”, and
“brokenheartedness.” Many of these definitions, reacting as they do against the perceived
imbalance of the definitions above (and especially sin as pride), only swing to the other
extreme of the polarities, emphasizing sin as systemic, dispositional, and primarily
against the other, not God.
Feminist theology’s identification of sin with systemic patriarchy and sexism has
helpfully emphasized structures of sinfulness. But as Angela West,28 Wanda Warren

25. Valerie Saiving, “The Human Situation: A Feminine View,” in Womanspirit Rising:
A Feminist Reader in Religion, Carol P. and Judith Plaskow Christ (New York: HarperCollins,
1979), 25–42 Daphne Hampson adds to Saiving’s critique by suggesting that Neibuhr also has an
extraordinarily individuated concept of the human being, who finds himself essentially caught up
in competitive relationships” Daphne Hampson, Theology and Feminism, Signposts in Theology.
(Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell, 1990), 122. Judith Plaskow expanded
Saiving’s critique in her dissertation. See Judith Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace: Women’s
Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich (Washington: University
Press of America, 1980).
26. As Delbanco chronicles, sin as pride was problematized long before the feminist
critique. In the midst of the economic expansion of the late 19th century it became clear that those
attributes once attributed to Satan—avarice, desire and ambition—were now those qualities most
likely to ensure success in the new economy. He writes: “[I]t had become unconvincing to evoke
the devil from pulpits and soapboxes as the embodiment of ‘unchecked self-interest’ because
America was now all about the glory of self-interest.” Delbanco, Death of Satan, 96–97.
27. As William J. Cahoy notes, this observation is strikingly similar to Kierkegaard’s
assessment of two ways of sinning. Cahoy helpfully develops both Kierkegaard’s and feminist
thought on the ways of sinning and their anthropological significance (William J. Cahoy, “One
Species or Two? Kierkegaard’s Anthropology and the Feminist Critique of the Concept of Sin,”
Modern Theology 11, no. 4 [October 1995]: 429–54).
28. Angela West, Deadly Innocence: Feminist Theology and the Mythology of Sin (New
York: Cassell, 1995).
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Berry,29 and Mary Grey30 have argued, the diverse definitions of sin in the work of such
feminist theologians as Mary Daly, Letty Russell, and Rosemary Radford Ruether betray
an inadequacy to encapsulate the whole of the human condition. In particular, there
seems to be a lack of attention to the individual responsibility for sin. Angela West
suggests that many feminist theologians have come perilously close to defining sin in
such a way that exonerates women. The insufficiency of these definitions to capture the
complete picture of sin is further attested by the proliferation of definitions within
feminist theology and the demurring from a “feminist consensus” by women of other
racial contexts, e.g. womanist, mujerista, and Asian feminist theologies.31
Ultimately it is unclear whether there is anything distinctly male or female about
these ways of sinning. As Kierkegaard acknowledged, not only are there men and women
who struggle with the iconic sin of the opposite sex, there are elements of weakness in
defiance and defiance in weakness. That sin has this multifaceted character points away
from the likelihood of tidy definitions. This last observation both reinforces and
undermines the feminist position. On the one hand, it acknowledges the value of the
emphasis on the reverse of pride as an aspect of human sinfulness. On the other, it shows
the weakness of experience based theological methodology—it fails to speak as
univocally as one might like.

29. Wanda Warren Berry, “Images of Sin and Salvation in Feminist Theology,” Anglican
Theological Review LX, no. 1 (1978): 25–54.
30. Mary Grey, “Falling Into Freedom: Searching for New Interpretations of Sin in a
Secular Culture,” Scottish Journal of Theology 47, no. 2: 223–43.
31. Angela West comments especially on the disconnect between feminist and womanist
theologians in chapter 6 of Deadly Innocence: Feminist Theology and the Mythology of Sin, 38–
48.
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Definitions of Sin and Theological Epistemology

Why might two theological strains come to such distinct understandings of human
sinfulness? And why are both of their definitions demonstrably deficient? One possible
answer relates to their theological epistemology and methodology. Both evangelical and
feminist theologies operate with thoroughly modern religious epistemologies. Much of
evangelicalism is still shaking loose from a scientific approach to theology that regarded
the biblical text (and in a lesser sense nature) as the storehouse of facts about God.32 This
gave way to an at times facile method of proof-texting Christian doctrines. While these
methods are falling out of favor in the academy they are still widely practiced at the lay
level and certainly within the fundamentalist strain of Protestantism. Many evangelicals
still operate with a foundationalist epistemology, a correspondence theory of truth, and a
propositionalist theological methodology. As a result they articulate doctrines through
statements and definitions. This combined with an ardent biblicism and adherence to a
doctrine of the verbal inspiration of Scripture leads them to focus on words and
discursive biblical texts as the preferred mode of expression of truth claims. Furthermore,
Scripture, and biblical narrative in particular are approached with the tools of history
rather than literature.
Feminist theological methodology may rightly be traced to Friedrich
Schleiermacher, the so-called “father of modern theology” for whom the point of
departure for theological reflection was neither the biblical text nor the accepted creeds
32. Charles Hodge offered one of the classic statements of this in his systematic theology.
“The Bible is no more a system of theology, than nature is a system of chemistry or of mechanics.
We find in nature the facts which the chemist or the mechanical philosopher has to examine, and
from them to ascertain the laws by which they are determined. So the Bible contains the truths
which the theologian has to collect, authenticate, arrange, and exhibit in their internal relation to
each other.” Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 1:1.
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but rather the experience of redemption in the community of faith.33 Rather than starting
from the presupposition of an infallible, authoritative text, feminist theology begins in
concrete human experience, namely, of women. Doctrines and theological formulations
are checked against lived experience, especially the experience of the oppression of
women under patriarchal societal structures even in, or especially within, the church.34 In
this feminist theology is certainly akin to liberation theology and has spawned a host of
other contextual theologies such as womanist, mujerista, and gay and lesbian theologies.
Neither of these methods have fared well in the postmodern critique. Among
other critiques, the postmodern thought problematized such totalizing “metanarratives” as
those offered by evangelical and feminist theologies, be it propositionally authoritative
revelation, or gender typical experience. Specifically, while their preferred
epistemologies—revelational rationalism and gendered experientialism—account for
certain aspects of the process of human knowing, both accounts fall short of
encapsulating the process of human knowing. Accordingly, the theological
methodologies and outcomes derived from them are insufficient.35
33. B. Gerrish, and Sergio Sorrentino, “Scleiermacher, Friedrich,” in Encyclopedia of
Religion, vol. 12, Lindsay Jones (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005), 12:8160–61 Kathryn
Greene-McCreight (among others) makes this connection between Schleiermacher and feminist
theological methodology. She also finds their roots in Immanuel Kant and ultimately Ludwig
Feuerbach. See Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Feminist Reconstructions of Christian Doctrine:
Narrative Analysis and Appraisal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 29.
34. For a compelling demonstration that a correspondence theory of truth can even be
found in such prominent feminist theologians as Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Rosemary Radford
Ruether and Mary Daly see Sheila Greeve Davaney, “Problems with Feminist Theory: Historicity
and the Search for Sure Foundations,” in Embodied Love: Sensuality and Relationship as
Feminist Values, Paula M. Cooey, Sharon A. Farmer, and Mary Ellen Ross (San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1987), 79–95.
35. Gestrich points to a particular feature of this modernist orientation, its
anthropocentrism, when he writes, “Even when they leave the traditional, exclusive orientation
toward the individual behind them, most theological doctrines of sin still have a modernistic—
anthropocentric and modernistic—subjectivist orientation. The distortion of humanity and the
threat to man [sic] posed by sin are emphasized: for example, his disturbed psychological
condition, the development of society or (human) history ‘in the wrong direction,’ his failure to
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NARRATIVE AND THEOLOGY
Concurrent with Menninger’s revival of sin language, the movement now known
as narrative theology was beginning to gain strength. Though its purposes are not merely
practical, among the features that commend it to many is its ability to speak meaningfully
to the human experience. Practitioners of narrative theology regularly claim that theology
done in a narrative key is better attuned to both human thought and experience and the
way the world actually works. Furthermore, it is argued that narrative is an important
element in human knowing, the recovery of which ameliorates some of the postmodern
criticisms of other epistemological systems.

The Narrative Turn

While like most intellectual movements the rise of narrative thinking cannot be
traced to one particular issue or moment, a legitimate place to begin is H. Richard
Niebuhr’s essay “The Story of our Life,” written in 1941.36 There he wrote,
The preaching of the early Christian church was not an argument for the
existence of God nor an admonition to follow the dictates of some
common human conscience, unhistorical and super-social in character. It
was primarily a simple recital of the great events connected with the
historical appearance of Jesus Christ and a confession of what had
assume personal responsibility. The slandering of God and the agony and disorder prevalent
among nonhuman creatures (the disruption of world order), as well as sinful forces having a
fateful effect that transcends the personal dimension of life, are less in view,” a critique the
ostensibly theocentric evangelicals might find arresting. Gestrich, Return of Splendor, 37–38.
36. H. Richard Niebuhr, “The Story of Our Life,” in Why Narrative?: Readings in
Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and
Stock, 1989), 21–44. In the introduction to this volume Hauerwas adds that Karl Barth’s Church
Dogmatics should be included in discussions of the rediscovery of narrative for theology (Stanley
Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, “Introduction: Why Narrative?” in Why Narrative?: Readings in
Narrative Theology, Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones [Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock,
1989], 5 n.4). For more on Barth’s use of biblical narrative in his theology see David Ford, Barth
and God’s Story: Biblical Narrative and the Theological Method of Karl Barth in the “Church
Dogmatics” (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1981).
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happened to the community of disciples. Whatever it was that the church
meant to say, whatever was revealed or manifested to it, could be
indicated only in connection with an historical person and events in the
life of his community. The confession referred to history and was
consciously made in history.37
Niebuhr’s recommendation of the preaching of the early church was no facile attempt at
theological repristination, nor a rejection of the theology produced by thinkers abetted by
philosophy. It was, however, a clarion call to consider the irreducibly historical character
of Christian theology in the face of methods that sought to get behind the Christian story
through demythologization or to systematize the story through doctrine.
Eventually this observation of the narrative basis for Christian claims led to the
realization that the value of narrative was not merely an historical accident but due to the
fact that narrative is “a crucial conceptual category for such matters as understanding
issues of epistemology and methods of argument, depicting personal identity, and
displaying the content of Christian conviction.”38 The last of these (the value of narrative
in displaying Christian conviction) is congruent with Niebuhr’s point. The other two—
issues of epistemology and argumentation and depicting personal identity—are equally
important.

Story and System

First, it is claimed that narrative is a fundamental component of human knowing.
Narrative offers a distinct way to organize information that in some cases is superior to
the organization offered by systems. This is far from a simplistic appeal to the importance
or ubiquity of stories in human society. As Stanley Hauerwas writes, “[T]he crucial
37. H. Richard Niebuhr, “The Story of Our Life,” 21.
38. Hauerwas and Jones, “Introduction: Why Narrative?” 5.
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appeal to narrative is not because of the significance of ‘stories,’ though that may be part
of it; rather what is significant is the recognition that rationality, methods of argument,
and historical explanation have, at least to some extent, a fundamentally narrative
form.”39
This priority of narrative to system is at the heart of narrative theology. Terrence
Tilley contrasts narrative theological methodology with a propositional method. “A
Christian propositional theology engages in exploring transforming and proclaiming the
doctrines of Christianity. A Christian narrative theology undertakes exploring,
transforming and proclaiming the stories of Christianity. If stories give meaning to the
metaphors / stereotypes / codewords / doctrines which we use, then a narrative theology
is more fundamental than a propositional theology.”40 His pithy remark, “The stories of
God cannot be captured in a system,”41 expresses well many narrative theologians’
attitudes.
Yet the appeal to narrative is not a simplistic replacement of systems with
stories.42 Johann Baptist Metz describes the relation between story and system: “There is
no question of regressively obscuring the distinction between narrative memory and
theological argument. It is much more a question of acknowledging the relative value of
rational argument, the primary function of which is to protect the narrative memory of
39. Ibid., 4.
40. Terrence W. Tilley, Story Theology, Theology and Life Series, vol. 12. (Wilmington,
Del.: M. Glazier, 1985), 11.
41. Ibid., 16.
42. Historian Louis O. Mink regards narrative highly but seems to put it on par with,
rather than above theory as an epistemological tool. “Even though narrative form may be, for
most people, associated with fairy tales, myths, and the entertainments of the novel, it remains
true that narrative is a primary cognitive instrument—an instrument rivaled, in fact, only by
theory and by metaphor as irreducible ways of making the flux of experience comprehensible.”
Louis O. Mink, “Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument,” in The Writing of History, ed.
Robert H. Canary, Henry Kozicki (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press,
1978), 131.
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salvation in a scientific world, to allow it to be at stake and to prepare the way for a
renewal of this narrative, without which the experience of salvation is silenced.”43 David
F. Ford likewise doesn’t pit story against system so much as he sees them (along with
performance) as aspects of the theological task. “My position on the interrelation of the
other two modes with that of performance is that the systematic questions are
unavoidable and need to be thoroughly pursued, and that the story-related questions
require a similarly specific attention.”44

Story and Self
Hauerwas’s other claim, that narrative is an essential component of “depicting
personal identity,” is likewise important. Storytelling both draws us together as humans
insofar as virtually all humans tell stories, but also sets us apart in that we each inhabit
our own narratives and understand ourselves in light of those narratives. In fact, it is
through narrative that we attempt to articulate a cohesive view of ourselves. Whereas
system is of limited use in connecting my younger self to my current self, narrative offers
a way of relating them. Stanley Grenz writes, “[A]ny semblance of meaning in the
present is linked to at least a rudimentary sense of narrative continuity with a meaningful
past and a conceivable future, which gives the impression that the person is en route from
somewhere to somewhere and hence that the person’s narrative constitutes some type of a

43. Johann Baptist Metz, “A Short Apology of Narrative,” trans. David Smith, in Why
Narrative?: Readings in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones
(Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1989), 259.
44. David F. Ford, “System, Story, Performance: A Proposal About the Role of Narrative
in Christian Systematic Theology,” in Why Narrative?: Readings in Narrative Theology, Stanley
Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1989), 204.
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whole.”45 Anthony Giddens speaks of the contemporary project of self-identity as one of
maintaining a coherent, ongoing narrative of the self in the midst of rigid systems and a
welter of choices. “The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of
coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of
multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems.”46
This narrative self-understanding is necessary for ethical reasoning as well. As
Giddens suggests, one may be able to give an internally coherent account of their actions,
but “What makes a given response ‘appropriate’ or ‘acceptable’ necessitates a shared—
but unproven or unprovable—framework of reality.”47 In this he agrees with Alasdair
MacIntyre who, in After Virtue, argued that ethical reasoning and behavior could not be
rightly understood apart from some narrative context. He wrote, “Every particular view
of the virtues is linked to some particular notion of the narrative structure or structures of
human life.”48 What this means is that without some shared, over-arching narrative
framework, communities cannot come to agreement regarding what is ethical or not. The
delineation of ethical systems and specific ethical values is subsequent to the
development of a shared narrative. It has been argued that this is in part because human
experience has a fundamentally narrative shape.49 We make sense of our lives and

45. Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of
the Imago Dei, Matrix of Christian Theology, vol. 1. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2001), 135.
46. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern
Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 5. Giddens contrasts self-narration with
collage, the placing of various stories side by side with no fundamentally uniting texture.
47. Ibid., 36.
48. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 174.
49. Hauerwas and Burrell write: “It is that ordering, that capacity to unfold or develop
character, and thus offer insight into the human conditions, which recommends narrative as a
form of rationality especially appropriate to ethics” (Stanley Hauerwas and David Burrell, “From
System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality in Ethics,” in Why Narrative?: Readings
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communicate about ourselves through stories. Furthermore, we understand ourselves to
be a part of various stories (e.g. familial, denominational, national).50 Story works at the
level of both the individual and the collective.

Types of Narrative Theology

Like most theological movements, narrative theology is not of one piece. While a
variety of typologies have been proposed, an enduring distinction has been the
association of groups of thinkers with two “schools”: the Yale school and the Chicago
school. Gary Comstock has attached more descriptive labels to these forms of narrative
theology. He calls them “pure” and “impure” narrative theologians. “Pure narrative
theologians are those tied to, or inspired by, what has gone on in New Haven: the
antifoundationalist, cultural-linguistic, Wittgensteinian-inspired descriptivists. (Hans)
Frei, (George) Lindbeck, (Stanley) Hauerwas, and David Kelsey believe narrative is an
autonomous literary form particularly suited to the work of theology. They oppose the
excessive use of discursive prose and abstract reason, insisting that Christian faith is best
understood by grasping the grammatical rules and concepts of its texts and practices.
Narrative is a privileged mode for doing this.”51 This is clearly not an exhaustive list nor
description. Regarding the “impure” narrative theologians, Comstock writes, “Impure
narrative theologians are those with loyalties to, or sympathies with, what has gone on in
in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones [Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and
Stock, 1989], 180).
50. Vicente Balaguer summarizes these impulses toward narrative succinctly when he
writes: “[E]s narrativamente como se puede acceder a la comprensión de sí mismo, como se
puede dar un valor ético a las acciones en el marco de una vida narrada, como puede entenderse
la Historia, o incluso, como debe entenderse al final todo discurso crítico.” (Vicente Balaguer,
“La Teología Narrativa,” Scripta Theologica 28, no. 3 [1996]: 690)
51. Gary L. Comstock, “Two Types of Narrative Theology,” Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 55, no. 4: 688.
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the Second City: the revisionist, hermeneutical, Gadamerian-inspired correlationists.
(Paul) Ricoeur, (David) Tracy, (Julian) Hartt, and (Sallie) McFague agree with their
purist cousins that stories are a critical and neglected genre in which important religious
truths and practices are communicated. But they deny narrative unique theological status.
Believing that Christian sacred narratives are irreducibly infected with historical,
philosophical, and psychological concerns, they seek to apply the methods of those
disciplines to their interpretation. For them, narrative is neither pure nor autonomous.”52
Scott Holland describes the difference between these schools of thought in a
different yet helpful way. He writes, “While Yale theologians seem most interested in
keeping their community’s story straight, those drawn to the work of David Tracy and the
Chicago school are much more interested in doing theology while listening to other
people’s stories.”53 This difference can be seen in authors’ preference for biblical
narrative or personal narratives of those in the faith.
As the interest in narrative has become increasingly popular and taken up by
theologians in various traditions, these distinctions have become less clear and perhaps
less relevant. The epistemological value of narrative for theology and many other fields
has reached a level of agreement that means that even thinkers not intending to employ
narrative in any comprehensive way acknowledge its value. Further, as we will comment
more below, awareness of narrative in a simple sense has found its way into the work of
many theologians whose relationship to it is not as strict as for those listed above.

52. Ibid.
53. Scott Holland, How Do Stories Save Us?: An Essay on the Question with the
Theological Hermeneutics of David Tracy in View, Louvain Theological & Pastoral Monographs
(Louvain ; Dudley, MA: Peeters ;, 2006), 98.
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Critiques of Narrative Theology

Not surprisingly for a novel theological approach, there has been no shortage of
criticism of narrative theology as a whole as well as the work of its individual
practitioners. Often these critiques take the form of affirming the benefits of the narrative
turn while ultimately questioning whether narrative can bear the weight required of it. In
a book focusing on the work of Stanley Hauerwas, Gale Heide questions whether
narrativists can really leave behind “system.” He concludes: “In the end, it seems as
though a certain amount of system, perhaps as merely a coherentist effort at maintaining
consistency with Scripture, is inescapable in theology.”54 Preferring the vocabulary of
“drama” to that of narrative Francesca Aran Murphy offers a wide-ranging critique of
narrative theology that has itself been both praised and panned.55 Murphy essentially
accuses narrative theology of falling into all of the same epistemological traps from
which it claims to be escaping.
In 1987, Carl F. H. Henry, then one of the most prominent evangelical voices,
engaged in a brief debate with Hans Frei concerning narrative theology. While
appreciative of narrative theology’s commitment to the centrality of the biblical text and
to Frei’s insistence that the reader should seek to fit his or her world into the world
narrated by Scripture, Henry was ultimately wary that Frei’s language about the biblical
narratives and the gospel accounts in particular failed to defend their full historicity. In
particular, Henry worried that the narrative approach undermined the reality of the

54. Gale Heide, “System and Story: Narrative Critique and Construction in Theology”
(2009), xvii.
55. Francesca Aran Murphy, God is not a Story: Realism Revisited (Oxford ; New York:
Oxford University Press Oxford, 2007).
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resurrection.56 Comments like Lindbeck’s that “[t]he Bible is often ‘history-like’ even
when it is not ‘likely-history’” do not sit well with many evangelicals.57 Similar concerns
have been raised regarding the propriety of applying narrative critical techniques in
biblical interpretation. However, V. Phillips Long makes a strong case that narrative
crafting and historical reliability are not mutually exclusive.58
A distinct critique comes from Michael Goldberg. He notes, “What Jews have
asked of Christians for the past two millennia is nothing if not narrative dependent: what
justification do Christians have for identifying the deity whose salvific activity is
depicted in the gospel story as the One whose saving acts are portrayed in Israel’s prior
story?”59 Goldberg goes on to compare and contrast the narrative depictions of God in
two paradigmatic events: the Exodus and the Resurrection. He sees an important
asymmetry. Whereas the Old Testament narrative depiction portrays God accomplishing
salvation in conjunction with humanity, the work of redemption in the cross and
resurrection of Jesus appears too one-sided. Per the tools of narrative criticism, the
characterization of God in these two narratives suggests two different characters.60
With a nod to Augustine’s Confessions and the Puritan practice of journal keeping
as a spiritual discipline Alan Jacobs detects a defect in narrative theology’s focus on
storytelling in the community at the expense of personal narratives. He writes, “In short,
56. Carl F. H. Henry, “Narrative Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal,” Trinity Journal 8,
no. 1 (Spring 1987): 3–19.
57. George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal
Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), 122.
58. V. Philips Long, The Art of Biblical History, Foundations of Contemporary
Interpretation, vol. 5. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994).
59. Michael Goldberg, “God, Action, and Narrative: Which Narrative? Which Action?
Which God?” The Journal of Religion 68, no. 1 (January 1988): 40.
60. One might remark that perhaps Goldberg has overlooked the importance of the
doctrine of the Incarnation and the full humanity of Jesus Christ. Insofar as Jesus was fully
human this plan of salvation does include human participation.
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what is currently needed, it seems to me, is a narrative theology that draws on the great
resources provided by the thinkers I have mentioned—MacIntyre, Newbigin, Hauerwas,
and so on—but which also understands what Augustine and the Puritans understood: the
importance of thinking narratively about individual lives. If we are to achieve this goal,
we must cultivate as our primary resources, a faculty and a virtue: memory and hope.”61
Those sectors of Christianity open to narrative theology but still concerned with the
importance of the definitive experience of personal conversion may resonate with Jacob’s
critique.
In a monograph on the theological hermeneutics of David Tracy, Scott Holland
voices what may be the most telling critique of narrative theology. He writes,
Although reflection on the religious meanings and claims embodied in
stories has always been a task of the theologian, the turn to the narrative
genre as a privileged theological category became one of the most
significant methodological emphases of late 20th-century theology,
hermeneutics, and critical theory. Yet despite hundreds of books, articles
and conferences on the topic there is clearly no consensus concerning how
stories are to be used theologically in the conversations and debates within
the contemporary theological guild.62
What Holland highlights is the fact that for the most part, the question of narrative’s
usefulness to theology has been mired in seemingly endless discussions of methodology,
either between practitioners of the difference styles of narrative theology, from other
theological positions, or even from other disciplines such as philosophy.63 Though there
61. Alan Jacobs, “What Narrative Theology Forgot,” First Things, no. 135 (Ag-S
2003): 27.
62. Holland, How Do Stories Save Us?, 72.
63. See Keith E. Yandell, ed., Faith and Narrative (Oxford ; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001). Though the philosophers represented in this volume generally regard
renewed interest in narrative as a felicitous development, they are less convinced than the
narrative theologians (and especially the pure narrative theologians) that narrative can displace
more discursive modes of thought at least in the philosophical project. They go so far as to claim
that “narrative discourse is neither a source of religious or moral knowledge not otherwise
available, nor a basis for principled assessment of competing theological or ethical claims” (3).
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is widespread agreement regarding the value of narrative in the theological task, it is
unclear how best to appropriate it.

Narrative and Beyond

Not surprisingly, such a novel approach has occasioned both devotees and
detractors so many of the early volumes were defenses of the movement with minimal
application of the method.64 As the movement has matured, more detailed attention to
specific issues and theological loci has become common. James McClendon has
contributed significantly with his influential Biography as Theology65 as well as a three
volume systematic theology.66 The importance of ethics for narrative theology can be
seen in McClendon’s unique ordering of the theological material. He begins with Ethics
in volume 1, moves to Doctrine in volume 2 and closes with Witness. Samuel Wells
makes a similar application of narrative theological thinking to ethics in his
Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics.67 Gabriel Fackre has also contributed
significantly with his introductory The Christian Story and The Doctrine of Revelation: A
Narrative Approach.68 Many other works incorporate narrative modes of thought less
comprehensively.

64. See, for example, John A. Beck, God as Storyteller: Seeking Meaning in Biblical
Narrative (St. Louis, Mo.: Chalice Press, 2008); Tilley, Story Theology; William J. Bausch,
Storytelling: Imagination and Faith (Mystic, Conn.: Twenty-Third Publications, 1984); John
Shea, Stories of God: An Unauthorized Biography (Chicago: Thomas More Press, 1978); Mark
Ellingsen, The Integrity of Biblical Narrative: Story in Theology and Proclamation (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1990).
65. James Wm. McClendon, Biography as Theology; How Life Stories Can Remake
Today’s Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1974).
66. James Wm. McClendon, “Systematic Theology” (1986-c1994).
67. Samuel Wells, Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: Brazos
Press, 2004).
68. Gabriel Fackre, The Christian Story: A Narrative Interpretation of Basic Christian
Doctrine (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1978); Gabriel Fackre, The Doctrine of
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Narrative and Drama
Acknowledging their debt to Hans Urs von Balthasar,69 some theologians and
biblical scholars have proposed the superiority of the language of drama to that of
narrative to describe the biblical story and how it informs Christian doctrine and
practice.70 Various theories have been proposed as to how best to divide the biblical
drama into acts. N.T. Wright sketches a five-act drama in his New Testament and the
People of God: Creation, Fall, Israel, Jesus, Church and Restoration.71 Building from
Wright, Craig Bartholomew and Michael Goheen suggest a six-act drama, roughly:
Creation, Fall, Israel, Christ, Church, and Consummation. Their version is cast as the tale
of a king who establishes, loses and regains his kingdom.72 Other proposals organize the
biblical material differently.
Both story and drama have become popular ways to talk about the coherence of
the canon but the extent to which these works actually theologize on the basis of such
narrative or dramatic development varies greatly. In evangelical circles, the drama of
Scripture is often merely put alongside the discursive, propositional doctrines. That is, the
Revelation: A Narrative Interpretation, Edinburgh Studies in Constructive Theology. (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1997).
69. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, trans. Graham
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988).
70. Of course, with the language of drama comes debate as to whether the biblical drama
is more comedic or tragic in form. J. Cheryl Exum, though open to the possibility that the Bible
as a whole evinces classic comedic elements, argues persuasively that several biblical tales are
tragic (Tragedy and Biblical Narrative: Arrows of the Almighty [Cambridge, [Cambridgeshire:
Cambridge University Press, 1992]). Looking more expansively and theologically at the question
of revelation, Francesca Aran Murphy makes a case for a more comedic structure (The Comedy of
Revelation: Paradise Lost and Regained in Biblical Narrative [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000]).
Obviously one must be careful not to expect extra-biblical categories such as tragedy and comedy
to be applicable to biblical narrative without remainder.
71. N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1992), 141–42.
72. Craig G. Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen, The Drama of Scripture: Finding
Our Place in the Biblical Story (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 27.
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narrative telling of Scripture is more a form of biblical theology than dogmatic or
systematics.
One exception is the work of Kevin Vanhoozer who has applied the concept of
drama further than most others in his Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic
Approach to Christian Theology.73 Vanhoozer’s target is not narrative theology per se but
rather the relationship of Scripture, doctrine, and church as he observes it in George
Lindbeck’s “cultural-linguistic” model. Accordingly, he is not especially concerned to
defend any particular dramatic layout of the biblical story but rather to articulate, using
dramatic categories, the relationship of Scripture to doctrine and doctrine to the church.
In the end, his work is almost too detailed but is responding to the critique of merely
propositional approaches to doctrine.

NARRATIVE IN EVANGELICAL AND FEMINIST THEOLOGY

Narrative theology arose in part as an antidote to the excesses of modernist
epistemologies and as an attempt to ameliorate some of the postmodern critiques of
totalizing systems. Though certain strains of narrative theology would still maintain the
existence of a biblical ‘metanarrative’ in the face of the postmodern critique, it can also
be argued that the biblical metanarrative is not totalizing in the same way as systems are.
Thiselton argues:
‘Plots,’ or ‘emplotment,’ allow for reversals, conflicts, surprises,
complexities, hopes, frustrations, and fulfillment. They are the very stuff
of human life (not theoretical thought) with which Christian Doctrine
interacts. A ‘grand narrative’ (although not in the sense implied by
Lyotard) may recount God’s dealings with the world; ‘little’ narratives
73. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to
Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).
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may also portray the appropriation of divine acts on the scale of particular
events and persons, with all the ambiguity and need for interpretation that
characterizes a journey or narrative en route. There is room for what
Ricoeur terms ‘a hierarchy of levels.’74
Thus narrative theology tries to navigate between the certainty and totality of modern
system and the uncertainty characteristic of much postmodern thought.
How far has the narrative turn penetrated Evangelical and Feminist theology?
While there are elements within it that should be amenable to each, its epistemological
claims as well as its relationship to the biblical text run counter to their own.

Evangelicals and Narrative Theology
Though it is certainly not the last word on the topic, Carl Henry’s unease about
narrative theology has been shared by other evangelicals. The question of the historicity
of biblical narrative is ever-present and many evangelicals are uneasy with the fact that
many of the chief advocates of narrative theology reject inerrancy. Furthermore, when
narrative theology is put in the service of a view of the nature and use of Christian
doctrine such as George Lindbeck’s “cultural-linguistic” model they are further
suspicious.
Gabriel Fackre represents a more optimistic evangelical viewpoint on the value of
narrative theology. He notes that there is considerable overlap between the concerns of
narrative theology and some of the values of evangelical theology. In evangelical
theology he detects a commitment to the overarching story of Scripture, immersion in the

74. Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2007), 66.
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individual biblical narratives, and an emphasis on the personal narrative of conversion.75
He rightly warns, however, of the limits of personal narrative in evangelical estimation.
“Evangelical narrative will be critical, however, of any point of view that rests its
narrative case in such way with celebrations of affect, autobiography or biography, or
reads the Christian story as a species of the genus, universal experiential story. Biblical
narrative has an integrity of its own and cannot be absorbed into human experience as
such.”76
There is evidence that evangelicalism is appropriating aspects of the narrative
proposal. Kevin Vanhoozer has tried to rehabilitate Lindbeck’s model with his own
“canonical-linguistic” model of the nature and function of doctrine.77 What is more,
prompted in part by David Steinmetz’s article “The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis”
the movement known as the “theological interpretation of Scripture” has arisen and has
prompted a burgeoning bibliography.78 This movement is bringing theologians and
biblical scholars into closer proximity resulting in more theologically sensitive readings
of texts as well as more textually sensitive theological appropriation of the biblical
material. However, the movement is still young and is just beginning to apply the fruits
of these labors to specific theological loci. It remains the case that much evangelical
theology is still employing modernist approaches to the theological enterprise.

75. Gabriel Fackre, “Narrative Theology from an Evangelical Perspective,” in Faith and
Narrative, Keith Yandell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 192.
76. Ibid., 195.
77. Vanhoozer, Drama of Doctrine Vanhoozer draws on Hans Urs von Balthasar as well
as N. T. Wright’s proposal of a dramatic layout to the biblical canon.
78. For an introduction to theological interpretation of Scripture see Daniel J. Treier,
Introducing Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Recovering a Christian Practice (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008) and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed., Dictionary for Theological
Interpretation of the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005).
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Feminists and Narrative Theology

The role of the narrative mode of thought in feminist theology has not been much
more significant. Kathryn Greene-McCreight quotes Alvin Kimel’s assertion that “the
fundamental weakness of feminist theology is precisely its rejection of the narrative
identification of God.”79 Though she tempers this blanket statement somewhat, she goes
on to chronicle the systemic shortage of attention to narrative in feminist theology.
Indeed, the narrative depiction of God and Jesus is problematic to feminist theology due
to his maleness and the consistent depiction of God not only as Father, but as a less than
nurturing, affirming character.80 Feminist theologians have scoured the Scriptures in
search of more feminine depictions of God such as Sophia81 and the Shekinah82 or have
sought to re-identify God and Christ in feminine form through the language of Goddess,
Thealogy, and Christa.83 Whatever the recourse, what remains clear is that the biblical
narrative presentation of God and Christ is not only not formative for feminist theology
but consistently rejected.

79. Alvin Kimel, “It Could Have Been...” Pro Ecclesia 3 (1994): 393; quoted in GreeneMcCreight, Feminist Reconstructions, 5, n. 15.
80. Kathryn Greene-McCreight helpfully charts the various solutions that feminist
theologians have proposed to this problem. What is relevant for our purpose is her observation
that none of the responses reckon with the narrative portrayal of Christ. See chapter 4 of GreeneMcCreight, Feminist Reconstructions.
81. This identification of a divine feminine builds primarily from the presentation of
Wisdom personified in Proverbs thought it incorporates various New Testament references to the
“wisdom of God.”
82. Reference to the Shekinah—the radiant glory of God—as a feminine divine trades on
the fact that the word Shekinah is feminine in Hebrew. The term itself does not occur in the
canonical text but was formed from the word “to dwell” which is found in several passages which
speak of God’s presence in the tabernacle or with his people.
83. Rita Nakashima Brock traces the origin and development of Christa. See especially
chapter three of Rita Nakashima Brock, Journeys by Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power (New
York: Crossroad, 1988) and Rita Nakashima Brock, “Communities of the Cross: Christa and the
Communal Nature of Redemption,” Feminist Theology 14, no. 1 (2005): 109–25.
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NARRATIVE AND BIBLICAL STUDIES

The story of the influence of the literary turn in biblical studies is parallel to and
overlaps with the history of narrative theology but deserves separate comment. In the
latter half of the last century interest in biblical studies began to shift away from attention
to the history and sources of texts to attention to literary wholes. In Pentateuchal studies,
for instance, this meant a move away from the documentary hypothesis that had
dominated the field, to attention to the final form of the text and how they fit together
than where they came apart. More energy and attention was paid to literary and rhetorical
strategies than source and form. Biblical theology began to focus more on the theology of
entire books or sections of literature.

Biblical Narrative Studies

Attention to literary features included increased attention to genre and narrative in
particular. Literary and specifically narrative criticism became popular additions to other
forms of criticism.84 Narrative criticism pays close attention to the features of
narratives—plot, character, dialogue, narration, gaps, time, setting—and distinguishes
between the implied author and reader and the original author and reader. Various of
these features can be seen in the work of Adele Berlin, Meir Sternberg and Robert
Alter,85 among others, and in countless works addressing discrete biblical corpora or

84. For a helpful, brief introduction to narrative criticism, see Mark Allan Powell, What is
Narrative Criticism? Guides to Biblical Scholarship. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990).
85. Adele Berlin, Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative Bible and Literature
Series, 9 (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1983); Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative:
Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985);
Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981).
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specific books.86 These methods have breathed new life into texts that had at times
suffered painful dissections under the knife of other critical approaches.

The Nature of Biblical Narrative

A particularly important observation regarding the nature and function of biblical
narrative, an observation that contributed to the development of narrative theology came
in Erich Auerbach’s influential study Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western
Literature.87 The most cited chapter in his lengthy study is his analysis and comparison of
the Genesis account of the sacrifice of Isaac (Genesis 22) with Homer. What Auerbach
discerned was a distinctive tendency in the biblical narratives to suppress details thereby
accentuating the salient features of the narrative.88 Later Hans Frei drew further attention
to the way the “realistic narrative” quality of biblical narratives distinguishes them from
both mythical and historical texts. Frei in particular chronicled the turn away from
reading the biblical narratives as realistic narrative and toward the tendency to assess
them as history or as myth.89 This turn resulted in the application of various critical tools
to Scripture either to confirm or deny their historicity or to access some kernel of truth

86. See, for instance, John H. Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as Narrative: A BiblicalTheological Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992); J. P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art in
Genesis: Specimens of Stylistic and Structural Analysis, 2 (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press,
1991); William S. Kurz, Reading Luke-Acts: Dynamics of Biblical Narrative (Louisville, Ky.:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993); Robert C. Tannehill, The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A
Literary Interpretation, Foundations and Facets. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986–90).
87. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis; the Representation of Reality in Western Literature,
Translated from the German by Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).
88. Meir Sternberg would later deny the stark difference Auerbach painted between
Biblical and Homeric narration, but the effect of Auerbach’s work still stands (Sternberg, Poetics
of Biblical Narrative, 232).
89. Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative; a Study in Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
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behind the historical or mythical husk of the text.90 We will see these impulses in the
evangelical and feminist theologians we examine.
A central claim regarding narrative in general but applicable to biblical narrative
is the claim that the meaning of the story cannot be separated from its form as narrative.
Though certainly no narrative theologian, Flannery O’Connor commented succinctly on
this point:
When you can state the theme of a story, when you can separate it from
the story itself, then you can be sure the story is not a very good one. The
meaning of a story has to be embodied in it, has to be made concrete in it.
A story is a way to say something that can’t be said any other way, and it
takes every word in the story to say what the meaning is. You tell a story
because a statement would be inadequate. When anybody asks what a
story is about, the only proper thing to tell him is to read the story. The
meaning of fiction is not abstract meaning but experienced meaning, and
the purpose of making statements about the meaning of a story is only to
help you to experience that meaning more fully.91
This was Hans Frei’s concern regarding the prevailing approaches to biblical narrative.
Whether regarding it as history or myth, there was an attempt to unearth a meaning
beyond the story itself. This impulse is as in evidence in Rudolf Bultmann’s famous
project of ‘demythologization’ as it is in the contemporary preacher’s moralizing
sermons.
Michael Root offers a similar critique about the use of story and the relationship
of the reader to the story that we will find helpful in our later analysis. He suggests that

90. In Deep Exegesis Peter J. Leithart demonstrates that both those that approach the
narratives as history and those who regard them as myths end up treating the text as a husk. The
mythical approach cracks open the text in search of a transcultural principle. The historical
approach drills through the text in search of an event. Deep Exegesis: The Mystery of Reading
Scripture (Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2009).
91. Flannery O’Connor, Mystery and Manners: Occasional Prose, Sally and Robert
Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1969), 96.
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there are two ways that the Christian story (and by extension individual narratives) can
relate to the life of a reader: illustrative and storied. He explains:
The story can bear an illustrative relation to the reader’s life and world.
The story illustrates certain redemptive truths about self, world, and God.
The soteriological task is to bring out the truths the story illustrates and
show how they are redemptive. Only when the narrative is transcended
does the redemptive relation become clear.
The Christian narrative can also bear a storied relation to the reader. The
Christian story and the life and the world of the reader do not exist in
isolation, but constitute one world and one story. The reader is included in
the Christian story...The task of soteriology is, then, to show how the
reader is included in the story and how the story then is or can be the story
of that reader’s redemption.92
The illustrative use of stories assumes that the meaning is behind the story or is a
truth that can best be expressed otherwise but which the story illustrates. All stories are
“just so” stories or fables with easily determinable morals. But this approach transgresses
the inherent polyvalence of narratives. Bausch goes so far as to describe stories as
“pluralistic.”93

Narrative Coherence and Typology

One of the main contributions of narrative thought is a form of coherence that
rivals that offered by system or even history. History places events in chronological
relationship to one another. Complex causal relationships might also be determined.
Systems put people and events in fixed relationship to one another. Narrative, or story,
offers further ways to relate events and people to one another. In narratives earlier events

92. Michael Root, “The Narrative Structure of Soteriology,” in Why Narrative?:
Readings in Narrative Theology, Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf
and Stock, 1989), 266. (emphasis original).
93. Bausch, Storytelling: Imagination and Faith, 110.
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may foreshadow later events. Later events may fulfill aspects of prior events. Narrative
offers a way to talk about the development yet continuity of concepts and identities.
One specific way that narratives and biblical narrative in particular use to related
events within the narrative is through typology. In typology earlier and later characters
and events shed light on one another, assisting in the interpretation of those events. This
offers a manner of connection far richer than that offered by system or mere chronology
and causation. There has been a resurgence in this sort of figural reading because of how
seriously it takes the narratives and characters as they stand but also offers connectivity
between earlier and later sections of scripture.

Evangelical Theology and Biblical Narrative

Biblicism is a hallmark of evangelical theology and yet, when coupled with a
particular view of doctrine and how it functions in the church, it becomes clear that some
parts of Scripture are prized more highly than others for their doctrinal payout. Ironically,
in spite of these theologians’ avowed biblicism, the biblical narratives (especially read as
narratives) play very little role in the theological task. The a priori decision to regard
them as primarily historical accounts relegates them to the role Michael Root terms
“illustration”, a status that falls short of the now broadly agreed upon epistemological
capacity of narrative. While it would be unfair to characterize all Evangelical usage of
narrative as illustrative,94 it is clear that with many of the Old Testament stories in
particular, the tendency is to regard them as illustrations of principles that are taught
discursively elsewhere.
94. For instance, when considering the cross-work of Christ it is clear that evangelical
thought leans toward the inclusion of the believer in the story of Christ. However, interaction
with other narratives tends towards Root’s principalization-illustrative category.
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Even when the fall narrative is considered, the approach is often heedless of its
narrative features and its context within a broader narrative (both within the book and
canon) and typically only finds there a confirmation of a definition of sin derived from a
more discursive biblical genre. Though it is generally agreed upon that Genesis 3–11
narrate the decline of humanity into sin, not much theological use is made of this. In
keeping with Frei’s observation, much ink is also spilt defending the historicity of the
Genesis 3 account.95 As important as the matter of historicity may be, Frei is correct that
excessive attention to the history can obscure the theological intent of the narrative. To
paraphrase Lindbeck, perhaps the evangelical may be best served by regarding the text as
story-like even while affirming that it is history.

Feminist Theology and Biblical Narrative
Feminist theology’s relationship with Scripture in general and with biblical
narrative in particular is much less friendly. The combination of the conviction that the
biblical narratives were composed in patriarchal societies with the sordid history of the
use of biblical narratives to support oppression of women, even in the church, has led
many women to reject the biblical narratives outright. As Greene-McCreight summarizes,
“Without feminist theology, the Bible is understood to be dangerous to women’s
health.”96

95. The literature on the historicity of the Genesis accounts of creation, fall and flood is
enormous and increasing all the more so as prominent voices raise doubts and propose new
solutions to the problem of coordinating the biblical material with scientific and archaeological
discovery. See John Walton and the debate at www.biologos.com.
96. Greene-McCreight, Feminist Reconstructions, 39.
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As Greene-McCreight and others have shown, there are various ways that
feminist theologians have approached or appropriated Scripture.97 Many of these methods
have much in common with a “hermeneutics of suspicion”; it is assumed that the text’s
provenance in a patriarchal culture has tainted whatever message the text might have.98 It
is not uncommon for feminist exegetes to offer “new” readings of texts seeking to redeem
them from their patriarchal past and recapture them for religious use.99 This is especially
true of the iconic narratives of the Old Testament where the mistreatment of women by
men is often graphically portrayed (e.g. Abraham, Sarah and Hagar, Lot and his
daughters, Jephthah and his daughter). Yet while many of these readings give detailed

97. Carolyn Osiek offered one of the first typologies of feminist appropriation of
Scripture: rejectionist, loyalist, revisionist, sublimationist, and liberationist. (Carolyn Osiek, “The
Feminist and the Bible: Hermeneutical Alternatives,” in Feminist Perspectives on Biblical
Scholarship, ed. Adele Yarbro Collins [Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1985], 93–105).
Greene-McCreight (among others) finds typologies of feminist use of Scripture problematic and
opts instead to appropriate David Tracy’s practice of examining how feminist theologians
construe Scripture. She discerns four main feminist construals of Scripture: as inspired witness,
as vehicle for patriarchy, as vehicle for patriarchy and racism, and as cultural artifact. GreeneMcCreight, Feminist Reconstructions, 38–40.
98. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze and critique feminist theology’s use of
Scripture more broadly. However, in addition to Kathryn Greene-McCreight’s critiques, several
others have expressed concern at the effects of privileging personal experience over divine
revelation. George Stroup summarizes succinctly the problem: “All interpretation takes place
within a hermeneutical circle, but when a critical principle determines the meaning of the text,
then the principle itself becomes the primary authority for Christian faith and the Bible becomes a
witness to the critical principle rather than a witness to the God revealed in Jesus Christ” (George
W. Stroup, “Between Echo and Narcissus: The Role of the Bible in Feminist Theology,”
Interpretation 42, no. 1 [1988]: 31).
99. Emily Cheney explains and exemplifies a variety of approaches for loosing biblical
texts from their sexist strictures. See Emily Cheney, She Can Read: Feminist Reading Strategies
for Biblical Narrative (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996). Two works by
Elizabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza are important as well. See Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Bread not
Stone: The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984) and
Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1992).
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attention to the text, attention to the biblical narratives as narrative is overshadowed by
the concern to de-patriarchalize the text.100
There is no doubt regarding the patriarchal cultural provenance of the biblical
literature nor of the reprehensible views concerning women propped up by questionable
exegesis.101 However, one wonders if in rejecting the biblical narratives they have thrown
out the theological baby with the patriarchal bath water. Cultural features that a story
contains do not necessarily reflect the message of the story.102 Attention to the literary
features of narrative together with a broader narrative approach might assist the reader in
not focusing too narrowly on offensive features of the story that may not bear on its
overall meaning.

SUMMARY

Christian sin-talk has atrophied and this threatens the loss of the Christian
prophetic voice in the public square. In two sectors of Christianity—Evangelicalism and
Feminism—sin remains a central topic. But neither of these traditions offers a compelling
definition of sin. Their reductionistic definitions of sin overemphasize certain aspects of
humanity and salvation while muting others. At the same time, there has been a growing
awareness of the place of narrative in personal and intellectual development. What is
more, the biblical narrative is being read freshly after decades of inattention.
100. Greene-McCreight suggests that feminist depatriarchalization of the text is
analogous to Rudolf Bultmann’s demythologization project. Greene-McCreight, Feminist
Reconstructions, 30–31.
101. Mary Daly’s relatively brief historical survey of various theologians’ views on
women is enough both to establish the fact and to sadden the reader. See chapter 2 of The Church
and the Second Sex (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985).
102. Stephen Fowl exposes the problems of committing oneself to the idea that texts
themselves have ideologies, an accusation feminist theologians commonly hurl at scripture. See
Stephen Fowl, “Texts Don’t Have Ideologies,” Biblical Interpretation 3, no. 1 (1995): 15–34.
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In response to the renewed awareness of the importance of narrative for human
knowing, it seems obvious that the Christian theologian would turn first to consider the
narratives understood to be authoritative for the church. In the case of both the
evangelical and feminist theologians cited, it could be argued that the theologians’
embrace of an outmoded modernist epistemology which underestimates the value of
narrative is ingredient in their truncated appropriation of Scripture and arrival at a partial
definition of sin. Indeed, in both cases, their prior theological and methodological
commitments have limited them in even the most basic application of narrative in their
theologizing—theological reflection on the biblical narratives. While for the evangelical
theologians mentioned the Bible is the preeminent theological resource, the continuing
commitment to “propositional” knowledge and the treatment of the narratives primarily
as history result in either the avoidance of the biblical narrative as theological resource or
a handling of them in a manner inattentive to their narrative form. Tilley may overstate
the case when he says that “[p]ropositional theology presupposes that narratives are
dispensable portrayals of religious faith,”103 but it is true that the theological value of
narrative as narrative has often been underappreciated. In the feminist theologies listed
“narrativity” of a sort is important (the female experience of patriarchal oppression), but
the biblical narratives themselves are not regarded as an authoritative source because of
their provenance in patriarchal cultures and their centuries-long use to legitimate
patriarchy.104

103. Tilley, Story Theology, 12.
104. In Redeeming the Dream: Feminism, Redemption and the Christian Tradition, Mary
Grey repeatedly acknowledges the importance of myths for the formation of human thinking
about matters such as sin and redemption. To that end she makes frequent reference to narrative
episodes from ancient mythology and contemporary literature that she feels illustrate her point.
Curiously absent is much reference to biblical narrative episodes, except occasionally to propose
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Interestingly, there are movements in both of these theologies that suggest that
more robust appropriation of the biblical narratives may be possible. In addition to
changes within evangelical theology with respect to epistemology,105 there is
considerable interest in the practice of the “theological interpretation of Scripture” within
evangelical circles. This cross-disciplinary movement is bringing biblical scholars and
theologians into closer contact and bodes well for the theological appropriation of
“forgotten” aspects of the biblical text. What is more, fresh thinking is being done in
evangelical circles about the relationship between narrative and historicity in an effort to
retain the high view of the historical accuracy of Scripture without sacrificing the literary
component. For their part, feminist biblical scholars, in an effort to unmask the abuse of
biblical texts in service of oppression, have given detailed attention to biblical narratives,
in some cases applying some of the tools of narrative criticism. One thinks of the work of
J. Cheryl Exum106 and Phyllis Trible.107 While for neither of these theological streams is
the pure narrative theological approach likely to be an option, an increased appropriation
of narrative modes of thought beginning with more conscientiously narrative approaches
to biblical texts is not an impossibility.

a more suitable form of the story. (Mary Grey, Redeeming the Dream: Feminism, Redemption
and Christian Tradition [London: SPCK, 1989]).
105. Steven Sherman surveys some warming of evangelicals to a chastened epistemology
and cites Kevin Vanhoozer, Robert Webber, and John Franke as examples. See Steven Sherman,
Revitalizing Theological Epistemology (Eugene, Or.: Pickwick, 2008).
106. See especially J. Cheryl Exum, Tragedy and Biblical Narrative: Arrows of the
Almighty; J. Cheryl Exum, Fragmented Women: Feminist (Sub)Versions of Biblical Narratives,
JSOT. Supplement Series (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1993).
107. Phyllis Trible, Texts of Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives,
Overtures to Biblical Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984).
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STORIES OF SIN, SELF, AND THE SAVIOR:
THE SCOPE AND DIRECTION OF THIS PROJECT

After this survey of the status of the theology of sin and the rise of the importance
of narrative a fundamental question remains to be asked. Have theological discussions
and definitions of sin taken adequate account of narrative modes of thought and
specifically the presentation of sin in biblical narrative? How might a narrative sensitive
reading of specific biblical narratives offer a better depiction of human sinfulness for use
in both theological and pastoral applications? In this dissertation we propose to
demonstrate the effects on a theology of sin of non-narrative approaches to the biblical
narrative and the theological task and then to move from an examination of the narrative
development of sin in one set of narratives to appropriating those insights into the
development of a narrative sensitive description of sin.
While some have regarded narrative theology as a passing fad, there is little doubt
that there is at least a lingering sense that biblical narrative has been insufficiently tapped
for its theological potential. Paul House’s attitude is reflective of a growing consensus
and the perspective of this dissertation: “I believe in narrative theology in the sense that I
am convinced that narrative analysis yields theological data that involves readers in the
biblical story in a unique and telling way. To be more specific, how the Bible itself
depicts God, Israel, and other primary characters through statements, settings, and events
can lead interpreters to legitimate and accurate theological comments that come from the
text itself.”108 We propose to offer just such a narrative analysis with a view to

108. Paul R. House, “Examining the Narratives of Old Testament Narrative: An
Exploration in Biblical Theology,” Westminster Theological Journal 67 (2005): 230.
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discovering those “accurate theological comments” from the text that will help balance
overly discursive approaches.

The Structure of the Argument

Critique of Non-Narratival Theologies of Sin

First, to demonstrate the shortcomings of non-narrative sensitive approaches to
defining sin we will examine in detail the work of two feminist theologians (chapter two)
and two evangelical theologians (chapter three). These will be compared and contrasted
and their strengths, weaknesses and presuppositions will be addressed. In particular we
will observe how narrative modes of thought and specific biblical narratives have—or
have not—played a role in their theology of sin.
For feminist theology the work of Mary Daly and Rita Nakashima Brock will
figure prominently. Mary Daly’s work is important for two reasons. First, in Daly’s
theology one encounters a full expression of feminist theology. Daly took the feminist
methodologies to what she saw as their logical conclusion—the rejection of Christianity.
If there is an epistemological and methodological deficiency of the order that we are
suggesting, such a bold statement of feminist thought should put it in stark relief. Second,
Daly’s specific definition of sin and salvation as the obstruction and reclamation of selfnaming is particularly ripe for comparison with the biblical narrative description. As a
complement to Daly’s approach I will also consider the work of Rita Nakashima Brock.
Brock makes a good dialogue partner for several reasons. First, her work is from an
Asian-American perspective which highlights the diversity within feminist theology.
Second, in one work in particular, Proverbs of Ashes, Brock and co-author Rebecca Ann
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Parker seek to engage in theological reflection on redemption (and by extension, sin) in
an intentionally non-discursive mode through the use of personal narratives. Finally,
since behind some of the concern of this dissertation is the loss of sin language in popular
culture it is noteworthy that several of Brock’s works are written to appeal to a wider
audience than the academic community alone.
To examine the role of narrative in the theology of sin of evangelical theology in
chapter three I will consider the work of one standard systematic theology—Systematic
Theology by Wayne Grudem109—as well as a more focused work, The Fall and Sin:
What We Have Become as Sinners by Marguerite Shuster.110 Grudem’s work is relevant
not for its scholarly rigor nor because it is particularly representative of what is
happening in academic evangelical theology but because it typifies the early-modern
methodology of generations of evangelical theologians even as it remains extremely
popular at both the seminary and lay levels. Even if it can be argued that there has been
movement in evangelical theology as a result of postmodern critique and in light of
narrative theology more specifically, it has not “trickled down” to the pew or even the
pulpit. Shuster’s work, a recent book-length treatment of sin, is a valuable contribution to
the discussion because she represents a more “liberal” strain of evangelical theology,
comfortable with more mythological readings of Genesis and the complementarity of
biblical revelation with scientific theory. In particular we will attempt to discern what
role, if any, narrativity and specifically the biblical narratives play in their theology of
sin.

109. Grudem, Systematic Theology.
110. Shuster, Fall and Sin.
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What we will discover is that the renderings of sin proposed by these theologies,
derived as they are using modernist methods and founded on modern epistemologies, are
insufficiently attentive to the importance of narrative modes of thought in theologizing.
Further, in their definition of sin, they often almost completely ignore the witness of the
biblical narrative—both individual narratives and the Bible’s overall narrative structure.
While one particular narrative, the so-called “fall” narrative of Genesis 3 has long figured
prominently in theological reflection on sin (e.g. reflection on Genesis 3 was central to
Augustine’s description of sin as pride) this text is often appropriated in ways that
actually subvert the narrative as narrative. As a narrative it works as a whole whereas its
appropriation in a theology of sin is usually done without reference to its broader context
(evangelicals) or is discarded or “transvalued” (feminists).111 These theologies therefore
offer thin descriptions of the human condition and consequently distorted pictures of
redemption, humanity, and the divine–human relationship.
What is particularly lacking in both of these theologies of sin (and evident in their
handling of the biblical narrative) is any way to handle continuity between the past and
present that allows for development. Their epistemologies depend upon fixed notions of
the human (feminists) and revelation (evangelicals) that remain unchanged across time.
The narratives are approached as myth (feminists) or history (evangelicals) in ways that
overlook their narrative character. Their definitions of sin, while capturing certain aspects

111. Meir Sternberg diagnoses the lack of attention to context as a primary cause of
misunderstanding of narrative when writing that the underlying questions regarding the narrator’s
intent are not recognized more fully “is largely due to the tendency to read biblical texts out of
communicative context, with little regard for what they set out to achieve and the exigencies
attaching to its achievement. Elements thus get divorced from the very terms of reference that
assign to them their role and meaning: parts from wholes, means from ends, forms from
functions. Nothing could be less productive and more misleading.” Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical
Narrative, 1–2.
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of the human situation with startling clarity, are nonetheless insufficient and speak less
than prophetically in the current intellectual milieu.

Narratives of Sin and the Narrativity of Sin
Of theological interpretation of narrative Ronald Thiemann writes, “Theologians
have often been criticized for imposing upon Scripture grand interpretive schemes which
ignore or violate the structures of biblical texts. Theological interpretation of narrative, if
it is to avoid that danger, must be characterized by close textual analysis guided by clear
textual warrants. Such analysis requires in turn a limitation of the material discussed.”112
In chapter four we will essay to follow this advice as we engage in a reading of Genesis
3–11 with specific emphasis on the episodes that narrate sin. Our focus will be upon how
the narrative depicts sin: what is the reference point of sin? who is it against? how, if at
all, does sin develop in the narrative? We will observe that when read as a whole a more
multi-faceted view of sin is developed than that in Genesis 3 alone. Sin is not easily
reduced to either side of the polarities involved. Furthermore, sin is presented not as a
fixed concept but as one that develops in relationship to humanity. Most importantly, we
will propose that the clearest reference point for sin is neither God directly nor the other
but is the description of the human as created in the image of God, relational, and
commissioned, an identity that the narratives depict humanity beginning to live into. We
will further observe that rather than depicting humanity and sin as fixed realities, these
foundational narratives present humanity and sin in a dance of development:
advancement in one area challenging the other.
112. Ronald F. Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987, c1985), 114.
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Using the insights gained in this narrative reading, in chapter five we will propose
key elements of a narrative depiction of the nature of sin and bring it into dialogue with
the systematic approaches discussed earlier to demonstrate how such a reading would
strengthen or reframe those positions. We will see that a concept of sin related to the
depiction of the human as the imago dei as a narrated reality enriches sin-talk and offers
ways to link the definition of sin more directly to Christ. We will conclude that rather
than offering myths of the original sin or illustrations of a fixed concept of sin, the
narratives of Genesis 3–11 serve as types of sin that narrate humanity’s character and
depict sin rather than define it.
Finally, as we revisit the flow of the argument in chapter 6 we will conclude with
proposals about the direction of further study. We will suggest that the more multifaceted
depiction of sin that such a reading provides offers a more diverse vocabulary for use in
pastoral (and apologetic) applications in a cultural and social context where the
traditional language of sin as pride and disobedience have lost their voice. The ultimate
goal is to offer a depiction of human sinfulness that speaks more adequately of and to the
human situation by way of the types of sin portrayed in the expanded fall narrative.

The Limits of the Study

Any study investigating a topic so broad as sin, so current as narrative theology,
and so endlessly debated as the primeval history must necessarily limit itself. As
Thiemann suggests we must restrict the textual focus. For us it will be Genesis 3–11. A
fully developed narrative theology of sin would want to consider many other narratives
such as Israel’s resistance of Yahweh’s covenant advances in the later Pentateuch or
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perhaps the sinful decline observable in the book of Judges.113 But the significant role
that these narratives play in the overarching narrative of sin and redemption warrants the
narrowness of our focus. While a fuller defense of this selection will await a later chapter,
suffice it to say that it is the opinion of many that Genesis 3–11 uniquely depicts human
sinfulness. One example will suffice: “In contrast with this [the Old Testament’s lack of
theorizing about sin], the Jahwist’s great hamartiology in Gen. III-XI about the way in
which sin broke in and spread like an avalanche is undoubtedly something exceptional:
for never again did Israel speak in such universal terms of sin as exemplified in
standardized models, and yet at the same time in such great detail.”114
For the purposes of this study we will approach the finished form of the biblical
text and not engage in the discussions of source, redaction, authorship or dating.115 Since
narrative approaches do give consideration to the implied author and readers we may
have cause to comment on author or narrator in that sense. Furthermore, we will not
engage the debates surrounding the historicity of the primeval narrative. Since our
analysis is primarily narrative some important exegetical issues may be bracketed or
relegated to the footnotes.
We must be modest about what contribution this dissertation might make to a
systematic hamartiology. As Stephen Fowl notes, “In terms of biblical interpretation,
113. For instance, both K. Lawson Younger (Judges and Ruth, The NIV Application
Commentary [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002]) and Daniel I. Block (Judges, Ruth, The New
American Commentary, vol. 6 [Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1999]) argue
that the theme of Judges is the sinful decline of Israel to the moral status of Canaanites.
114. Gerhard von Rad, The Theology of Israel’s Historical Traditions, vol. 1 of Old
Testament Theology, trans. D.M.G Stalker (Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 2005), 154.
115. Some feminist efforts at reclaiming sexist narratives appeal to the compositional
history of the text suggesting that earlier versions of the story may not have evinced the
patriarchal bias of the current form of the text. This approach can be found beyond biblical
interpretation as, for instance, Mary Grey speculates on the possibility of earlier, less patriarchal
versions of Greek myths. See Grey, Redeeming the Dream: Feminism, Redemption and Christian
Tradition.
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being able to identify oneself as a sinner injects a crucial element of provisionality into
one’s interpretive practices.”116 That is to say that as a sinner one should expect one’s
interpretation of Scripture (and perhaps especially one’s interpretation of passages about
sin?) to be partial if not distorted.117 What is more, a fully-orbed systematic theology of
sin would have many more elements to take into consideration beyond the narrative
depiction of sin. There is certainly a place for word studies, analysis of the metaphors
(along the lines of Anderson’s study, see below), context and genre sensitive exegesis of
other biblical corpora, etc.

Relationship to Recent Studies

At least two recent studies are animated by similar concerns and traverse
overlapping territory with this dissertation. It behooves us to distinguish this project from
theirs. These are Gary A. Anderson’s 2009 book Sin: A History118 and Robert Gonzales’s
recent book Where Sin Abounds: The Spread of Sin and the Curse in Genesis with
Special Focus on the Patriarchal Narratives.119 Both deal with sin and the biblical
narratives in some detail.
In Sin: A History, Gary A. Anderson attempts to identify and trace the dominant
metaphors for sin in Scripture. In particular he argues that one can identify a shift in the
116. Stephen E. Fowl, Engaging Scripture: A Model for Theological Interpretation,
Challenges in Contemporary Theology. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 82.
117. For a discussion of various models of the noetic effects of sin see Stephen K.
Moroney, “How Sin Affects Scholarship: A New Model,” Christian Scholars Review 28 (Spring
1999): 432–51. On Emil Brunner’s model, one expects the effects to be most severe in matters of
theology. It seems reasonable to suggest that the noetic effects of sin might be most severe on
our understanding of sin! (Though Moroney ultimately suggests that our perceptions of God are
more effected than our knowledge of self.)
118. Gary A. Anderson, Sin: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
119. Robert Gonzales, Where Sin Abounds: The Spread of Sin and the Curse in Genesis
with Special Focus on the Patriarchal Narratives (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers,
2010).
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primary metaphor of sin in Scripture from “sin as weight” to “sin as debt”. He further
links this shift in thinking to a shift in primary concepts of atonement and ultimately to
the practice of almsgiving. Anderson’s work is a valuable contribution to biblical and
systematic theology. Specifically, any comprehensive theology of sin would be wellserved to consider his careful treatment of the biblical metaphors for sin and what the
metaphors for sin contribute to a biblical or systematic theology of sin. In fact, the
biblical tendency to speak of sin metaphorically, like its preference for narrative
presentation, further supports the contention that sin is resistant to definition much less
reduction to an essence. What is more, Anderson raises the issue of theological
development, a question that any attempt at narrative theology must reckon with. If there
is discernible development in a theological idea in Scripture, how does one rightly
appropriate the earlier material? In considering the metaphors, Anderson has helpfully
moved the discussion beyond mere word studies. However, as important as metaphors
may be in capturing human experience and depicting sin, there is a fuller picture to be
seen by considering how narratives of sin depict the human condition, not only the
metaphors to which the condition gets reduced.
Closer to our project is Robert Gonzales’s recent book Where Sin Abounds: The
Spread of Sin and the Curse in Genesis with Special Focus on the Patriarchal Narratives.
Gonzales argues that sin is a major theme throughout the narratives of Genesis, not just in
chapters 3–11. He proceeds to examine the treatment of sin through the patriarchal
narratives to trace the spread of sin. While we will have much cause to interact with
Gonzales’s work, this project differs from Gonzales’s in distinct ways. First, whereas
Gonzales claims that too much attention has been paid to sin in the primeval narratives to
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the detriment of the patriarchal depiction, it is my contention that insufficient theological
use has been made of the presentation of sin in the primeval narrative because of a too
restrictive focus on Genesis 3 as a fall narrative. Second, Gonzales admits that the
breadth of his study disallows attention to “literary devices or the overall structure of the
patriarchal narrative”120 whereas our approach trades on the notion that the theological
import of the passages cannot be safely separated from the literary elements. In short,
both of these works do important biblical groundwork without approaching too explicitly
the systematic theological task.
Two dissertations also address themes similar to our project. Margaret Dee
Brachter’s dissertation “The Pattern of Sin and Judgment in Genesis 1–11” is
characterized by careful literary attention to the primeval narrative.121 Through an
analysis of structure and plot she attempts to discern a pattern to the way the stories of sin
and judgment play out. While Brachter’s attention to details of narrative and plot will
prove useful to our investigation, her work is more strictly literary and does not bring her
conclusions into meaningful dialogue with a theology of sin. Harold Shank’s 1988
dissertation focuses more narrowly on the depiction of sin in the Cain and Abel
episode.122 Having set this episode within the context of the theme of Genesis 1–11
which he discerns to be “the self-limitation of God” Shank concludes that the Cain-Abel
episode does not contribute to a story-line of the spread of sin, but rather to the
aforementioned theme of God’s self-limitation. Once again we may have cause to interact

120. Ibid., 14.
121. Margaret Dee Brachter, “The Pattern of Sin and Judgment in Genesis 1–11,” Ph.D.
diss. (Louisville, KY: The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1984).
122. Harold Shank, “The Sin Theology of the Cain and Abel Story: An Analysis of
Narrative Themes Within the Context of Genesis 1–11,” Ph.D. diss. (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette
University, 1988).
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with some of Shank’s literary work, but our thesis will differ from his substantially. Like
Brachter, Shank’s work does not attempt to make theological use of the discovery.
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CHAPTER 2

SIN, SELF, AND STORY IN THE FEMINIST THEOLOGY
OF MARY DALY AND RITA NAKASHIMA BROCK

Unlike some strands of Christian theology, sin has occupied a place of importance
in feminist theology from the discipline’s inception. Serene Jones goes so far as to say,
[N]o single topic in Christian theology has more resonance with feminist
theory than the much disdained topic of sin...feminist theory is based upon
the belief that the oppression of women is profoundly wrong, that the
world is not as it should be, and that the brokenness we experience cuts
deep into our social fabric and has done so for a long time. This
recognition of the pervasive, insidious, and historically persistent forces of
destruction at work in the world sits at the heart of the feminist
movement.”1
Despite this centrality, what sin is and what role it plays in feminist theology varies from
theologian to theologian.
Many trace the origin of feminist theology to a 1960 article by Valerie Saiving
that addressed the deficiencies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Anders Nygren’s definitions of
sin.2 Saiving judged that Niebuhr’s definition of sin as prideful self-magnification failed
to take into account women’s experience. Saiving rooted her critique in an assessment of
the distinct modes of being unique to males and females. She wrote, “In a sense,
masculinity is an endless process of becoming, while in femininity the emphasis is on
being.”3 This distinction she linked to the inherent passivity of the female bodily
experiences of menstruation, pregnancy, and menopause. Accordingly she proposed that

1. Serene Jones, Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: Cartographies of Grace,
Guides to Theological Inquiry. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 96.
2. Valerie Saiving, “The Human Situation: A Feminine View,” in Womanspirit Rising: A
Feminist Reader in Religion, Carol P. and Judith Plaskow Christ (New York: HarperCollins,
1979), 25–42.
3. Saiving, “The Human Situation: A Feminine View,” 32.

52
the fundamental forms of female temptation were different than those of males whose
identity is primarily developed through action. She concluded:
For the temptations of woman as woman are not the same as the
temptations of man as man, and the specifically feminine forms of
sin...have a quality which can never be encompassed by such terms as
‘pride’ and ‘will-to-power.’ They are better suggested by such items as
triviality, distractibility, and diffuseness; lack of an organizing center or
focus; dependence on others for one’s own self-definition; tolerance at the
expense of standards of excellence; inability to respect the boundaries of
privacy; sentimentality, gossipy sociability, and mistrust of reason—in
short, underdevelopment or negation of the self.4
As important for feminist theology as her specific critique of sin was Saiving’s
approach. Her criticism was not that Niebuhr’s definition failed to ring true to the biblical
witness nor the Christian tradition. In fact, in naming sin as pride Saiving acknowledged
that Niebuhr was squarely in the tradition dating back to Augustine. Instead, she judged
that Niebuhr’s definition failed to resonate with female experience. The problem of a
partial definition of sin stemmed from an insufficiently developed anthropology, an
anthropology that failed to assess male and female human experience differently.
Saiving’s solution sought to root a more female understanding of sin in a more accurate
understanding of the female, that is, on a different anthropology. In her case it was an
experience-based approach to anthropology that suggested that there was as much (or
more) different about males and females as the same.
Others soon followed Saiving’s lead.5 In particular, in Sex, Sin, and Grace, Judith
Plaskow expanded upon several of Saiving’s ideas.6 While expressing in more detail the

4. Ibid., 37.
5. Somewhat curiously Susan Nelson Dunfee offered a very similar critique of Niebuhr
some twenty years later that makes no reference whatsoever to Saiving’s article. Comparing
Dunfee’s piece to Saiving’s does reveal the development of feminist theology, however, as
Dunfee utilizes themes and language now common to feminist theology only nascent in Saiving’s
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distinct ways of being human unique to males and females Plaskow was careful to note
that rather than speaking of mutually exclusive gender experience categories “feminine
experience reveals in a more emphatic fashion certain aspects of the human situation
which are present but less obvious in the experience of men.”7 Accordingly, her claim
was that Niebuhr and Tillich were guilty of reductionism and her goal was a more holistic
definition of sin better attuned to the human condition.8 Like Saiving, Plaskow’s
complaint about Niebuhr’s definition of sin was an anthropological one. She judged that
Niebuhr, by failing to render rightly the nature of human persons as male and female, had
erred in his definition of sin and its essence. The solution, therefore, was a corrected
anthropology. We should note, however, that this implied a different epistemology, an
approach to knowing that privileged human experience as the source of knowledge.
As Plaskow expanded Saiving’s critique, so many other feminist theologians
critiqued and developed those early feminist theological stirrings, especially as it related
to the understanding of humans and sin. By 1978 Wanda Warren Berry could survey
several distinct feminist hamartiologies.9 As the feminist theological movement grew it
gave birth to other disciplines such as womanist and mujerista theology with their distinct

critique. (Susan Nelson Dunfee, “The Sin of Hiding: A Feminist Critique of Reinhold Niebuhr’s
Account of the Sin of Pride,” Soundings 65 [Fall 1982]: 316–27).
6. Judith Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace: Women’s Experience and the Theologies of
Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich (Washington: University Press of America, 1980).
7. Ibid., 5.
8. As Saiving, Plaskow and Dunfee are quick to point out there are places in Niebuhr’s
treatment of sin where he acknowledges a certain two-sidedness to human sinfulness. The reverse
of sin as pride for Niebuhr is sin as sensuality. All three claim, however, that Niebuhr ultimately
subsumes sin as sensuality under sin as pride and proposes a single antidote—self-sacrificial love.
9. Wanda Warren Berry, “Images of Sin and Salvation in Feminist Theology,” Anglican
Theological Review LX, no. 1 (1978): 25–54 Berry surveyed the work of Rosemary Radford
Reuther, Mary Daly, and Letty Russel.
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viewpoints.10 In 2000 Mary Elise Lowe offered a status quaestionis on feminist theology
and sin, surveying the work of several theologians: Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sally
McFague, Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, Angela West, Linda Mercandante, Delores S.
Williams, Mary Potter Engel, and Mary McClintock Fulkerson.11 As part of her
examination and critique she categorized their approaches. She suggested that Ruether,
McFague, and Suchocki represented relational or panentheistic approaches to sin as
opposed to the theistic approaches of West and Mercandante. She saw both Williams and
Engel working from distinct social contexts, namely those of black women and victims of
abuse respectively. As a result of her post-modern, post-structuralist, discourse-analysis
approach to reconceptualizing sin Fulkerson was categorized alone. These diverse
methodologies generate diverse hamartiologies. Lowe’s article (including responses in
the same volume from many of her interlocutors) is a helpful map of many of the issues
in feminist theology both in sin-talk and beyond.
As we see, sin, or at least a critique of the traditional understanding of sin, has
been important in the feminist theological project from the outset. At the core of this
critique—both of definitions of sin specifically and of the theological enterprise more
broadly—is a repudiation of an androcentric approach to the theological task that neglects
or even suppresses the distinct human experience of women. Though few if any feminists
reference Menninger’s work it is clear that feminist theology is concerned about the state

10. By 1993 Christine Smith’s survey of sin in feminist thought had to interact with far
more proposals from distinct contexts: Carter Heyward (lesbian theology), Rita Nakashima Brock
(Asian-American feminism), Mary Potter Engel (victims of abuse), Karen Lebacqz (feminist
ethics), Katie Cannon (womanist), and Beverly Wildung Harrison. (Christine M. Smith, “Sin and
Evil in Feminist Thought,” Theology Today 50, no. 2 [1993]: 208–19).
11. Mary Elise Lowe, “Woman Oriented Hamartiologies: A Survey of the Shift from
Powerlessness to Right Relationship,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 39, no. 2 (Summer
2000): 119–39.

55
of sin-talk in the church and culture. From Saiving’s article onward, central to the
feminist critique of classic sin-talk is the assertion that the very way theology has spoken
about sin has not only failed to take female experience into consideration but has itself
served to further the extent of true sin—the oppression of women. For them the regnant
lexicon of sin is part of the problem. As Rachel Sophia Baard points out, several feminist
theologians refer to this sinful sin-talk as the fall or “original sin”, thus “making use of a
classic hamartiological notion, one that they have criticized as oppressive to women, to
deepen their very critique of classic sin-talk.”12 As we will see, however, though
employing some of the classic categories of sin-talk, feminist theologians are less
sanguine about the usefulness of classic narratives of sin.
Feminist theologians have been clear about the anthropological basis of their
critique of classic sin-talk. That is, their understanding of the meaning of sin is tied very
closely with their understanding of what it means to be a human self. Indeed,
anthropology is the controlling feature of their theology and sin-talk a subset thereof.
They contend that a poor view of the human makes for lackluster language about sin and
salvation. The question remains, however, as to whether feminist theology has itself
offered an adequate anthropology. In particular, have feminist theologians moved beyond
modernist assumptions about the nature of humans and the role of human experience in
knowing?
Postmodern thinking has destabilized any essentialist notions of the human and
similar totalizing categories. Along with that critique has been the realization of the
inherently narratival structure of experience and particularly of the development of the
12. Rachel Sophia Baard, “Constructive Feminist Critiques of Classic Sin-Talk: A
Rhetorical Reading,” Ph.D. diss. (Princeton Theological Seminary, 2004), 160.
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self. This aspect of the narrative turn raises the questions that are the concern of this
chapter. What role have narrativity and the particular narratives of Scripture played in the
feminist theologians’ development of a definition and doctrine of sin? And how is this
borne out in their use of biblical narrative and the narratives of Genesis 1–11 in
particular? In departing from the narrow definitions that they find in the tradition do they
move to something more in keeping with the narrative development of humans and
humanity? In this chapter I propose to analyze the work of two feminist theologians on
sin: Mary Daly and Rita Nakashima Brock. After examining their approach to the issue
of the self and sin and their definition of sin in particular I will critique their method and
conclusions from a narrative perspective. What role does an awareness of the narrative
nature of human experience play in their thought? How does the overarching narrative or
dramatic structure of Scripture influence their position? Finally, how, if at all, do the
biblical narratives regarding sin play a role in their theologizing about sin?
Daly and Brock are good interlocutors because they not only offer different
definitions of sin, but they also offer differing anthropologies. Daly operates with more
essentialist categories in her description of the human person and therefore sin while
Brock prefers a more relational approach to anthropology. Further, Daly’s work is cast in
a more academic vein while Brock clearly writes with a popular reader in mind.
As we consider these definitions of sin from feminist theology our question from
chapter one remains. Do these definitions of sin speak effectively to the contemporary
human self-understanding? In particular, do they reflect an awareness of the important
narrative component in human experience and self-understanding? What we hope to
show is that while the definitions of sin offered in feminist theology do succeed in
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shining light on certain aspects of the human condition, they ultimately fail to offer
compelling sin-talk for two reasons one material and one formal but both related to
narrative. First, they begin with reductionist depictions of the human person and the
process of human knowing. That is, they fail to offer compelling definitions of sin for the
same reason that they have critiqued traditional definitions. Second, they move
unidirectionally from this anthropology to definitions of sin rather than recognizing the
mutually forming and informing relationship between sin and human self-understanding,
a reciprocal relationship captured best in narrative and in particular in the biblical
narrative.

SIN, SELF, AND STORY IN THE THEOLOGY OF MARY DALY

For several decades Mary Daly was at the forefront of feminist theology. One can
almost follow the trajectory of the feminist theological movement in miniature in tracing
the path of Mary Daly’s development as a feminist theologian.13 Between each of her
first few works of feminist theology one can detect significant shifts. As a result,
discussing her work is an exercise in correlating later work to earlier.14 Her first work of
feminist theology, The Church and the Second Sex, exposed sexism both in Catholic
practice and in doctrine. Her proposals for realignment of particular church doctrines and
practices were modest. The negative reaction to her book, however, prompted the more

13. Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki says of Mary Daly that “[h]er works span—and arguably
inaugurate—the past three decades of feminist reconsideration of God” (“The Idea of God in
Feminist Philosophy,” Hypatia 9, no. 4 [October 1994]: 58).
14. Daly does a bit of this correlating herself in forwards and epilogues to reprints of her
earlier works. In fact, her “Feminist Postchristian Introduction” and “New Archaic Afterward” to
the 1985 publication of her groundbreaking work The Church and the Second Sex (originally
published in 1968) treats the Mary Daly of that text as naive about the possibility of continued
relationship with Christianity.
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thorough critique and reworking of traditional theological methods and teachings that one
encounters in Beyond God the Father. In Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy, as
the title suggests, Daly cast her net beyond theology to apply her tools of feminist critique
and construction to philosophy.15 Though mainstream feminist theology and Mary Daly
eventually parted ways, her influence on feminist theology is difficult to overstate.
Mary Daly’s Methodology and Anthropology

Daly offers her first definition of sin in Beyond God the Father. Since the feminist
critique of traditional definitions of sin is fundamentally an anthropological one it is no
surprise that her definition of sin is closely linked to her understanding of what it means
to be human, that is, to her theological anthropology. As we examine her work our
question is two-fold. First we must consider the adequacy of Daly’s definition of human
nature. Then we will consider the definition of sin that she derives from that
understanding of human nature and ask whether she has rightly rendered the relationship
between sin and human nature. In particular we are concerned to see if and how Daly’s
definition of self and sin accord with the narrative character of human experience and the
biblical narratives.
For Daly, to be human is to have the power to name.16 “To exist humanly is to
name the self, the world, and God. The ‘method’ of the evolving spiritual consciousness

15. Daly held doctoral degrees in both theology and philosophy.
16. Daly does not explicitly connect this capacity for self-naming to humanity’s creation
in the image of God. However, this approach to anthropology, rooting the nature of humanity in
some capacity, is reminiscent of positions on the significance of the imago dei that root it in
particular human capacities such as language and reason. Borrowing language from Emil
Brunner, Stanley Grenz refers to this type of approach to the imago dei as a “structural” approach
because it refers to something embedded in the structure of human nature. He contrasts this with
relational approaches to the image of God and offers a survey of the development of the doctrine.
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of women is nothing less than this beginning to speak humanly—a reclaiming of the right
to name.”17 Naming is not merely a matter of denomination but rather is an act of selfrealization. “Naming is a verb that evokes and that is a process of active Realizing.”18 To
exist humanly is to have and to exercise the ability to self-actualize through the “naming”
of self, world, and God.
Though humanity possesses this power of self-actualization, the exercise of it is
threatened by a deeper problem: the danger of nothingness. At the core of humanity’s
problem for Daly is a conflict between the potential for self-identification and the desire
for security. This desire for security arises from the threat of nothingness.19 In search for
a personal identity, a significance to ward off nothingness, many succumb to the
temptation of security and accept stultifying, pre-packaged identities. Of this conflict
Daly writes:
The only alternative is self-actualization in spite of the ever-present
nothingness. Part of the problem is that people, women in particular, who
are seemingly incapable of a high degree of self-actualization have been
made such by societal structures that are products of human attempts to
create security. Those who are alienated from their own deepest identity
do receive a kind of security in return for accepting very limited and
undifferentiated identities. The woman who single-mindedly accepts the
role of ‘housewife,’ for example, may to some extent avoid the experience
of nothingness but she also avoids a fuller participation in being, which
would be her only real security and source of community.20

Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago
Dei, Matrix of Christian Theology, vol. 1. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 142.
17. Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 8.
18. Mary Daly, Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press,
1984), 203.
19. Daly reveals and acknowledges a dependence on Paul Tillich’s discussion of
humanity’s anxiety in the face of “non-being.”
20. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 23.
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As will be seen below, it is patriarchal society’s penchant for sexual stereotypes that
perpetuates the restricting of women to roles that offer security but not “full participation
in being.”21
Mary Daly’s Theology of Sin

As with other aspects of her theology, one can observe a development in Mary
Daly’s understanding of sin from her early to later work. In a way, sin is programmatic
for Daly’s theology as the drive to expose it in its many forms informs several of her
books. Despite the fact that she denounces traditional theology and renounces traditional
methodologies, her “doctrine of sin” bears an uncanny resemblance at least structurally to
traditional formulations. That is, one can identify the notion of a “fall”, a correlate to the
doctrine of total depravity, and a version of the noetic effects of the fall.

Defining Sin
Daly’s fundamental definition of sin is built directly off of her understanding of
the nature of humans. Since to be human is to self-name, sin is false-naming. Yet very
early it becomes clear that the sin of false-naming is not something that characterizes all
humans in the same way. Rather, in Daly’s thinking, one group of humans are guilty of
21. In addressing the conflict between self-actualization and the desire for security Daly
takes up issues that Anthony Giddens presents as endemic to the experience of the self in
modernity. Daly may be speaking generally of how security and self have operated in humanity
throughout history, but her focus is clearly on the current cultural milieu. What Giddens’s
treatment offers that Daly’s does not is the notion of a trade-off between “ontological security and
existential anxiety.” Giddens sees the formation of the human self in a reflexive relation
depending upon but also differentiating itself from the institutions that offer it “ontological
security.” Daly presents the individual (woman) with an either/or option. Either one capitulates to
the pre-packaged identity or one self-actualizes, self-names. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and
Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1991), 35.
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false-naming themselves, the world, God, and most importantly, the other group of
humans. Namely, men are guilty of the sin of mis-naming and women are the primary
victims. Daly claims that “it is necessary to grasp the fundamental fact that women have
had the power of naming stolen from us. We have not been free to use our own power to
name ourselves, the world, or God.”22 The result is that women have been systematically
excluded from participation in the fullness of human existence.23 Daly’s several books
detail the various areas of human concern in which this has been the case.
An important feature of Daly’s understanding of sin is its systemic expression.
For Daly, the problem of false-naming is not primarily individual acts perpetrated against
women. Rather it characterizes an entire system and way of thought that prevents women
from full self-actualization. This patriarchal system is indeed enforced by individual acts
but extends much deeper. This system of false-naming works by acting on women in
deep psychological ways. Women are systematically excluded from society and selfnaming by corrupt institutions and cultural expectations. Several of Daly’s books detail
these institutions. She cites such cultural practices as Indian widow-burning, Chinese
foot-binding, and female genital mutilation. She likewise critiques technical knowledge
systems, health professionals (both physical and psychological), and academia as
participating in the perpetuation of systems that deny women their rightful human power
of self-naming.

22. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 8.
23. In defining full humanity as freedom to self-name and sin as the denial of it, Daly is
ahead of many other feminist theologians who, like her, insist that women have been denied full
humanity, yet unlike her, without ever defining what they understand full humanity to be. As we
will see, Daly’s definition is problematic but it is at least consistent.
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Original Sin

As was suggested, Daly repurposes elements of traditional theological sin-talk in
her theology. While many have jettisoned the notion of original sin, Daly finds the idea
still useful though different for males and females. The original sin of patriarchy is the
pinning of human sinfulness on women. That is, Daly points directly to the narrative of
Genesis 3, the so-called “fall narrative”, as the heart of patriarchy’s sin. She writes:
Theologians and scholars generally have failed to confront the fact that in
the myth of the Fall the medium is the message. Reflection upon its
specific content and the cultural residues of this content leads to the
conviction that, partially through this instrument, the Judeo-Christian
tradition has been aiding and abetting the sicknesses of society. In a real
sense the projection of guilt upon women is patriarchy’s Fall, the
primordial lie. Together with its offspring—the theology of ‘original
sin’—the myth reveals the ‘Fall’ of religion into the role of patriarchy’s
prostitute.”24
Echoing Valerie Saiving’s work, Daly declares that the “original sin” for women
is not pride or false-naming but rather the acceptance of patriarchal society’s depiction of
women as evil. “The first salvific moment for any woman comes when she perceives the
reality of her ‘original sin,’ that is, internalization of blame and guilt.”25 Whereas Saiving
saw women tempted to diffuseness and triviality, Daly sees them beholden to inhuman
views of themselves.
Of course, the method of transmission of original sin has been a perpetual
discussion. But unlike some views whereby the taint of sin is inherited biologically, for
Daly sin is inherited through “socialization processes.” Daly deflects guilt for submission
to these socialization processes away from women: “The fault should not be seen as

24. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 47.
25. Ibid., 49.
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existing primarily in victimized individuals, but rather in demonic power structures which
induce individuals to internalize false identities.”26 A host of environmental issues, then,
are what cause women to mis-name themselves and others. Daly even goes so far as to
relate the distraction that societal structures cause in women’s self-actualization to evil.27
Evil is what distracts humans, and especially women, from actualizing their human
potential fully.

Noetic Effects of the Fall

To refer to the effects that human sinfulness has on human thinking and reasoning
theologians speak of the noetic effects of the fall. Because of sinfulness humans, though
capable of reason, are flawed in their reasoning. Mary Daly’s theology of sin includes a
similar notion. Due to the effects of cultural and societal structures women are incapable
of thinking rightly about their position and subjugated position. Patriarchy is such that “it
is inevitable that this artificial atmosphere be filled with subliminal messages intended to
incapacitate on deep psychic levels. These messages are designed to prevent women from
Realizing our Elemental potency.”28 Women are often unaware of these “deep psychic
levels” and the extent of the ways in which their perspective has been shaped by the
patriarchal societal structures.

26. Ibid.
27. “Years ago, Hannah Arendt wrote accurately of ‘the fearsome word-and-thoughtdefying banality of evil.’ I am suggesting here that banality itself can be evil, in the sense that
‘evil is whatever distracts.’” Daly, Pure Lust, 254.
28. Ibid., 153.
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Total Depravity

Naming, of course, means much more than mere denominating. For Daly, the
power of naming is the power of definition, of forming one’s identity, one’s very essence.
So patriarchal false-naming is an assault on the very personhood and humanity of
women. Further, false-naming implies the inaccurate construal of the world. According to
Daly, males have inaccurately named all aspects of our world. Daly believes that every
field of enquiry and every aspect of human life and thought has been touched by
patriarchal misnaming. This is an analogue to the reformed doctrine of total depravity.
The doctrine of total depravity holds that human fallenness and sin touch every aspect of
human thought and activity. Nothing is left pristinely untouched by sin’s stain.
Obviously, such a grim view of the extent of sin’s effects if left untempered by some
counter-doctrine of grace can issue forth in a pessimistic outlook on humanity. Indeed,
the tenor of much of Daly’s writing evinces such a pessimism.
The “Fall”

Mary Daly rejects traditional readings of Genesis 3 as a symptom of the problem
of sin rather than as an explanation of sin’s origin. However, as Rachel Sophia Baard
pointed out, Daly co-opts the language of “the Fall” for use in her theology. “This
movement beyond patriarchy’s good and evil can be seen mythically as ‘the Fall’—the
dreaded Fall which is now finally beginning to occur, in which women are bringing
ourselves and then the other half of the species to eat of the forbidden fruit—the
knowledge refused by patriarchal society. This will be a Fall from false innocence into a
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new kind of adulthood.”29 She goes on to summarize: “Rather than a Fall from the sacred,
the Fall now initiated by women becomes a Fall into the sacred and therefore into
freedom.”30

Applying the Definition

After developing the concept of sin as false naming Daly then uses this definition
to expose heretofore obscured aspects of sin in patriarchy. In naming the seven deadly
sins of lust, avarice, glutton, pride, anger, envy and sloth Daly claims that patriarchy has
misnamed sin in order to use the concept of sin and the specification of these particular
sins to misname and victimize women. Daly proposes renaming the sins of patriarchy, a
renaming based off of the original categories. First, Daly identifies the root problem,
namely a sin that patriarchy failed to name: deception. Patriarchal thought has deceived
itself into thinking it has rightly named the world, women, and sin.31 Pride she renames
“professions” by which she means the codification of bodies of technical knowledge that
only serve to stultify true human knowing. Avarice becomes possession, specifically the
male possession of female energy. Anger she renames aggression. She sees all male
violence aimed at women. Male lust she calls obsession. She rejects the negative
characterization of the word lust and reclaims it to refer positively to the pure female
conception of reality. This move is the focus of her work Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist
Philosophy. In this renaming gluttony is no longer a matter of physical consumption but
rather the manner by which patriarchy seeks to assimilate women to its ways effectively
29. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 67.
30. Ibid., (emphasis original).
31. Though Daly does not make the connection, it is of more than passing interest that in
the narrative of Genesis 3 it is the woman who excuses her partaking of the forbidden fruit by
claiming that she was deceived.
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devouring them. Envy, renamed elimination, is the attitude of patriarchal males toward
those females who seek to self-identify. Finally, sloth is recast as fragmentation, the
fragmentation of women’s identities by reducing them to busy work through the
enforcement of sexual stereotypes. Here Daly intersects with Saiving’s original
identification of female sin with sloth or triviality, though in Saiving’s work it was a
temptation for women and in Daly’s it is a sin by males of which women are the victims.
These eight sins are not so much identifiable in individual actions (though they certainly
may be) but are “incarnated in the institutions of patriarchy and in those who invent,
control, and legitimate these institutions.”32
Exposing these sins and the patriarchal institutions which support them becomes
programmatic for Daly as she herself explains in the introduction to Quintessence.
Gyn/Ecology started the discussion and treated the sins of processions (deception),
professions (pride), and possession (avarice) in particular. Pure Lust addresses aggression
(anger) and obsession (lust) exposing the sinful male versions of these behaviors and
calling women to life-giving anger and lust. Quintessence takes up the final three:
assimilation (gluttony), elimination (envy), and fragmentation (sloth). So it would be fair
to say that sin, understood as false naming of women and the world, stands at the center
of Mary Daly’s theology.
The final move in Daly’s demolition of traditional theologies of sin, those
theologies she brands as products of patriarchy, is to name what the patriarchal system
truly regards as sin, namely, the rising up of women to name themselves and the world.
Indeed, as the subtitle of her book Amazon Grace: Re-calling the Courage to Sin Big
32. Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1978), 31.
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suggests, she calls women to sin, that is, to violate the patriarchal taboo of strong, selfidentified women. “Self-presentiating women—being WRONG according to the
prevailing assumptions—may be said to Sin.”33 She develops this more fully in
subsequent books. “To Sin against the society of sado-sublimation is to be intellectual in
the most direct and daring way, claiming and trusting the deep correspondence between
the structures/processes of one’s own mind and the structures/processes of reality. To Sin
is to trust intuitions and the reasoning rooted in them. To Sin is to come into the fullness
of our powers, confronting now newly understood dimensions of the Battles of
Principalities and Powers.”34 This move really completes Daly’s project and
demonstrates how her theology is essentially an extended reflection on sin and evil as she
understands them. Re-naming sin as patriarchal false-naming of women was followed by
an analysis of the manifold ways in which this false-naming takes place and an exposure
of the systems and institutions that serve to perpetuate it. Escape—or salvation—from
these cycles and structures involves the realization by woman that she has internalized
the guilt that patriarchal society has placed upon her and then the active rejection of
society’s naming and reclamation of her pride and self through self-naming.
Of course, one’s definition of sin shapes how one conceives of good and evil and
therefore what one thinks it means to act ethically. Because the standards of the culture
are so misshapen by patriarchy, women must learn to resist the cultural notions of what is
good and evil. “The beginning of liberation comes when women refuse to be ‘good’
and/or ‘healthy’ by prevailing standards. To be female is to be deviant by definition in the

33. Daly, Pure Lust, 151 (emphasis original).
34. Ibid., 152.
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prevailing culture.”35 Obviously Daly is proffering no less than a radical new ethic, an
ethic which she extends in Gyn/Ecology.

Mary Daly and Biblical Narrative
As it is for many feminists, the Bible is a very problematic book for Mary Daly. 36
And, like other aspects of her theology, her regard for Scripture and its role in theology
developed over time. At the time of Church and the Second Sex one can classify Daly’s
position as a fairly standard “liberal” approach to Scripture. There she applied the
traditional historical-critical tools to compare the later creation account of Genesis 1 with
the earlier version found in Genesis 2. Though not charged with the tone of her later antipatriarchal polemic, even then she regarded the biblical text as the product of its cultural
situation and the biases of its authors. Accordingly, she questioned its authority to speak
to the contemporary female situation. Because the Bible’s authors were men of their
times, “[i]t is therefore a most dubious process to construct an idea of ‘feminine nature’
or of ‘God’s plan for women’ from biblical texts.”37 This reveals her experiential
epistemology; woman’s experience corrects scripture. However, she employs what might
be called an “ethical trajectory” approach to Scripture’s portrayal of the male-female
relationship suggesting that “[i]n the writings of Paul himself there are anticipations of a

35. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 65.
36. Kathryn Greene-McCreight offers a helpful categorization of ways in which feminist
theologians construe Scripture (Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Feminist Reconstructions of
Christian Doctrine: Narrative Analysis and Appraisal [New York: Oxford University Press,
2000], 38–39). The literature on feminist theology’s use of Scripture is too vast to summarize
here.
37. Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 75.
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development toward realization of the full implications of this equality.”38 It is the task of
theology to help us move further along this trajectory.
Daly’s later handling of biblical narrative is a combination of a hermeneutic of
patriarchal suspicion combined with the use of free-wheeling symbols, especially “the
Goddess.” This can be observed in her handling of a passage that does not address the
issue of sin. After developing the concept of the goddess as tripartite, a state of affairs
Daly claims as the predecessor of the patriarchal doctrine of the trinity, Daly applies this
image to the account of the visit of the Magi. The three magi represent the goddess
casting the symbols of their authority before the infant Christ. She concludes: “All of this
suggests that if the subliminal message in the story is that the Goddess was brought to her
knees before Jesus, the implications are indeed vast. If, symbolically speaking,
Goddesses and no mere kings were throwing down their crowns, then star-crowns were
thrown down, indicating a surrender of the whole cosmos...The message of surrender of
mind/spirit to the incarnate boygod is obvious.”39 The message of the narrative has
nothing to do with authorial intent, its place in the discreet narrative of the gospel, nor in
the overarching drama of Scripture. Rather, concepts foreign to the biblical drama are
employed as hermeneutical keys.40

38. Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, 83.
39. Daly, Pure Lust, 88.
40. One can observe the effects of Daly’s method when applied to stories in a brief
comment she makes about fairy tales. She writes that society trains people to blame their mothers
because “nearly everyone has been indoctrinated from infancy in the mother-hating myths of the
controlling religion: Patriarchy. Fairy tales (for example ‘Snow White’ and ‘Cinderella’) teach
that the only good mothers are dead ones, thinly disguising living mothers as ‘evil’ stepmothers.”
In failing to interpret these stories with reference to the context (story) which gave rise to them—
a context in which the premature death of one’s parents and the necessary recourse to other
relatives for care was fairly common—Daly misses the rather obvious fact that the stories revere
the birth mother as the preferred care-giver and relation. Daly, Gyn/Ecology, 266.
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Mary Daly and Genesis 3–11

Like many feminist theologians Daly finds the traditional narrative of Adam and
Eve’s fall into sin extremely problematic. Her handling of the text is predictable based on
her prior methodological commitments regarding the place of experience in theologizing
and in her essentialist anthropology. While in her early work (The Church and the Second
Sex) she approached the text with the standard tools of historical-critical inquiry, shortly
she gave primacy to female experience and subjected the text to her depatriarchalizing
lens. As we saw above, she reads the Genesis 3 narrative as evidence of the patriarchal
mis-naming of women as the origin of sin.
An essentialist view of the sexes is evident in Daly’s use of the Genesis 3
narrative as well. By reading the story as an account of how women will share with men
the knowledge that leads to salvation, she makes the same category mistake as the
interpreters she has denounced for misogynist readings of the text. Treatment of the text
as a myth in which Eve stands for woman and Adam for man fails to take into
consideration a broader and more fundamental category that the story may be working
with, humanity, and ignores the more fundamental detail the text uses to describe the
nature of the humans, the imago dei. In an earlier comment she comes closer to the mark.
In The Church and the Second Sex Daly said of the Genesis creation narratives: “Today,
both the Genesis accounts, whatever their relative merits, are understood to teach that
man and woman are of the same nature and dignity and that they have a common mission
to rule the earth”41 But this is as close as Mary Daly ever comes to reckoning with the
biblical presentation of humanity on its own terms. In Beyond God the Father Daly
41. Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, 78.
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makes a startling use of the text. As we have already noted, Daly repurposes the concept
of “the fall” to describe both the turn that religion and society made toward patriarchy as
well as to describe what women need to do to break free from patriarchy’s tyranny.
Strikingly Daly does not only use “the Fall” as a theological concept but attempts to link
her new concept of fall to the features of the narrative. She writes:
I am now suggesting that there were intimations in the original myth—not
consciously intended— of a dreaded future. That is, one could see the
myth as prophetic of the real Fall that was yet on its way, dimly glimpsed.
In that dreaded event, women reach for knowledge and, finding it, share it
with men, so that together we can leave the delusory paradise of false
consciousness and alienation. In ripping the image of the Fall from its old
context we are also transvaluing it. That is, its meaning is divested of its
negativity and becomes positive and healing.42
In this version of the fall, the woman, rather than being deceived and leading the
man after her, is finding illumination and sharing it with him. She is at least completely
honest about what she has done, “ripping the image of the fall from its old context” and
“transvaluing” it. This use of the text, of course, pays little to no attention to the text in its
context or as part of a larger narrative. The interpretive controls are not drawn from the
context in which the narrative is embedded but from Daly’s rendering of the past and
future of the sexes.
Sin, Self, and Story in Mary Daly: Summary

Mary Daly takes sin seriously. Exposing the sin of patriarchal misnaming of
women provides the outline for her entire theological project. She goes to great lengths to
identify the soul-stultifying tendencies of human (male) institutions that dehumanize
women. This prophetic project is grounded in her understanding of what it means to be
42. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 67.
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human: the ability to self-define. Sin is that which thwarts the person’s attempts at selfdefinition. Her emphasis on the theological resource of personal experience leads her to
conclude that the balance of sin has been against women by men, not so much by
individual acts as by cultural institutions and ways of thinking that serve to prevent the
self-definition of women. For similar reasons she finds that the biblical text as well as
much of the history of theology is complicit in the oppression of women and thus ignores
it or reads it in ways that subverts the original message.

SIN, SELF, AND STORY IN THE THEOLOGY OF RITA NAKASHIMA BROCK
A brief survey of Rita Nakashima Brock’s work reveals that she is animated by
many of the same concerns that inspired Mary Daly and other feminist theologians.
However, a closer look reveals some distinct emphases. Of mixed Asian and Puerto
Rican descent but raised in the United States, Brock brings a diverse cultural perspective
to her theology. Some of her work taps directly into the concerns of Asian women.43 As
we shall see later, the issue of violence is of particular concern for Brock, especially
violence against women. Distinct from Mary Daly is the obviously popular tone of some
of her work, most notably Proverbs of Ashes and Saving Paradise, both co-written with
Rebecca Ann Parker. While her work has not been as systematic as Daly’s she warrants
our consideration because of her special focus on the atonement as well as for her
incorporation of personal narratives in her work, especially in Proverbs of Ashes.
Furthermore, her relational anthropology differentiates her from Mary Daly’s more

43. See especially Rita Nakashima Brock and et al., eds., Off the Menu: Asian and Asian
North American Women’s Religion and Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2007) and Rita Nakashima Brock and Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, Casting Stones: Prostitution
and Liberation in Asia and the United States (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996).
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essentialist and structural stance and lets her serve as representative for a host of similar
approaches.
Central to Brock’s work is a critique of traditional views of the atonement. Her
main criticism flows from her special concern about violence. Having diagnosed violence
at the core of humanity’s problem, Brock finds it incoherent to suggest that an act of
violence like the crucifixion of Jesus could have any positive effect. Instead she
characterizes the penal substitution theory of the atonement as “cosmic child abuse.”44
Furthermore she claims that this view of the cross condones violence and attempts to
valorize suffering in a way that leaves victims of violence no way of resisting the
suffering. These issues can be seen to be behind all of her major works. In Journeys by
Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power she sought to write a feminist christology that
addressed the shortcomings of traditional atonement theories as well as other feminist
concerns. In Proverbs of Ashes, she and Rebecca Ann Parker take on the dangers of the
idea of “redemptive suffering” and the notion of love as self-sacrifice. Most recently, in
Saving Paradise, Brock and Parker attack what they perceive as an unhealthy
crucicentrism in contemporary Christian piety and call the church away from the cross
and back toward a Christianity shaped by visions of paradise here on earth. Brock regards
traditional atonement theology with its emphasis on guilt and the cross to be complicit in
the ongoing oppression of women.
Before considering Brock’s distinct definition of sin and the role of scripture in its
formation, we will briefly survey the methodological and epistemological underpinnings
of her project. This will be important for our later assessment of the inclusion or
44. Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker, Proverbs of Ashes: Violence,
Redemptive Suffering, and the Search for What Saves Us (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 157.
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exclusion of narrative modes of thought and biblical narrative in her theology of sin. As
we did with Mary Daly we will examine her anthropology and its relationship to her
definition of sin. We will conclude with critical interaction with these aspects of her
thought.
Rita Nakashima Brock’s Theological Methodology and Epistemology

Unlike Mary Daly who sought to rewrite the entirety of philosophy and theology
in a feminist mode, Rita Nakashima Brock’s writing has been more selective and less
systematic than Daly’s. But a careful reading of her work makes her methods clear. In
Journeys by Heart, Brock differentiates her method from those linking their Christian
thought and practice to Jesus. She writes:
If Jesus is a model for self-giving, for filial obedience, for love, or for
liberation, the question a Christian must ask is, ‘What would Jesus do or
have me do in this situation?’ Such a question leads the focus of feeling
and action away from self-awareness, away from our inner selves, our
contexts, and our history because we are not compelled to ask ‘How do I
feel right now, how are others feeling, and what can I do to lessen all our
pain and suffering in this context?’ The first question focuses on reality
external to us as the prime source for love and action, on obedience to
ideology, conformity to heroic norms, self-sacrifice, and vicarious
feelings. The second moves toward heart—toward self-possession,
profound relationality, and the emergence of creative caring. The
reclamation of heart is crucial to the redemption of Christ and ourselves.45
As is clear, Brock takes her personal experience of suffering and the suffering of
others as her point of departure for theological and ethical reflection. This she feels is
closer to the nature of the human as relational and more attuned to our ways of knowing.
“Heart” becomes for Brock an important way to refer to the whole human.

45. Rita Nakashima Brock, Journeys by Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power (New
York: Crossroad, 1988), xiv.
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Brock further contrasts her “journey by heart” with theological methodologies of
the cognitive-propositionalist strain.
Christian theology has tended to focus on cognitive, analytic, and often
polemical methods of discourse, a noisiness that makes the quiet, inner
journey to heart difficult. I believe a liberating faith lies on the borders of
our thinking where heart links thinking with feeling, perception, and the
body. This looking toward and from the heart is what has compelled me to
turn patriarchy inside out and to examine the broken heart of male
dominance. And there, in examining my own wounds, I found the power
that heals and allows the touching of heart to heart, the most sacred power
I know.46
Here she ties together the themes of heart, the feminist criticism of patriarchy, and
her turn to personal experience. Implicit is a linking of the “cognitive, analytic, and often
polemical methods of discourse” with patriarchy and male dominance. It can be seen,
then, that she shares Mary Daly’s critique of patriarchally influenced methods of enquiry.
Equally important is Brock’s understanding of the nature of humans and human
knowing, that is her anthropology and her epistemology. Not surprisingly, these are
tightly linked. Brock begins her discussion of the human person by discussing power. She
contrasts “male power”, power expressed through dominance, with Erotic power. Erotic
power is “[t]he fundamental power of life, born into us, [that] heals, makes whole,
empowers, and liberates. Its manifold forms create and emerge from heart, that graceful,
passionate mystery at the center of ourselves and each other. This power heals
brokenheartedness and gives courage to the fainthearted.”47 This power, like humans, is
fundamentally relational and fundamental to human existence.

Erotic power is the power of our primal interrelatedness. Erotic power, as
it creates and connects hearts, involves the whole person in relationships
46. Ibid., xvi.
47. Brock, Journeys by Heart, 25.
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of self-awareness, vulnerability, openness, and caring. Common
understandings of power as dominance and the ability to have one’s
way—as volitional self-assertion—posit power as causality: the more
direct causality, the more power a self possesses. However, erotic power
as an ontic category, that is, as a fundamentally ultimate reality in human
existence, is a more inclusive and accurate understanding of the dynamics
of power within which dominance and willful assertion can be explained.
Power as a causal concept is better understood when set into the ontic
framework of erotic power as the most inclusive principle of human
existence. Hence all other forms of power emerge from the reality of
erotic power.48
Here Brock posits this relational power as woven into the very fabric of existence,
a “fundamentally ultimate reality” and an “ontic category.” One may observe some
influence of process thought in this identification of the relationality and
interconnectedness of all reality. She summarizes her position on the relationship
between power and human existence by asserting that “Erotic power is the fundamental
power of existence-as-a-relational-process.”49 The human person, for Brock, is a
relationally constituted being.
This fundamental relatedness of humanity issues forth in a particular view of
human knowing. The essential power of the universe, erotic power, is relationally
mediated. Accordingly, knowledge is attained through relationship. Knowledge of self
and others cannot be achieved through sensory perception. On the basis of her
understanding of our essential relationality and its implications for human knowing,
Brock, like Daly, assesses the limitations of technical knowledge.
The difficulty of understanding power as relational bonds is lodged partly
in the Western tendency to focus on sensory perception as the only
reliable, measurable knowledge. Through such knowledge, things are
known externally to us, especially in unilateral, causal relationships that
are objectifiable. Sensory perception is an important way we know our
48. Ibid., 26.
49. Ibid., 41.
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world, but not our inner selves. The inner physical feelings of our body
and the emotions we know inside our bodies are not told to us through our
five senses. The knowledge of ourselves stored in our memory and the
messages sent to us in dreams come from a world not tied in any
immediate way to our senses. Yet these are important, subjective forms of
knowing. They are, as it were, knowing by heart.50
Knowledge of our inner selves both physically and emotionally is beyond the
reach of sensory perception.51
Brock attacks directly the modern epistemological fallacy of objectivity.
Our technocratic, rationally oriented society has great difficulty dealing
with dreams and the shamanistic magic of mythic images, except to
relegate them to fiercely rational psychological analysis, or to images as
art. In rejecting anything that might smack of supernaturalism, we draw
our truth concepts predominantly from cognitive awareness. The literalism
and reductionism of scientific thinking and its reliance on objective truth
results in a one-to-one fusion of self and world, cause and effect,
predictability and control. The self disappears into its objective
observation of objects and pretends it has removed itself. This outmoded
but still common concept of objectivity in Western thought assumes that a
neutral place exists from which an observer, whose presence does not
interfere with the event taking place, can tell what ‘really’ occurred. This
assumption of objectivity grounds the scientific method and is used to
subordinate ideas that overtly take an advocacy position. This myth of
objectivity has been challenged in Marxist, feminist, and process thought
and by relativity physics.52
Human knowledge, then, is fundamentally subjective and relational. What seems to be
lacking is any control or check on the knowledge one comes to through the heart.

50. Ibid., 37.
51. She speaks of the possibility of dreams coming from a source not touched by the
senses. This seems to be the acknowledgment of a spiritual realm that interfaces with our physical
existence, but Brock does not develop this aspect of her metaphysics enough for the reader to
conclude. Given that she calls these knowings “knowing by heart” she may merely consider the
inner person the source of these revelations.
52. Brock, Journeys by Heart, 44.
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Rita Nakashima Brock’s Theology of Sin

In discussing sin Brock, like many feminist theologians, begins by offering a
critique of traditional definitions. Not surprisingly, her critique relates directly to
woman’s experience of the traditional doctrines of sin. Like Mary Daly, she finds a tight
link between the traditional doctrines of sin and the real problem—patriarchy.
“Sinfulness, as a category within Christian analyses of humanity, is tied to the
reinforcement of patriarchal theology.”53 That is, the definitions of sin and salvation that
are offered in theology are complicit in the continued mistreatment of women.
Specifically, “[s]infulness is aligned with blame, punishment, and guilt, and blame has
usually been assigned to woman as the originator of sin, or to our maternal, organic birth
which must be transcended by a higher, spiritual birth.”54
Brock summarizes the traditional view this way: “The Christian notion of original
sin, based in traditional, dualistic assumptions about good and evil and patriarchal notions
of obedience and disobedience, claims that we are born with a tragic flaw that we do not
choose, but for which we bear the penalty if we do not take responsibility for the flaw
that results in evil. At the same time we are powerless alone to remove the penalty for our
flaw and, therefore, must reply on a higher power whose pure goodness and grace pardon
us from the penalty.”55 To Brock, this rendering of the human condition and its solution
relies too heavily on divine initiative and agency. This overemphasis on the divine side of
sin and salvation is itself a result of our true damage. Brock writes: “I believe it is our
damage—in which one major factor is patriarchy—that has produced a doctrine of sin as
53. Ibid., 6.
54. Ibid., 6.
55. Ibid., 16.
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a description of our original human state. The existence of that category requires us to
misplace divine incarnation and human redemption in someone else’s perfection and
heroic action, or in a power outside ourselves that helps us transcend the concrete
realities of life.”56 Though less stridently expressed, one observes here a critique shared
with Mary Daly that a major place where sin is found is in the traditional definitions of
sin.
Like Mary Daly and other feminists, Brock’s sees the problem as rooted in
anthropological considerations. “The claim that Jesus Christ and his death and
resurrection are the way out of the consequences of sin has rested on particular notions of
the character of being human, of the human character, and of redemption.”57 This is in no
small part due to the tradition’s exclusive focus on Christ, a male. “The son, as a model
for all human behavior, no matter how prophetic, feminist, or androgynous, cannot
include women. For he is still male, and no woman is allowed to represent human
existence in the same inclusive way.”58 Accordingly, there is little place for Christ in
Brock’s theology.
Like Valerie Saiving, Judith Plaskow and others before her, Brock finds the
traditional focus on pride to be wanting. Once again, the problem is not so much a
misidentification of a feature of broken humanity as it is a shortcoming in the proposed
solution. “In identifying sin as pride, Christian theology rightly undercuts the angry
violence suppressed behind a false nostalgic picture of the self. However, in reaching for
the underside, theology confuses the self-abnegation and humiliation that produce pride

56. Ibid., 9.
57. Ibid., 2.
58. Ibid., xiii.
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with the healing and self-affirmation, the grace, that come from legitimate anger and
honest memory.”59 In countering pride with self-abasement, Brock asserts, traditional
theologies of sin only commit a reverse error against the human person, an error that is
felt more acutely by women than men.60
Brock’s critique of traditional understandings of sin and her constructive
suggestion are rooted in her relational anthropology. For instance, she rejects the
traditional concept of original sin as a state into which all human beings are born because
“[s]infulness is understood to be a state that is prior to the particular relationships that
shape human beings.”61 Because we are fundamentally relational beings, placing the
origin of sin prior to the instantiation of our concrete relationships creates a theological
concept that fails to take our human nature into sufficient consideration.
Brock goes on to explain what sin is in her relational anthropology. Sin, or
brokenness as Brock prefers, is a natural result of our relationality.
If we begin with an understanding that we are intimately connected,
constituted by our relationships ontologically, that is, as a basic
unavoidable principle of existence, we can understand our brokenness as a
consequence of our relational existence. This ontological relational
existence, the heart of our being, is our life source, our original grace. But
we are, by nature, vulnerable, easily damaged, and that vulnerability is
both the sign of our connectedness and the source of the damage that leads
to sin.”62

59. Ibid., 19.
60. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to determine whether the feminist criticisms
of Augustine’s definition of sin as pride is historically accurate and fair reading. While it is true
that this idea is found in Augustine, Jesse Couenhaven argues that Augustine’s views on the root
of sin were importantly shaped by the Pelagian controversy. He suggests that the mature
Augustine propounded a view of sin that has more in common with the feminist concerns. See
“‘Not Every Wrong is Done with Pride’: Augustine’s Proto-Feminist Anti-Pelagianism,” Scottish
Journal of Theology 61, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 32–52.
61. Brock, Journeys by Heart, 6.
62. Ibid., 7.
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Our relationality is central to who we are as humans and to be truly relational, for
Brock, includes being vulnerable. The damaged condition that leads to sin is found in our
vulnerability. Because of how dependent upon relationships we are for our very being,
we are able to wound and be wounded to the very core of our being through how we treat
one another in our relationships. “Sin emerges because our relationships have the
capacity to destroy us and we participate in destruction when we seek to destroy
ourselves or others. Hence sin is a sign of our brokenheartedness, of how damaged we
are, not of how evil, willfully disobedience, and culpable we are.”63 Sin, here, is not an
innate condition of individual humans but rather something that “emerges” out of the
nexus of relationality and vulnerability. It is an unavoidable part of being relational
beings. She concludes: “I am suggesting that sinfulness is neither a state that comes
inevitably with birth nor something that permeates all human existence, but a symptom of
the unavoidably relational nature of human existence through which we come to be
damaged and damage others.”64 It is hard to see how this is that much different than sin
as a state into which we are born; it merely pushes it a step further back. Worse yet, it
roots sin in our very make-up as humans leaving little hope for escape.

Rita Nakashima Brock and Scripture

In light of the preceding methodological and epistemological considerations it is
not surprising to find that the interpretation of scripture plays a relatively minor role in
Brock’s theological practice. While perhaps not as overtly antagonistic toward scripture
as Mary Daly, Brock submits scripture to her feminist critique and finds in it a pastiche of
63. Brock, Journeys by Heart, 7.
64. Ibid.
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culturally conditioned ideas of varying theological value to the contemporary situation.
For instance she writes: “Readers of the Bible must carefully weigh the prophetic texts
against each other, not as infallible commands but as a range of human responses to
crisis. Listening to the Bible requires testing various texts in light of moral questions that
the Bible itself raises about its own traditions.”65 Here she rejects the propositional
authority of scripture. Brock finds that there are themes or traditions in the Bible that call
into question other messages within the canon. Accordingly, scripture is to be read
against itself, so to speak. “The scriptures must be read critically and carefully for
religious and ethical guidance, using principles that the Bible itself provides. John’s
Gospel should be weighed against its own report that Jesus, a Jew, said, ‘I came that they
might have life.’ The Gospel is clear that the will of God is that life should flourish.”66 It
is beyond Brock’s purpose to elucidate what these embedded principles are. What is not
in evidence, however, is any attempt to orient the diverse biblical texts to an overarching
narrative and to use that narrative structure as a guide to the evaluation of divergent
traditions.

Rita Nakashima Brock and Genesis 3–11

Though she does not comment on them in detail, the unavoidability of sin in
Brock’s thought suggests how she might handle the Genesis 3–11 narratives. Because sin
is an unavoidable aspect of being relational, there need be no etiological narrative. For
Brock there was no primal time of innocence from which humanity has fallen. Rather,

65. Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker, Saving Paradise: How Christianity
Traded Love of This World for Crucifixion and Empire (Boston: Beacon Press, 2008), 22.
66. Ibid., 49.
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these narratives that have played such a crucial role in the development of traditional
doctrines of sin need to be submitted to critical feminist analysis. One of Brock’s (and
feminist theology more broadly) complaints about the Genesis 3 narrative is that it
blames woman for sin. Brock is right to reject such readings of Genesis 3. Most of those
readings are done too narrowly without sufficient attention to the narrative development
of the concept of sin. But rather than offer a more narrativally adequate reading, Brock
discards the text altogether.
In Saving Paradise Brock (and Parker) do offer brief commentary on the early
chapters of Genesis particularly how they compare with other contemporaneous
cosmogonies.
Like the Sumerian stories, the book of Genesis set the stage with ‘at the
beginning of Creation,’ and then told of things going wrong. Humanity
failed the requirements of life in paradise. Disasters followed. God exiled
the woman and the man from the garden. Childbirth became arduous. Men
dominated women. Brothers murdered and deceived one another,
wrangling over their inheritance and fighting over blessings. Fathers raped
their daughters. Tribes invaded and colonized lands, killing or oppressing
their inhabitants. Somewhere, paradise remained in the world, haunting
every tale of folly, injustice or greed.67
This matter of fact recitation of the evils recorded in Genesis and beyond is not
submitted to theological scrutiny nor is the narrative development of sin considered. The
potential theological significance of the similarity in the plot structure of these ancient
cosmogonies, biblical or otherwise, is not considered either. The embeddedness in human
thinking of notions of a pristine primeval period sullied by human (and/or divine)
misdeeds as an explanation of the current condition merits more examination than Brock
affords it.

67. Ibid., 16.
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They do note that the Genesis account evinces a more positive anthropology. “In
Genesis 1, humanity, male and female, shared in the divine image. They were not the
flawed grunt labor for the gods in the Sumerian stories—not slaves, but gods. Instead of
being impaired by exploitation, humanity was empowered and given agency to act
ethically.”68 As is clear, this understanding of the nature of humans in the creation
narratives coincides with Brock’s discussion of power or agency as a distinct feature of
human nature. Beyond this agency, however, Brock offers little by way of explanation of
what it may mean for humans to bear the imago dei nor does she offer an interpretation of
what caused humanity to so misuse this agency.
In looking at the divine prohibition of Genesis 2–3, Brock softens somewhat the
traditional view of this as a divine law. “When God explained to the earthling that not all
the trees were safe to eat, the story suggested that Creation had boundaries that should not
be crossed and that acquiring knowledge carried risks.”69 Given the carnage of the
following chapters, Brock’s assessment of the divine decree as a “suggestion of
boundaries” underestimates its significance. Other than this and the summary of the
remainder of Genesis quoted above, Brock offers no sustained reflection on the Genesis
account of humanity.

Sin, Self, and Story in Rita Nakashima Brock: Summary

Sin is not as central a theme for Brock as it is for Daly. It is related to our innate
relationality and is an unavoidable feature of our humanity. Because we are relational we
must be vulnerable and because we are vulnerable we become damaged, brokenhearted.
68. Ibid., 14.
69. Brock and Parker, Saving Paradise, 16.
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The signal example of our brokenheartedness is violence against the other. Again, male
conceptions of power, knowledge and relationship only contribute to the spread of
brokenheartedness.
Brock summarizes her position on sin and salvation succinctly:
We are broken by the world of our relationships before we are able to
defend ourselves. It is not a damage we willfully choose. Those who
damage us do not have the power to heal us, for they themselves are not
healed. To be healed, we must take the responsibility for recognizing our
own damage by following our hearts to the relationships that will
empower our self-healing. In living by heart, we are called not to absolve
ourselves of the consequences of an inherited flaw. We are called to
remember our own brokenheartedness, the extent of our vulnerability, and
the depth of our need for relationships. Hence we are not called to
dependence on a power outside ourselves, but to an exploration of the
depths of our most inner, personal selves, as the root of our connections to
all others.70
We become damagers by being damaged by others in the relationships that are inherent in
our humanity. Salvation, to the extent that there is such, is found within as we choose to
pursue good relationships.

MARY DALY AND RITA NAKASHIMA BROCK ON SIN:
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
We have now seen the outlines of Mary Daly and Rita Nakashima Brock’s
theologizing about sin. Their positions have both strengths and weakness, often closely
related. As we critique their work side by side we will see how their positions are
weakened by a failure to take into consideration narrative modes of thought as well as
sketching their relationship to the biblical narratives and metanarrative.

70. Brock, Journeys by Heart, 16.
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To help us evaluate their stance toward narrativity the work of Stephen Crites will
be helpful. Stephen Crites defines as a feature of the modern mindset the attempt to break
free from a sense of narrative time in our self-understanding.71 That is, we employ
various strategies to provide a coherent understanding of our lives, strategies that seek to
circumvent the inherently narrative structure of experience. Two such strategies that he
highlights are “abstraction” and “contraction.” In abstraction “images and qualities are
detached from experience to become data for the formation of general principles and
techniques.”72 Features of human experience are excised from their context and granted
an explanatory power that may surpass their explanatory value. The second strategy
Crites details is “contraction.” In contraction the narrative structure of experience is
overcome by narrow focus on one image, moment or feeling. Attention is constricted “to
the particular image isolated from the image stream, to isolated sensation, feeling, the
flash of the overpowering moment in which the temporal context of that moment is
eclipsed and past and future are deliberately blocked out of consciousness.”73

Sin and Being Human

As we observed, much of the feminist critique of the traditional definitions of sin
takes issue with traditional notions of the human. One strength of both Daly’s and
Brock’s projects is how closely tied their definitions of sin are to their understanding of
what it means to be human. The strength of this is how directly and relevantly they are
able to speak to human experience. All of us have experienced “brokenheartedness” in
71. Stephen Crites, “The Narrative Quality of Experience,” in Why Narrative?: Readings
in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and
Stock, 1989), 85.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., 85.
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the context of our relationships and have been thwarted in our efforts at self-definition.
However, it is necessary for us to examine their construal of the human more closely
particularly as it relates to the narrative construction of the self.
Mary Daly’s Self-Naming Self
As we saw, Mary Daly’s definition of being human is the capacity to self-name.
Sin, by contrast, is having that capacity stolen or thwarted. In short, sin is that which
threatens our humanity. We will see later that such a definition is useful. However, we
must ask whether Daly’s definition of the human is adequate.
Daly’s version of the human—self-definition—is problematic in that it
overestimates the power of the self and underestimates the role of factors external to the
self in the formation of the individual. Anthony Giddens argues that the construction of
identity is a more reflexive process in which there is a balance between the controlled and
the uncontrolled. Giddens casts this reflexive activity in specifically narrative terms. “A
person’s identity is not to be found in behavior, nor—important though this is—in the
reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going. The
individual’s biography, if she is to maintain regular interaction with others in the day-today world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate events which occur in
the external world, and sort them into the ongoing ‘story’ about the self.”74
As Giddens points out, rather than being capable of complete self-definition, our
identities are formed in the give and take of what we control and what we don’t.75 He

74. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 54.
75. Like Daly, Giddens recognizes that systems are not always tuned to human
development. “Holding out the possibility of emancipation, modern institutions at the same time
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gives the specific example of economic systems: “Consider the example of money. In
order to utilize money, an individual must participate in systems of economic exchange,
banking and investment and so forth, over which she has little direct control. On the other
hand, this process allows the individual—given sufficient resources—a diversity of
opportunities which would otherwise be absent.”76 On Daly’s account, such economic
systems are inherently problematic because they restrict the capacity of the human to
self-name. Cast in the terms not of self-naming but self-narrating, Giddens’s account is
more nuanced.
This definition of humanity as self-naming runs afoul of the biblical narratives as
well. While Genesis 1–3 show humans with incredible responsibilities and powers of self
and world actualization, they stop short of giving humanity absolute power of selfidentity. If anything, these early narratives and Genesis 3 and 11 in particular speak
directly to the issue of the limitations on self-definition.77

create mechanisms of suppression, rather than actualization of the self.” Giddens, Modernity and
Self-Identity, 6.
76. Ibid., 193.
77. It is further problematic because, though Daly is intent upon forging unity amongst
women, her definition of humanity drives one toward individualism. Such an individualism cuts
against Daly’s aims to unite women in some fundamental way against men. Daly recognizes this
problem and attempts to compensate for it by positing some transcendent idea of womanhood.
She writes: A problem that is implicit in such Naming is the classic philosophical problem of ‘the
one and the many.’ For it is clear that Lusty women are profoundly different from each other.
Not only are there ethnic, national, class and racial differences that shape our perspectives, but
there are also individual and cross-cultural differences of temperament, virtue, talent, taste, and of
conditions within which these can or cannot find expression. There is, then, an extremely rich,
complex Diversity among women and within each individual. But there is also above, beyond,
beneath all this a Cosmic Commonality, a tapestry of connectedness which women as
Websters/Fates are constantly weaving. (Daly, Pure Lust, 26–27.) Women are therefore defined
with reference to this trans-cultural, trans-temporal “tapestry of connectedness.” It is hard not to
see this as the establishment of a new foundation from which to theologize. Indeed, several
writers have criticized Mary Daly and other feminists on just this point: the establishment of a
new “foundationalism.” For our purposes it is sufficient to note that this essential connection
amongst women transcends the narrative of humanity and human development.
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Rita Nakashima Brock’s Relational Self
Similarly, Brock’s relationally construed self has much to commend it.
Contemporary discussions of the human person have come to recognize the importance
of relationships in being human. Indeed, as we shall see, the biblical narratives and
Genesis 1–3 in particular, present humanity in a variety of relationships integral to their
role in the story.
However, narrow focus on relationality is in danger of abstracting a concept from
human experience in an effort to provide comprehensive explanation. This is an example
of Stephen Crites’s category of abstraction. Though on the one hand Brock’s concept of
relationality is supposedly derived from human experience, it becomes a heuristic
concept unhitched from the narrative context that gave it rise. This can be seen in the
manner in which she attempts to root relationality in the very nature of existence, human
or otherwise, by calling relationality “an ontic category.” Like Daly’s self-naming,
Brock’s relationality becomes more useful if it is set as one feature in the context of a
narrative.
In a brief article Meic Pearse diagnoses the anthropological efforts of the likes of
Daly and Brock as a modern attempt to address a postmodern problem: the dilemma over
personhood and identity. Pearse denies that the two categories can be separated.
The attempted distinction between ‘person’ and ‘identity’ is also unreal in
practice. It is an attempt to emphasize human essence (the former), by way
of distinction from relationality (the latter). Yet what we mean by a human
person is an individuated human being. It is the modern/postmodern
dilemma that has thrust upon us the quest for our personal ‘essence’,
precisely because postmodern conditions have made our identity so
unclear. In the absence of stable identity, we go looking for who we
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‘really’ are; that is, we go in quest of personal essentialism, an essence
that is not contingent upon our (fleeting) social relationalities.78
Pearse goes on to suggest that personhood is likely found “in the polarity between
essence and relational/identity” but reasons that the inscrutability of human “essence”
makes it a poor starting point. In fact, rooting personal and human identity in either of the
poles is problematic. Pearse writes: “Certainly an unbalanced emphasis upon personhood
as ‘essentialism’, leading to a ceaseless quest for the ‘real self’, can only fuel the
monstrous egotism and self-centeredness epitomized by the consumerist mindset, that full
flowering of self-assertion. On the other hand, the apparent corrective, namely that of
rooting personhood in relationality, can only encourage the obverse side of the same coin,
namely...pathetic self-loathing and ‘low self-esteem’.”79 Indeed, Daly’s work is an
example of the former and Brock’s of the latter and the tone of their writings display the
difference. Daly’s human as essentially self-naming leads her to a call for self-assertion,
at least among women. Brock’s call for empowerment through relationality leads
inexorably toward the danger of endless evaluation of the “authenticity” of one’s
relationships. Once again, the narratively construed self offers a balance of the two; there
are both fundamental relationships and realities but in the context of a narrative with
development and continuity.

78. Meic Pearse, “Problem? What Problem? Personhood, Late Modern/Postmodern
Rootlessness and Contemporary Identity Crisis,” Evangelical Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2005): 10
Interestingly, Pearse traces the postmodern condition of rootlessness in particular to the
problematization of distinctions between people, particularly on the basis of gender. Accordingly,
for the postmodern individual “a basic aspect of existence has been rendered problematic.” He
goes on. “The attack on traditional roles and the assault on ‘stereotypes’ were doubtless intended
to free groups deemed to have been oppressed by past metanarratives. But by kicking them aside,
we render our own situatedness and identities problematic, since we only know who we are in
relation to others. By forbidding ourselves to discriminate, we forbid ourselves to discern.” (9)
79. Pearse, “Problem?” 10.
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The Explanatory Value

An important aspect of any evaluation of a definition of sin is its explanatory
value. How well does the definition serve to critique or highlight the human condition?
As we saw in chapter 1, many definitions fail to speak relevantly to the contemporary
culture for one reason or another. Both of the definitions of sin offered by Mary Daly and
Rita Nakashima Brock serve as lenses that expose important elements of the human
condition.
Mary Daly’s definition of sin as that which thwarts self-naming is particularly
well-suited to exposing structures of sin that limit women’s capacity to self-actualize.
Indeed, as we observed, her work can be summarized as an effort to expose systems of
oppression in every aspect of life. She finds evidence of opposition to women’s selfactualization embedded in virtually every area of human culture. This makes some of her
work compelling reading. Unfortunately, Daly’s gender-specific definition makes her
evaluation lopsided. Equal attention could easily be paid to the manner in which various
cultural institutions and practices thwart male self-actualization or full humanization.
Brock’s emphasis on relationship connects directly with contemporary selfunderstanding of our relational make-up. Her description of individuals from fractured
relationships replicating those fractures in other relationships out of their own
“brokenheartedness” captures many people’s personal experience. However, the lack of
specificity of the ways and deeper reasons behind these behaviors and the lack of any
clear path to “salvation” makes her work less than compelling sin-talk in the
contemporary culture.
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The Story of Sin

One of the features of narrative thought is the continuity that it offers from past to
present and into the future. To say that God, humanity or sin are narrativally developed is
to put earlier and later events within each history into a certain relationship with each
other. As in the life development of any individual, earlier events are formative though
not entirely constitutive of the person. Later events (whether foreshadowed in the
narrative or not) also play an important role in the understanding of the character at any
given point in the narrative.

Epistemology

In her apparent embrace of the subjectivity of human experience and knowledge
Brock is in good company with many postmodern critics of modern epistemology.
However, some have challenged whether feminists like Brock and Daly have truly
avoided the pitfalls of modernity. As Sheila Greeve Davaney points out, in spite of
espousing the claim that all knowledge is interest-laden and culturally contextual, most
feminists do not embrace the radically nihilistic implications of the subjectivity of all
knowledge. Instead, they privilege the knowledge acquired through feminist experience
thereby creating an objective truth base or foundation. In summarizing her assessment of
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Davaney writes, “Truth, then, is assessed according to the
norm of the extent to which a vision promotes the full humanity of women, and such
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promotion is assumed to correspond to divine reality and its purposes.”80 In Brock’s case
in the specific matter of sin, the correspondence is between the objective standard of the
heart and violence. That which is objectively violent or that which breaks the integrity of
the standard of “heart” is sin.

Feminist Theology, Story and History
Another evidence of the non-narratival nature of both Daly and Brock’s theology
can be seen in their attitudes toward history and the role that the past plays in our
understanding of the present. Regarding the usefulness of the past Daly states quite
definitively, “My method contains no built-in assumption that we should direct our
efforts toward salvaging anything from the patriarchal past.”81 For her, the conviction that
the past and all our records of it are irredeemably corrupted by patriarchy militates
against finding any place for a revelatory past. This attitude overlooks too cavalierly the
reality of how much of who we are as individuals and as a species is shaped by our past.
We may indeed be more than our past but we cannot understand ourselves or our
situation apart from it nor is a total break from it possible. For Daly our past is exactly
what must be overcome. Our past has falsely named us and we must rename ourselves
and our world.
This rejection of the past is, of course, linked to the turn to experience as primary
theological resource. As we saw earlier, Daly rejects the possibility that past events could
possibly trump present experience. Of the assumption that any trans-historical, trans80. Sheila Greeve Davaney, “Problems with Feminist Theory: Historicity and the Search
for Sure Foundations,” in Embodied Love: Sensuality and Relationship as Feminist Values, Paula
M. Cooey, Sharon A. Farmer, and Mary Ellen Ross (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 89.
81. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 83.
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cultural revelation can be accessed from past events she wrote, “This is problematic in
that it tends to be backward-looking, assuming at least implicitly that past history (that is,
some peak moments of the past) has some sort of prior claim over present experience, as
if recourse to the past were necessary to legitimate experience now.”82 This is precisely
what a Christian theology attentive to the narrative structure of human existence claims,
that peak events, namely the Christ event at the very least, put in perspective human
experience now as well as the events that preceded them. To deny some role to the past is
solipsism at worst and chronological snobbery at best.83 Later events (whether
foreshadowed in the narrative or not) also play an important role in the understanding of
the character at any given point in the narrative.
A particular problem that this creates for Daly is the inability to account for good
or progress from the past. This can be seen in her diatribe against gynecological medicine
in Gyn/Ecology. Focusing on the bumbling and at times lethal manner in which modern
medicine and gynecology in particular developed, Daly exposes it as yet another
patriarchal tool for female domination and denigration going so far as to compare it to

82. Ibid., 73–74.
83. The problematic nature of this ahistorical tendency has led to countless efforts among
feminists to recover a more matriarchal past. These efforts can be plotted on a continuum from
the ideologically light search for influential women in the past to the ideologically heavy
reconstructions of a thoroughly matriarchal past complete with a fall into patriarchy. The later
Mary Daly evinces a preference for this latter approach. Cynthia Eller critiques the idea of such a
matriarchal prehistory. Ironically she finds that this recovery of a matriarchal past rather than
ultimately bolstering the feminist claims actually constricts the identity of women due to its
narrow identification of women with procreation, relationality, and bodiliness. “[T]he gendered
stereotypes upon which matriarchal myth rests persistently work to flatten out differences among
women; to exaggerate differences between women and men; and to hand women an identity that
is symbolic, timeless, and archetypal, instead of giving them the freedom to craft identities that
suit their individual temperaments, skills, preferences, and moral and political commitments”
(Cynthia Eller, The Myth of Matriarchal Prehistory: Why an Invented Past Won’t Give Women a
Future [Boston: Beacon Press, 2000], 8). In Mary Daly’s terms, Eller is claiming that in the
attempt to re-name history for women, the myth of the matriarchal past has severely limited
individual women’s ability to self-name.
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Nazi medicine practices.84 While we must acknowledge that medical progress has not
always been cautiously pursued with at times lamentable results for patients, it is difficult
to deny that there has indeed been progress that has resulted in a marked increase in the
quality of life for men and women alike. But Daly’s application to the past of her
definition of sin as patriarchal false-naming allows no such tension. One of the strengths
of a narrative approach is its ability to hold in tension issues such as these. Daly’s
approach leaves her no room to reconcile the difficulties. As we will see in a later chapter
this tension is demonstrated repeatedly in the narratives of Genesis 3–11.
Daly explicitly rejects any notion of past revelation having any present relevance.
This is, of course, because nothing can trump present female experience as a theological
resource. “[The] assumption that one can extract ‘religious truth’ from ‘time-conditioned
categories’ seems to mean that we can shuck off the debris of a long history of
oppressiveness and get to the pristine purity of the original revelation. This is problematic
in that it tends to be backward-looking, assuming at least implicitly that past history (that
is, some peak moments of the past) has some sort of prior claim over present experience,
as if recourse to the past were necessary to legitimate experience now.”85 Daly sets up a
false choice here that does not conform to human experience of the world. In our personal
experience of forming a self-identity the present and the past are in relationship to one
another. Neither holds exclusive power to define who or what we are. The past and
present are held in narrative relationship to one another with the past exercising an
important though not finally definitive role to the present. Instead Daly suggests that
84. See chapter 7 “American Gynecology: Gynocide by the Holy Ghosts of Medicine and
Therapy” and the same chapter’s conclusion and afterward “Nazi medicine and American
gynecology: a torture cross-cultural comparison” in Daly, Gyn/Ecology.
85. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 73–74.
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women can find their identity sufficiently in present experience. “In contrast, women
have the option of giving priority to what we find valid in our own experience without
needing to look to the past for justification. I suggest that this is the more authentic
approach to our problems of identity.”86
Brock’s attitude toward the past is similarly skeptical, though less pronounced
than Daly’s. Brock rejects theologies of salvation focused too narrowly on the cross of
Christ. This is due in part to her rejection of the idea that an act of violence might save
us. But its backward orientation disturbs her as well. “We cannot rely on one past event
to save our future. No almighty power will deliver us from evil. With each minute we
wait for such rescue, more die.”87 Like Daly, then, Brock wants to narrow our focus to
the experience here and now rather than in some past moment. Accordingly she looks for
the source of sin not in some etiological myth but in the fabric of our relational being and
for the source of salvation not in some first century historical event but in our exercise of
personal agency. But this too offers no way to hold together the narrative of human
experience and identity, male or female.

Past, Present, or Future Self?

Without the notion of a developing narrative in which to situate their views of the
person, Daly and Brock are forced to situate it in the past, the present or the future. As
was seen above, they reject the past outright. Daly, while giving priority in theology to
present experience, arrives at an anthropology that is in a sense a future oriented one. If
the essence of what it is to be human is to name oneself that work can never be final. To
86. Ibid., 74.
87. Brock, Journeys by Heart, 105.
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name oneself and not grow and develop as a person would be stultifying. Daly’s rhetoric
does evince this future orientation. In several of her works she engages in fantasies that
have her reporting back as it were from the future “Biophilic Era” when the sin of
patriarchy has been overcome. Furthermore she frequently uses the language of women
Spinsters weaving ever new spirals of self-hood and sisterhood. It seems even when the
gains of the present must be left behind for that yet better vision. True humanity seems
forever postponed.
On its face Brock’s relational focus seems to offer more linkage with the past.
Women of the present share with women of the past their deeply seated need for
relationship and the vulnerability and sin that attends it. Yet rooting humanity in
relationality is no more narratival than Daly’s model; the past offers no clues to the
present or future. The fact of our relationality is unchanged but the nature of our
relationships changes with the times. Brock’s view does not allow the past to say much to
the present because what is important is our experience of our relationships now. So there
is a radical presentism to Brock’s thought. In fact, since the quality and function of
various relationships has changed so much through time, the past has little to offer us in
thinking through our present relationships. People of the past, though equally relational as
we are, have nothing to say to us because they just don’t understand our relationships.
In his argument for conceiving of doctrine in narrative terms Anthony Thiselton
warns against the dangers of over- or under-realized eschatologies. “An overrealized
eschatology will err on the side of conceiving of God (and doctrine) as ‘already defined.’
Here God becomes entirely ‘the God of propositional revelation’ without as it were loose
ends. This system is closed rather than open. On the other hand, a one-sided futurist
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eschatology risks conceiving of God as ‘not yet defined,’ akin to the God of process
theology.”88 In their views of the human self, Daly and Brock evince these two poles.
For Daly’s self, tasked with self-naming in a hostile environment selfhood is forever
deferred. Accordingly she leaps far into some longed for future in which women are able
to fully self-realize. Brock’s eschatology is over-realized in that the human self as
relational is fully constituted with no development necessary. Stanley Grenz similarly
warns against the distorted eschatologies that are implicit in particular approaches to the
human and sin. He writes, “In existentialist developmentalism, the anthropological focus
lies with the potentiality present within the human person to become a self.
Consequently, existentialist theologians give little if any place to the language of human
destiny, to a corporate human history, or to any type of temporal eschatological
consummation to creation.”89 Brock in particular falls afoul of this. For Brock, the focus
is the “present potentiality” for relationship in which inheres the brokenness of sin. There
is no eschatological consummation; existing relationally in the present is what it means to
be human with little or no connectivity to that which has preceded or what will follow.90
What is missing is anything to hold the storyline of the self together. Thiselton points to
Ricoeur’s description of the narrative continuity and coherence that is achieved through

88. Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2007), 64.
89. Grenz, The Social God, 178.
90. Rosemary Radford Reuther highlights the non-eschatological orientation of much
feminist theology: “Thus redemption is about the transformation of self and society into good,
life-giving relations, rather than an escape from the body and the world into eternal life.
Otherworldly eschatology is usually not explicitly denied, but it is put aside.” Rosemary Radford
Ruether, Women and Redemption: A Theological History (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
1998), 8.
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the mind’s performing “three functions: those of expectation...attention...and memory.”91
Thiselton explains: “Christian doctrine relates closely to the memory of God’s saving acts
in history; attention to God’s present action in continuity with those saving acts; and
trustful expectation of an eschatological fulfillment of divine promise.”92 Daly dismisses
the revelatory past, sees only the ongoing hegemony of patriarchy in the present, and
offers no sure hope of a future of full self-naming. Brock similarly denies the value of
past and future and focuses only on a relational present.
Whereas Daly denounces the past and stakes her hope on a utopian “Biophilic”
future, Brock mostly ignores both the past and the future. She is reluctant to locate
salvation in either the past or the future. “Life is actually sustained...by integration,
interaction, and exchange in the present—it is ecological, not eschatological.”93 In Saving
Paradise Brock (and co-author Rebecca Parker) do excavate the Christian past but really
only in search of different images to drive their present focused theology. They explicitly
reject the narrative development of the Christian story and opt to replace the notion of
sacred time (or narrative) with sacred space. They write:
Early church sensibilities about salvation were oriented to space—to a
world of many dimensions, blessed by the all-permeating Spirit. However,
the modern Western religious consciousness imagines salvation almost
entirely in temporal terms. Theologians speak of sacred and profane time,
of salvation history, and of hope. They interpret the expulsion of Adam
and Eve from paradise as the beginning of salvation history: the world
runs along a hard arrow of time, beginning with human sin and
culminating in a final New Age, kingdom of God, Second Coming, or
New Heaven and Earth. Humanity lives ‘between the times,’ awaiting a
future yet to be consummated. Christ will return to fulfill God’s promise
of salvation, which the faithful will receive after death, after God destroys
this evil world, or after God creates a just world and has beaten all swords
91. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 19–20.
92. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 65.
93. Brock and Parker, Saving Paradise, 388.
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into plowshares. While these future-oriented themes are present among
early Christian ideas, they did not delay salvation until after death or in an
indefinite future time. They pictured salvation as the landscape of
paradise, an environment full of life that was entered here and now
through the church.94
Brock offers a false choice between sacred space and sacred time. Narrative and
especially dramatic understandings of the Christian story and human development hold
together both space and time.
A properly narratival approach to theology recognizes the importance of the past
without acting as though the past exercises hegemony over the present. The
interpretational practice of typology is rooted in the conviction that past and present
relate to one another in a mutually informing way and avoid privileging one over the
other.

Sin and the Biblical Story

We have seen that these feminist theologians embrace epistemologies and
anthropologies that ignore the element of narrative. How does this shape their approach
to the overarching narrative of Scripture? Again, Crites’s categories of abstraction and
contraction will be helpful.

Reading into the Narrative

In her analysis of feminist theological reconstructions Kathryn Greene-McCreight
notes the profound shift in theological outlook that comes from a change in one’s
governing doctrine. She points to such a change in governing doctrine in feminist

94. Ibid.
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theologies of sin. The governing doctrine is, in her words, an “extra-narratival” claim
about humans. She writes: “What we see, then, over the generation of feminist
scholarship on the primary Christian doctrine of sin, is a parsing and refining of the
particularities of women’s sin. The extra-narratival claim that women’s experience and
therefore women’s sin are distinct from men’s experience and men’s sin becomes a
governing doctrine which then determines the understanding of sin. The unintended
effect is a virtual cataloguing of the difficulties, both personal and social, faced by
women of different races and classes.”95 Because sin is being analyzed through the use of
a concept external to the biblical narrative, the role of the biblical narrative as a whole
and discrete narratives within the whole is minimized.
In making this move Greene-McCreight sees feminist theology making two
mistakes, one philosophical and one theological. Greene-McCreight finds totalizing
assumptions about the nature of men and women in feminist theology’s handling of sin.
Though many feminist theologians may reject essentialism, their arguments about sin
require something of the sort. “[F]eminist constructions of the doctrine of sin tend to
require, despite their best intentions, a universalizing of anthropology of the feminine.”96
Greene-McCreight’s theological critique of feminist theologies of sin is more
explicitly narratival. She notes that while there is no precise definition of sin in Scripture,
the feminist theological vision falls short by failing to take the picture of sin as painted in
the canon into consideration. “[F]eminist theologians’ consideration of the doctrine of sin
shows itself to be non-narrative, insofar as it defines women according to an

95. Greene-McCreight, Feminist Reconstructions, 59.
96. Ibid., 61.
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anthropology constructed almost entirely independently of the biblical drama.”97 This
essentialist, non-narratival anthropology is then brought back to the biblical texts as the
basis for reinterpretation or rejection. “[A]fter considering woman as defined according
to the extra-narratival claims of a particularly late-twentieth-century North American
framework, the feminist theologies then want to make use of this picture as a governing
doctrine through which to reinterpret the biblical concepts of sin, grace, and divine
agency.”98
Daly’s definition of humanity and its concomitant definition of sin demonstrate
Greene-McKreight’s point starkly. Daly defines being human as self-defining. It could be
argued according to the biblical narrative of Genesis 3–11 that “self-naming” is the
definition of sin! At the very least, the narratives that bookend the primeval narrative—
the “fall” narrative and the tower narrative—warn against human attempts at selfdefinition.

Narratival Selectivity

Theologizing in view of the overarching narrative of Scripture implies accepting
the whole of Scripture. Addressing herself specifically to those feminist theologians who
still regard the Bible as revelatory in some sense, Greene-McCreight concludes that from
a narratival perspective there is something disingenuous about the selective appropriation
of scripture. “It seems inherently contradictory for feminist theologians to claim to be
able to read Scripture as witness to the divine reality and to claim that it needs a warning
label indicating its toxicity, if the God we are talking about is that of the biblical
97. Greene-McCreight, Feminist Reconstructions, 62.
98. Ibid.
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narrative.”99 What she means is that if we accept that characters of a narrative or drama
are revealed progressively throughout the narrative, we can’t select moments in the
narrative as accurate and representative and reject others for being inadequate. Similarly
if humanity and sin are portrayed in narrative, selectivity only serves to distort not refine
the image. Here Daly is more intellectually honest than Brock because she ultimately
jettisoned the entirety of Scripture except to offer readings that transvalued the content of
the narrative.
While generally in agreement with Daly’s critique of classic sin-talk, Mary Grey
is concerned about the implications of Daly’s moving “beyond good and evil” precisely
due to its effects on the role and usefulness of the biblical narrative. She writes:
But it is not at all easy for Christian theology to undertake a new naming
of sin. For when it is asserted—as it is, for example, by Mary Daly—that
the whole construction of Christian soteriology, the necessity of salvation
in Christ, the doctrines of Atonement, grace, forgiveness and eschatology,
rest on a false naming of evil—as Daly claims—then a re-naming will
hold the risk of the rejection of Christian theology, at least in the form in
which we know it. Is the price too high? Daly’s own solution is wellknown. She wants to move beyond the patriarchal naming of good and
evil, into a new naming, the naming of True Being and New Creation.
Therefore the old framework of the story is useful to her in so far as it can
tell the story of ‘falling into freedom’ and ‘falling into the
sacred…However, Daly’s solution, based on the exodus covenant of
cosmic sisterhood, assumes a monolithic interpretation of scripture as an
oppressive underpinning of patriarchy, and ignores counter-traditions of a
God who sets free form bondage, and an understanding of Jesus as
Liberator.100
Grey also concludes that Daly’s manner of handling the biblical narrative and
narratives “ignores the way that the stories have also had liberating as well as oppressive

99. Ibid., 68.
100. Mary Grey, “Falling Into Freedom: Searching for New Interpretations of Sin in a
Secular Culture,” Scottish Journal of Theology 47, no. 2: 236–37.
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effects on women.”101 It remains the case that for centuries and into the present women
have been spiritually nourished by the biblical narratives even apart from feminist
readings of retrieval. It may be that this conflict stems from an inadequate understanding
of the relationship between the biblical metanarrative and some of its discrete narratives.
Anthony Thiselton distinguishes the biblical narrative from the totalizing,
philosophical narratives rejected in postmodernity. “The Christian narrative is different.
For although the biblical writings and Christian doctrine do offer an overreaching
narrative of God’s dealings with the world from creation to the end-time, alongside this
drama the Bible offers ‘little narratives’ about particular people in particular places at
particular times. A dialectical interplay of coherence and contingency characterizes these
texts.”102 An overarching understanding of the metanarrative guides the interpretation and
theological appropriation of the discrete narratives. Lacking these hermeneutical tools,
the feminist readers either reject the whole (e.g. Daly) or appropriate it selectively (e.g.
Brock). This latter move becomes a species of the error of isolating a “canon within the
canon.”103 But the move is predictable because of the impossibility of correlating all of
the biblical narrative to a concept foreign to it.

A Story with No Ending

As we saw Brock defines sin not as a characteristic of humans but as an
unavoidable result of our relationality. Accordingly, it had no beginning per se but was a
101. Ibid., 237.
102. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 127 (emphasis original).
103. William J. Abraham mentions this tendency in his critique of Rosemary Radford
Ruether’s theology and notes its similarity to a similar tendency in other sectors of Protestantism.
Indeed, we will have cause to consider the “canon within the canon” problem in our examination
of evangelical definitions of sin. William J. Abraham, Canon and Criterion in Christian
Theology: From the Fathers to Feminism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 444.
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natural result of our fundamental relational human nature. We saw as well that Brock
does not see our relationality as something that was previously unmarred by this damage
and later corrupted. The ability to damage and be damaged is endemic to the human
condition. Brock’s solution—“an exploration of the depths of our most inner, personal
selves, as the root of our connections to all others”—doesn’t suggest that there is any
final solution to humanity’s problem. Rather individuals find “healing” in this life
through pursuing heart-healthy relationships with their whole hearts. Brock posits no
final resolution of humanity’s broken relationships in part because her system does not
allow it. If the damage that results in sin is endemic to our nature, there is no possibility
of transcending that situation except by transcending relationship which would make us
something other than human.104
That sin as a feature of human existence is without clear beginning nor final
resolution betrays the absence of narrative in Brock’s thought. In spite of her appeal to
full selves there is not a clear vision of what a human is to be nor what humanity as a
whole is pointed toward and therefore no clear identification of where it is going nor how
to get there.105 Consequently, there is a lack of clear basis for any of the ethical

104. Interestingly, Angela West links the focus on present activism with a modernist,
Enlightenment way of thought in contrast to a Christian eschatological framework. “In the
interpretation of social change as the practical meaning of theological hope, this theology
displayed its origins in the empirical and humanist philosophies of the Enlightenment, which saw
human history in the here and now as the arena of human transcendence. This replaced the
ancient Christian eschatology which looked forward to a consummation at the end of world
history in which divine judgment would set to rights the misery and injustice of the world.”
Angela West, Deadly Innocence: Feminist Theology and the Mythology of Sin (New York:
Cassell, 1995), 14.
105. On this point it is curious that Brock speaks of “the full humanity of women” far less
often than many other feminist thinkers. Her relational anthropology is not dependent on some
notion of “full humanity.”
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outworking of her concerns. As both Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre have argued,
ethical reasoning takes place within the context of some shared narrative.
One metaphor that Brock uses frequently is that of life as a journey. On its face it
seems that this image may have much in common with a narrative structure of life.
Journeys, like narratives, have a starting point and a trajectory as well as a mixture of
elements within the journeyer/character’s control and those imposed unbidden from
without. Journeys, like narratives, unfold in a certain way and like narratives, particular
moments in a journey are placed in an orienting context by both earlier and later parts of
the journey. However, Brock’s use of the metaphor of journey shows it to be lacking a
key ingredient that might cement the similarities: a destination. Of the new christological
vision of erotic power that she promotes she writes, “This risk is the process of being on
the way, not to a goal at the end of history or time, but always on the journey of
expectation that comes from the courage of living by heart.”106 Unlike most narratives
and journeys the journey Brock proposes has no orienting telos. Normally, one’s
destination is a crucial though not exclusive determinant of one’s path along the journey.
What guides the journey for Brock? She answers: “The journey into the territories of
erotic power like the women’s journey to Jesus’ tomb is a journey with surprises and no
definite goals. It can only be followed as our hearts lead us.”107 The solution, then, is a
radically interiorized and personalized perspective.
While acknowledging the gains of relational anthropologies in several feminist
theologians, Derek Nelson registers some reserve particularly on the depiction of sin that
eventuates. His concern is the “absence of culpability.” He writes:
106. Brock, Journeys by Heart, 105.
107. Ibid., 107.
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When the self is conceived so thoroughly in relational terms, it becomes
harder and harder to see how the relational self is a responsible moral
agent. Victims of childhood abuse internalize their abuse as it forms their
sense of identity or their sense of self. Those sinful relations contribute to
making the self who it really is (even as that self is not as it ‘should’ be),
and it is logical that future actions of this self will stem from its own selfunderstanding. Thus it is, in a way, understandable when a childhood
sexual abuse victim becomes a sexual abuser of children. Yet the Christian
doctrine of sin simply must (if anywhere, here!) say that this is simply
wrong. Child sexual abuse is against God, is against God’s creature, and is
unequivocally sin.108
Though Nelson’s critique is aimed specifically at the work of Margaret Suchocki,
it is apposite here. Brock’s insistence that sin is woven into the fabric of our innate
relationality and that we hurt others out of our own brokenness from being hurt by others,
seems to exonerate us. What is more, it appears to create an infinite regress, sin has no
beginning, a decidedly unnarratival concept.
At the close of Saving Paradise Brock and Parker soften somewhat their realized
eschatology somewhat by acknowledging the tension between paradise and pain in the
world. “What we need now is a religious perspective that does not locate salvation in a
future end point, a transcendent realm, or a zone after death. Paradise is not withheld,
closed, or removed from us. Realizing this requires us to let go of the notion that paradise
is life without struggle, life free from wrestling with legacies of injustice and current
forces of evil. Assuredly, we are in a world in which the struggle continues. However, it
is also true that we already live on holy ground, in the presence of God, with bodies and
souls sanctified by the Spirit’s anointing, surrounded by the communion of saints.”109
This sounds like the tension that one finds in a narrative view of the progress of
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redemption. But Brock and Parker’s solution offers virtually nothing to those who by
nature of the extremity of their suffering cannot experience the paradise this world has to
offer. They do not offer a satisfactory end to the story and so sin and death seem to win.

Content without Context
Crites’s concept of “abstraction” describes how thinkers seek to escape narrativity
by abstracting certain concepts for use as an explanatory device. Brock does this both
with the concepts of relationality and violence. As we have seen, violence is central to
Brock’s definition of sin, her understanding of the human condition, and her critique of
traditional atonement theologies. However, her understanding and use of the theme of
violence is marred by her failure to understand the nature of human existence
narrativally. Brock nowhere defines what she means by violence though she frequently
asserts what violence does. She thinks that the nature of violence is obvious. However,
violence is an abstract concept. It finds its content in and through some context. Whether
we regard an act as an act of violence is shaped by a variety of factors including the intent
and the context in which the violent act took place. For a simple example, self-defense
with a weapon is regarded very differently than assault.
She analyzes the crucifixion with her relational anthropology and finds it
appalling. Rather than assessing the significance of the act of God’s self-offering in the
person of Jesus Christ within the story line of God’s self-revelation through his
relationship with humanity and Israel in particular, a story that culminates with the
glorious inbreaking of the promised resurrection, she analyzes it as an event in a fatherson relationship and deems it cosmic child-abuse. No act, no matter how relational,
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makes any sense in isolation. Excising the cross from its narrative context will always
distort it in some way. As Peter Leithart has pointed out, later events effect earlier events.
In his example, a shooting at 10:00 AM can become a murder or even an assassination at
1:00 PM when the victim dies. The later event (death) provides content to the former
event.110 This is commonplace in the relationships between events in narrative and
dramatic settings. When applied to the crucifixion it becomes clear that it was indeed an
act of violence on the part of the human perpetrators, but succeeding events and the
nature of the Father-Son relationship render it as some other sort of act, but not a violent
one. Attention to both prior and later pieces of the narrative is required to truly
understand any event.
Interestingly, Brock’s transparent autobiographical revelations expose the dangers
of a failure to think narratively. After recounting her strained relationship with the man
she believed to be her father but later learned was her adoptive father Brock observes the
following:
At every opportunity I misjudged his behavior and drew the most
ungenerous conclusions about him. I was grateful to have come to a
moment when I could see his life more clearly and to acknowledge the
goodness in him, but my gratitude was weighed with sadness. My
reassessment of his life came a decade after his death, when it was too late
to restore our broken relationship and heal old wounds. And my life had
been turned upside down by the knowledge that he was not my birth
father. He conferred grace on someone else’s daughter.111
Brock’s personal experience depicts poignantly the impossibility of full and
accurate assessment at any given point and time of our own personal narratives. What
Brock is acknowledging is a feature of the narrative or dramatic nature of human
110. Peter J. Leithart, Deep Exegesis: The Mystery of Reading Scripture (Waco, Tex.:
Baylor University Press, 2009), 42.
111. Brock and Parker, Proverbs of Ashes, 243.
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experience and the need for epistemic modesty characteristic of some postmodern
thinking. Later information and events give meaning to earlier events and place them in a
context whereby they can be more accurately understood and assessed. While she has
observed this as a feature of her own lived experience she does not recognize the
relevance to her theology. With a dramatic approach to biblical theology and doctrine one
acknowledges that later events, even those yet to occur, give final significance and
context to the earlier ones. As we have seen, though, Brock has cut herself off from the
possibility that some later, “eschatological” events might put earlier ones in context. She
insists, rather, that the theological picture must make sense personally now. As she wrote
in Saving Paradise, “Life is actually sustained...by integration, interaction, and exchange
in the present—it is ecological, not eschatological.”112 She affirms this in at the personal
level as well. She writes, “I do not know what I think of life after death. I do not live with
the thought of what will come after I have died. If a conscious personal life transcends
my physical body, I am prepared to discern what to do when that time comes.”113 But if
there is some post-mortem existence in which people retain some measure of personal
identity, does it make any sense to suggest that the two parts of that existence—the premortem and post-mortem—bear little or no relation to each other nor mutually inform
each other?

Sin and the Stories of Genesis
As a final piece of our critique we want to examine Daly and Brock’s stance
toward the specific narratives of Genesis 1–11. Specifically we are interested in whether
112. Brock and Parker, Saving Paradise, 388.
113. Brock and Parker, Proverbs of Ashes, 227.
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their appropriation or rejection of the narratives reflects a sensitivity to their narrative
quality. Given the value of narrative in reflecting the complex relationship between
humans and sin, it is interesting to note the absence of explicit use of the biblical
narratives in feminist theology. As Lowe observes of the theologians she surveyed,
“although most retain the concept of original sin as a way to account for the brokenness
of our existence, none of the proposals (save that of Angela West) attempts to recover or
interpret the image of the Fall of Adam and Eve in the garden.”114

Interpretational Tools

In general we may observe that the interpretational methods that both Daly and
Brock bring to the Genesis narratives are not especially literary. Both bring a hermeneutic
of suspicion to the text. As we saw, Daly’s earlier work was fairly standard historicalcritical interpretation. Later, she began to employ a more free-flowing symbolism in her
biblical interpretation with an eye to subvert traditional readings. Brock pays scant
attention to the text, except to reject traditional readings. It would be accurate to say that
both Daly and Brock spend more time reacting to readings of the text than they do
interpreting the text itself.

Storied relationship
Stephen Crites’s categories of abstraction and contraction were useful in
elucidating how one’s theology may seek to break free of the narrativity of human
experience. Michael Root offers a further way to evaluate the relationship between a

114. Lowe, “Woman Oriented Hamartiologies,” 137.

112
story and the reader’s world that is useful in assessing a theologian’s appropriation of
biblical narratives. Root suggests that a story can bear a storied relationship to the
reader’s world or an illustrative relationship. In an illustrative relationship, “the story
illustrates certain redemptive truths about self, world, and God. The soteriological task is
to bring out the truths the story illustrates and show how they are redemptive.”115 This is
a less than fully narratival way to appropriate the story because the story itself must be
transcended for its redemptive features to become clear. That is, one must reach to
something beyond or behind the story for it to speak.
Root contrasts this illustrative approach with a storied approach which he
describes thus:
The Christian narrative can also bear a storied relation to the reader. The
Christian story and the life and world of the reader do not exist in
isolation, but constitute one world and one story. The reader is included in
the Christian story. The relation of story to reader becomes internal to the
story. As a result, the relations between the story and the reader become
storied relations, the sort of relations that are depicted in narratives...These
storied relations, rather than general truths the story illustrates, mediate
between story and reader. The story is good news because redemption
follows from the primary form of inclusion in the story. The task of
soteriology is then to show how the reader is included in the story and how
the story then is or can be the story of that reader's redemption.116
The narrative is not seen as something outside the reader’s world that can be translated
into principles that speak to the reader’s world but rather is regarded as of a piece with
the reader’s own world and life experience.
On the basis of this distinction, how do Mary Daly and Rita Nakashima Brock
relate to the biblical narratives of Genesis 1–11? Daly at first rejects the illustrative use to
115. Michael Root, “The Narrative Structure of Soteriology,” in Why Narrative?:
Readings in Narrative Theology, Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf
and Stock, 1989), ???
116. Root, “The Narrative Structure of Soteriology,” 266.
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which the fall narrative is put because of how often it is used to illustrate the sinfulness of
women. Later, however, she finds a way to read the narrative illustratively in favor of her
purposes by selectively using the images she finds there. We cite again her re-reading of
the fall:
I am now suggesting that there were intimations in the original myth—not
consciously intended—of a dreaded future. That is, one could see the myth
as prophetic of the real Fall that was yet on its way, dimly glimpsed. In
that dreaded event, women reach for knowledge and, finding it, share it
with men, so that together we can leave the delusory paradise of false
consciousness and alienation. In ripping the image of the Fall from its old
context we are also transvaluing it. That is, its meaning is divested of its
negativity and becomes positive and healing.117
Here, Daly’s appropriation of the narrative of the fall is mythical. But she freely admits
that reading it that way requires one to excise it from its original context, its original
embeddedness in a narrative. This reading obviously takes little consideration of the
literary features of the narrative, intentionally ignores the narrative context (both near and
far), and serves as little more than an illustration of the sea-change that Daly hopes the
rising tide of feminist concerns cause.
As we saw, Brock makes little use of the narratives of Genesis 1–11 in her
theology. She regards the series of narratives as illustrative of human behavior parallel to
other ancient literature. Though dissatisfied with readings that present woman as the
guilty party, she does not offer much of a counter reading. And since sin is endemic to
the relationally constituted human, no story of the origins of sin is necessary. The stories
are little more than one culture’s illustrations of the range of ways that humans display
relational brokenness.

117. Daly, Beyond God the Father, 67.
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As we will see in a later chapter, it is unfortunate that these thinkers reject the
narratives of Genesis 3–11 so quickly. There is certainly much within those texts that
overlaps with their concerns. Homicidal Cain, abusive Lamech, and the violence of
antediluvian humanity coincide well with Brock’s concern with violence. Similarly,
Lamech’s boorishness and the corporate aspects of the sin that precipitated the flood and
the dispersion at Babel echo Daly’s concerns of systemic sin and even the fallenness of
language. If nothing else, it is telling that while one may read Genesis 3 in such a way
that lays culpability at the woman’s feet, the succeeding narrative present the sinners as
principally male. But, having fallen into the same trap as the readings they reject—a
narratively restrictive reading of Genesis 3 as illustrative of sin—they deny themselves
rich theological resources.

Conclusion: Sin, Self and Story

Since its inception feminist theology has been concerned with sin. Eager to
transpose Christian doctrine and sin in particular into language that speaks relevantly to
female experience, feminist theologians have offered a range of retellings of Christian
scripture and doctrine. Rejecting the patriarchal and biblically based traditional versions
of sin, feminist theologians have attempted to articulate a definition of sin based off of
experientially derived anthropologies. In this study we examined the movement of two
theologians from anthropology to hamartiology and then critiqued the result. While in
some ways their definitions of sin did open up fresh ways to speak prophetically against
it, most notably structural sin, in the end their definitions of sin leave much to be desired.
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A particular piece that is lacking is any sense of development, particularly the
development captured in narrative. Their theology is controlled by concepts that admit of
little development, concepts such as female experience and relationality. These totalizing
concepts mark their work as modern and render their work of limited use in speaking
freshly to culture on the issue of sin.
We saw in particular that when these notions are brought to a reading of the
biblical texts regarding sin the outcomes are predetermined. The literary character of the
text—and especially its narrative character—is trumped by prior philosophical and
theological commitments. Accordingly, the biblical narrative and narratives are most
often seen as impeding feminist theology than supporting it.
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CHAPTER 3
SIN, SCRIPTURE AND STORY IN THE EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY
OF WAYNE GRUDEM AND MARGUERITE SHUSTER
Perhaps no Christian subgroup is more concerned than feminist theologians with
the role of sin than conservative Evangelicalism in both its Reformed and non-Reformed
branches. The centrality of conversion that David Bebbington identified as a defining
mark of Evangelicalism1 is tightly linked to a precise understanding of personal
complicity in the reality of human sinfulness. What is more, the doctrines of original sin
and total depravity have played a significant role in Evangelical theology. Indeed, words
like “Calvinist” and “Puritan” have come to be used pejoratively to describe excessive
attention to human depravity and sinfulness. Evangelism and the call to conversion
continue to be central to the evangelical ethos and so sinfulness, however it may be
defined, remains important to the group’s theological self-identity.
Whereas feminist interest in the doctrine of sin is born out of the intersection of
traditional definitions and the female experience, evangelical attention to the doctrine of
sin is rooted in adherence to the biblical text. Conservative Evangelical theology is
biblicist; though the biblical witness is construed a certain way. As William Abraham
narrates in his excellent study Canon and Criterion, various theological traditions
responded variously to the challenge to find epistemic grounds for the faith.2 In the
previous chapter we observed the direction that feminist theology takes in this matter:
1. One could likewise trace a link between Evangelicalism’s crucicentrism (another of
Bebbington’s helpful identifiers) and the centrality of sin-talk in Evangelical theology.
2. See especially chapters 5, 6 and 12 for the background to evangelical approach to
scripture and chapter 16 for Abraham’s evaluation of feminist theology’s position. William J.
Abraham, Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology: From the Fathers to Feminism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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grounding faith in experience. Following the Reformation, Evangelical Protestantism
opted for a form of theological foundationalism that grounded the authority of the faith in
Scripture alone. This move necessitated a robust doctrine of Scripture including a strong
doctrine of inspiration and inerrancy.3 The priority of the doctrine of Scripture can be
seen in the structure of many evangelical theology texts where discussion of the doctrine
of Scripture precedes and undergirds any of the other theological loci.
Combined with this biblicism was a rationalist and quasi-scientific approach to
the theological task which regarded the theologian’s responsibility as that of culling the
biblical witness for data that could be synthesized into propositions and definitions.
Charles Hodge offers one of the clearest statements of this theological approach. “The
Bible is no more a system of theology, than nature is a system of chemistry or of
mechanics. We find in nature the facts which the chemist or the mechanical philosopher
has to examine, and from them to ascertain the laws by which they are determined. So the
Bible contains the truths which the theologian has to collect, authenticate, arrange, and
exhibit in their internal relation to each other.”4 Though phrased in less scientific
language, we will see that at least one of our evangelical interlocutors has not strayed far
from this definition of the theological task.
Hans Frei recounts a parallel narrative concerning theologians’ approach to the
historical quality of the biblical narratives in his The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative.5
Historical criticism of the biblical narratives forced a decision between regarding the text
3. This legacy remains in the rather curious content of the doctrinal basis of the
Evangelical Theological Society which requires entrants to agree only to the inerrancy of
Scripture in the autographs and the doctrine of the Trinity.
http://www.etsjets.org/about/constitution#A3. Accessed 11/29/2013.
4. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 1:1.
5. Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative; a Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Century Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
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as myth or history. When faced with this choice, evangelicalism opted for history. As
Frei notes, the result has been an often apologetic enterprise seeking to support the text’s
historical claims externally. Ironically, this has often resulted in an inattention to the
specific features of the text as it has been supposed that the revelation is the event behind
the text rather than the text itself. So despite avowed biblicism, the evangelical reader
reads the event, not the text. Texts are not allowed to speak on their own, but merely
point beyond themselves to the historical events they purport to record.
It was specifically on the matter of the historicity of the resurrection that
evangelical spokesman Carl F. H. Henry took issue with Hans Frei in an interchange
about narrative theology. Henry appreciated the narrative theologians’ attention to the
biblical text but was concerned that their stance toward the historical reality behind the
texts was insufficient.
Narrative hermeneutics embraces uncertainty over historicity. The primary
interest of Christian interpretation need not be and is not historiography.
But a narrative-dramatic approach involving kerygmatic creativity is so
open to realistic theological fiction that it readily obscures historical fact
and clouds the foundations of a stable faith. The Christian Gospel is
inseparably dependent upon God’s self-revelation and soteric sacrifice
within the historical space-time continuum, and it is incumbent on those
who claim that narrative story and history are not incompatible to clarify
which historical specifics are nonnegotiable.6

6. Carl F. H. Henry, “Narrative Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal,” Trinity Journal 8,
no. 1 (Spring 1987): 13 Henry’s critique also reacted on the basis of narrative theology’s
relationship to core evangelical doctrines like inerrancy. “Narrative theologians reduce biblical
historicity and inerrancy to second-order questions; historical reliability is not a basic exegetical
premise, nor is biblical inerrancy. Since narrative hermeneutics focuses upon the received text,
questions of what lies behind the text—such as its authorship and its historical referentiality—are
bracketed. These questions, it is said, are not forefront concerns for the believer living in the
biblical world” (14). Henry is right but merely demonstrates that evangelicals and narrative
theologians (pace Abraham) search in different places for the epistemic grounding for their
claims.
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Because of his focus on the historicity of the text Henry overlooked many of the
advantages of construing the biblical text as an overarching narrative.
Both narrative theology and evangelicalism’s relationship to it have developed
since Henry’s initial interaction with it. All of these matters—epistemology, theological
methodology, and history—are topics of active discussion in evangelical theology. In
particular a work like Kevin Vanhoozer’s The Drama of Doctrine interacts with questions
of the doctrinal propositionalism and the function of the canon in the church.7
Furthermore, the movement referred to as the “Theological Interpretation of Scripture”
has been influenced heavily by criticism of dry, modern, scientific approaches to the
biblical text and seeks to appropriate scripture through greater literary attention and
informed by theological considerations not unlike the pre-modern guide of “the rule of
faith.”8 And V. Phillips Long, among others, has made careful arguments that historical
accuracy and literary shaping are not mutually exclusive.9 Furthermore, influenced in part
by N. T. Wright’s articulation of the drama of Israel in The New Testament and the
People of God there has been a marked interest in framing the entirety of scripture in the
terms of an overarching narrative.10

7. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to
Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).
8. Indeed, one of the seminal documents of this movement is David Steinmetz’s “The
Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis.” David C. Steinmetz, “The Superiority of Pre-Critical
Exegesis,” Theology Today 37, no. 1 (Ap 1980): 27–38.
9. V. Philips Long, The Art of Biblical History, Foundations of Contemporary
Interpretation, vol. 5. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994).
10. Several works of biblical theology have taken up the rubric of narrative to address all
of scripture or sections within it. The whole Bible: Craig G. Bartholomew and Michael W.
Goheen, The Drama of Scripture: Finding Our Place in the Biblical Story (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2004), the Hebrew Bible: Stephen G. Dempster, Dominion and Dynasty: A Biblical
Theology of the Hebrew Bible, New Studies in Biblical Theology (Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2003), and discrete biblical books: Timothy G. Gombis, The Drama of Ephesians:
Participating in the Triumph of God (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2010).
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Though there are certainly movements afoot within evangelicalism seeking to
reshape the movement’s approach to Scripture and theology, it is clear that, broadly
speaking, there is still an attachment to a biblicism that leans toward proof-texting and a
preference to summarize doctrines in propositions. This is especially true at the pastoral
and lay level. Hence, as was surveyed in chapter 1, there is broad acceptance of the
definition of sin as found in the Westminster Shorter Catechism question 14: “What is
sin? Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God.”
Evangelicalism, however, is not of a piece. Reformed and non-reformed
theologians approach the biblical text and discrete theological loci from different angles
and with different emphases. In this chapter we will examine two approaches to the topic
of sin from within different sectors of evangelicalism, in the work of Wayne Grudem and
Marguerite Shuster. For our purposes Grudem represents traditional, evangelical theology
and theologizing. As we will see, his approach is biblical, historical, and propositional.
His work is widely read in conservative evangelical circles and his Systematic Theology
is a popular college and seminary text. Furthermore, Grudem has continued to apply his
theological method in a host of other areas: work, politics, and economics.11 Marguerite
Shuster represents a moderate, reformed, evangelical position. She uses a covenantal
approach to scripture but is more open to dialog between science, history, and the biblical
text. As we survey their approaches to sin we will find that their approach to Scripture
and theology is the controlling factor in their interpretation much as the category of
anthropology (or self) was for the feminist theologians surveyed in the previous chapter.
11. Wayne Grudem, Business for the Glory of God: The Bible’s Teaching on the Moral
Goodness of Business (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2003); Wayne Grudem, Politics According to
the Bible: A Comprehensive Resource for Understanding Modern Political Issues in Light of
Scripture (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010); Barry and Wayne Grudem Asmus, The Poverty of
Nations: A Sustainable Solution (Wheaton: Crossway, 2013).
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SIN, SCRIPTURE, AND STORY IN THE THEOLOGY OF WAYNE GRUDEM

For our purposes, Wayne Grudem will represent the conservative end of the
Evangelical continuum. This is not because he is especially influential across the broad
sweep of academic Evangelicalism but because his theology and approach to Scripture
represent the “old guard” of Evangelicalism, a movement that is still very much alive
especially at the pastoral and lay level. His Systematic Theology while again, not
reflecting the shifts and changes in Evangelical theological methodology, is still very
popular as a college and seminary text and highly regarded at the lay level. Before we
examine Grudem’s theology of sin directly, we will briefly consider his relationship to
feminist theology and his approach to Scripture and the theological task more broadly.

Wayne Grudem and Feminist Theology
Grudem has written extensively on what he terms “Evangelical Feminism.”12
Much of this has not been theological interaction with significant thinkers in feminist
theology but rather with the movement within Evangelicalism called “egalitarianism”
which argues for equality between the sexes in the church and home rather than
defending role and leadership distinctions. The main focus of his work there concerns
practical considerations such as male and female roles in the church, home, and society.
Grudem has not offered a sustained biblical or theological critique of feminist theology
and its methods, choosing instead to focus on the handling and interpretation of specific

12. Wayne Grudem, Evangelical Feminism: A New Path to Liberalism? (Wheaton:
Crossway Books, 2006); Wayne Grudem, Countering the Claims of Evangelical Feminism
(Sisters, Or.: Multnomah Publishers, 2006); Wayne Grudem, Evangelical Feminism & Biblical
Truth: An Analysis of More Than One Hundred Disputed Questions (Sisters, Or.: Multnomah
Publishers, 2004).
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texts.13 Since much of the debate about male and female roles is centered in the text of
Genesis 1–3, we may find his approach to countering feminist readings of those texts
illuminating of his approach to scripture in general and the Genesis texts in particular.
Perhaps the only point of agreement between Grudem and feminist theologians is
on the sinfulness of chauvinism. “For most cultures through most of history the most
serious deviation from biblical standards regarding men and women has not been
feminism, but harsh and oppressive male chauvinism. It still exists today, not only in
some families in the United States, but also in a number of cultures throughout the
world.”14 Grudem asserts that the concept of the imago dei in Genesis 1:27 establishes
the fundamental equality of men and women and renders unacceptable the mistreatment
of women by men.
Wherever men are thought to be better than women, wherever husbands
act as selfish ‘dictators,’ wherever wives are forbidden to have their own
jobs outside the home or to vote or to own property or to be educated,
wherever women are treated as inferior, wherever there is abuse or
violence against women or rape or female infanticide or polygamy or
harems, the biblical truth of equality in the image of God is being denied.
To all societies and cultures where these things occur, we must proclaim
that the very first page of God’s Word bears a fundamental and irrefutable
witness against these evils.15
Unlike most feminist theologians, however, Grudem does not see evidence of this
chauvinism inscribed in the structures of culture nor in the rhetoric of Scripture. To the
contrary, he believes that the Bible repudiates male chauvinism. He does not, however,
offer a comprehensive approach for reckoning with the presence and even apparent
acceptance of some of these practices in scripture.

13. See especially Grudem, Evangelical Feminism & Biblical Truth.
14. Ibid., 524.
15. Ibid., 26.
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Wayne Grudem, Scripture and Theology

Grudem begins his systematic theology and adverts to his theological method
with a definition of systematic theology. “Systematic theology is any study that answers
the question, ‘What does the whole Bible teach us today?’ about any given topic.”16
While he acknowledges that others include consideration of historical and philosophical
investigation in their definition of systematic theology, he concludes that despite what
those fields may contribute, “only Scripture has the final authority to define what we are
to believe.”17 Not surprisingly, therefore, he articulates the process of theological study as
“collecting and understanding all the relevant passages of Scripture on any topic.”18 This
definition and process appears to regard both the discipline of theology and the text of
Scripture in much the same way as those who approached the Bible as the storehouse of
theological facts and systematic theology as the science of organizing the data as
captured in the quote from Charles Hodge included in chapter 1. What is missing is any
overarching structure for the approach to scripture or narrative to orient the various parts.
Apart from any other description, one must conclude that Grudem will approach all texts
in an undifferentiated way.
There is, in a sense, conflicting evidence on Grudem’s approach to scripture. On
the one hand, one of his recent editorial projects is Understanding the Big Picture of the
Bible which includes survey essays on the various biblical corpora and is headed by a
16. Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Pub. House, 1994), 21 (emphasis original).
17. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 22 It could be argued that Grudem is conflating
theology, doctrine, and dogma in this definition. Interestingly, a later distillation of his Systematic
Theology was perhaps more appropriately entitled Bible Doctrine. Wayne Grudem, Bible
Doctrine: Essential Teachings of the Christian Faith, ed. Jeff Purswell (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1999).
18. Ibid., 35.
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chapter offering “An Overview of the Bible’s Storyline.”19 This idea of “the Bible’s
storyline” seems influenced by the movement toward narrative theology. The very notion
of a “storyline” includes some concept of plot development. Additionally, as president of
the Evangelical Theological Society Grudem made a call for “whole Bible exegetes” to
take up the task of informing the church on what the whole Bible says on topics
various.20 Grudem has taken up this task himself on questions such as male and female
roles, business, and more recently, politics and economics. On the other hand, Grudem
has been sharply critical of William Webb’s “redemptive-historical hermeneutic”, a
method that purports to read a trajectory of ethical development in scripture on topics
such as slavery and women’s roles in church and society.21 While Webb does not speak
in terms of narrative, his method acknowledges an unfolding not unlike that which one
expects in a well-plotted narrative. Grudem, by contrast, regards the text as a doctrinally
consistent whole that can be approached at any point directly with the same set of tools.

Wayne Grudem’s Theology of Sin

After a brief chapter introducing the concept of systematic theology, Grudem
breaks down his work into seven parts which unfold in a fairly traditional manner. As is
common in biblicist theologies, part one concerns the “Doctrine of the Word of God.”
Only then does he turn to the doctrine of God, then man. The topic of sin finds its place
19. See Vern Poythress’ Chapter 1 of Wayne Grudem, C. John Collins, and Thomas R.
Schreiner, eds., Understanding the Big Picture of the Bible: A Guide to Reading the Bible Well
(Wheaton: Crossway, 2012).
20. Wayne Grudem, “Do We Act as If We Really Believe That the ‘the Bible Alone, and
the Bible in Its Entirety, is the Word of God Written’?” Journal of the Evangelical Theological
Society 43, no. 1 (March 2000): 7.
21. William J. Webb, Slaves, Women & Homosexuals: Exploring the Hermeneutics of
Cultural Analysis (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001).
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after a discussion of the creation of man, man as male and female, and the essential22
nature of man.23 The chapter on sin itself addresses the definition of sin, the origin of sin,
inherited sin24, actual sin, and the punishment of sin.

Defining Sin
Grudem starts the chapter with his definition of sin. “We may define sin as
follows: Sin is any failure to conform to the moral law of God in act, attitude, or
nature.”25 In that definition one can hear more than a mere echo of the Westminster
Shorter Catechism. This “failure of conformity” extends beyond acts to include desires,
evidence for which Grudem finds in the tenth commandment’s prohibition of coveting.
This lack of conformity is not merely a matter of acts which fail to conform to the law but
includes the nature of sinful humans. Accordingly, Grudem writes that “[e]ven while
asleep, an unbeliever, though not committing sinful actions or actively nurturing sinful
attitudes, is still a ‘sinner’ in God’s sight; he or she still has a sinful nature that does not
conform to God’s moral law.”26 He does not, however, unpack much in what this sinful
nature consists. In so saying, Grudem positions himself vis-à-vis the condition vs. act
polarity of sin. Sin is both condition and act, though the emphasis falls on act.
22. By “essential” Grudem speaks more to the composite parts of a human—body, soul,
spirit— than to the question taken up in much feminist literature regarding the essentialist or
contructivist understanding of gender.
23. On David Kelsey’s reading, the move of the doctrine of sin from the area of creation
to theological anthropology is just one of a series of migrations that the doctrine of sin has made,
each with its own set of theological implications. David H Kelsey, “Whatever Happened to the
Doctrine of Sin,” Theology Today 50, no. 2 (July 1993): 172.
24. Grudem explains his use of the term “inherited sin” as opposed to the more common
“original sin” by saying that the latter term “seems so easily to be misunderstood to refer to
Adam’s first sin, rather than to the sin that is ours as a result of Adam’s fall.” He finds the phrase
“inherited sin”, therefore, more readily understandable. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 494.
25. Ibid., 490.
26. Ibid., 491.
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Grudem acknowledges that there are other definitions of sin’s essence on offer, in
particular he mentions “selfishness.” He finds this definition wanting, however, because
the Bible doesn’t define sin thus, some self-interest is approved in scripture, many sins
cannot be said to be selfish, and such a definition would seem to impugn God’s character
since he seeks his own glory.27 As the first point makes clear, his principal problem with
defining sin as selfishness is a biblicist and propositionalist one, namely, that the Bible
does not define it that way. He concludes:
It is far better to define sin in the way Scripture does, in relationship to
God’s law and his moral character. John tells us that ‘sin is lawlessness’ (1
John 3:4). When Paul seeks to demonstrate the universal sinfulness of
mankind, he appeals to the law of God, whether the written law given to
the Jew (Rom. 2:17–29) or the unwritten law that operates in the
consciences of Gentiles who, by their behavior, ‘show that what the law
requires is written on their hearts’ (Rom. 2:15). In each case their
sinfulness is demonstrated by their lack of conformity to the moral law of
God.28
Grudem makes absolutely clear that God is the ultimate referent of the definition
of sin. Sin’s impact on other humans, the self, or the world is not emphasized. He
expands slightly on the concept of sin being contrary to the law of God by saying that sin
is what is contrary to the character of God. “In a universe created by God, sin ought not
to be approved. Sin is directly opposite to all that is good in the character of God, and just
as God necessarily and eternally delights in himself and in all that he is, so God
necessarily and eternally hates sin. It is, in essence, the contradiction of the excellence of
his moral character. It contradicts his holiness, and he must hate it.”29 But clearly the

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 492.
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controlling notion is the concrete concept of the law of God, a law that manifests God’s
character.
Several observations can be made at this point regarding Grudem’s definition of
sin. First, he approaches the biblical text expecting to find and then finding a definition of
sin, a definition he later refers to as a definition of sin’s essence. Second, this definition,
as the quote above reveals, is heavily dependent on the more discursive texts in scripture,
such as the epistolary literature. Third, sin is an assault against God. Its effects on other
humans or the world are secondary at best. Fourth, sin is primarily a legal matter. While
Grudem will comment on sin having the effect of damaging one’s relationship with God,
the relational aspect so central to other theologies is almost non-existent here. By
contrast, he underscores the legal aspect several times. “In terms of our legal standing
before God, any one sin, even what may seem to be a very small one, makes us legally
guilty before God and therefore worthy of eternal punishment. Adam and Eve learned
this in the Garden of Eden, where God told them that one act of disobedience would
result in the penalty of death.”30 Fifth, sin is personal. Nowhere in the discussion of this
chapter does Grudem recognize any social or corporate aspects of sin.

Sin and Genesis 3–11

It is not until his discussion of the origin of sin that Grudem engages the narrative
of Genesis. His principal objective is to explain how sin came to be a part of the world.
While he does not give it extended attention, he acknowledges that prior to the sin of
Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden sin was already in the world through the fall of

30. Ibid., 501.

128
Satan and the demons.31 From a human perspective, however, sin entered the world
through Adam and Eve’s act of eating of the tree as narrated in Genesis 3. There is no
doubt that Grudem regards the narrative of Genesis 3 as a fall narrative. But we should
note here that he already equates the situation of Satan and the fallen angels with that of
humanity.
While Grudem’s literalist interpretational method does not allow for Adam and
Eve and their actions to be understood mythically, he still wants to find something
universal or representative about their act. “Their eating of the fruit of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil is in many ways typical of sin generally.”32 So he intends to
find in this originary sin further information about the definition of sin. His analysis finds
that their sin offered divergent answers to the questions “What is true?”, “What is right?”,
and “Who am I?”, questions of reality, morality, and identity. Eve erred by doubting the
veracity of God’s word, by trusting her own judgment, and by trading subordination to
God for an attempt to become like him. Grudem suggests that the narrative of the fall
reveals the truth that sin is ultimately irrational; the choice of Adam and Eve to disobey
was a foolish choice.
Grudem insists on the “historical truthfulness of the narrative of the fall of Adam
and Eve.”33 Since the account is part of a book that is historical narrative, “so also this
account of the fall of man, which follows the history of man’s creation, is presented by
the author as straightforward, narrative history.”34 Having regarded the text primarily as
history, Grudem nowhere interacts with any of the literary features of the text, features

31. Ibid., 492.
32. Ibid., 492–93.
33. Ibid., 493.
34. Ibid.
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that, as we will see in the following chapter, problematize the isolation of this narrative.
He effectively decontextualizes the narrative, not only from what follows but also from
what precedes it. Meir Sternberg identifies this as a principal error in the use of narrative.
He notes “the tendency to read biblical texts out of communicative context, with little
regard for what they set out to achieve and the exigencies attaching to its achievement.
Elements thus get divorced from the very terms of reference that assign to them their role
and meaning: parts from wholes, means from ends, forms from functions. Nothing could
be less productive and more misleading.”35 In the case of Grudem’s reading of Genesis 3,
the prohibition regarding the tree is in singular focus without reference to the prior
instructions regarding fruitfulness and dominion. Accordingly, Grudem is interpreting the
event, not the text, an ironic twist given his avowed biblicism.36 A more literary approach
to this text would consider how the fall of Adam and Eve related to the imago dei and
their call to steward the earth. It might further examine the fall out in the following
chapters.

Wayne Grudem on Sin: Summary
We will reserve our critique of Wayne Grudem’s theology of sin for later but we
will pause here to summarize what we have seen. Grudem’s approach to theology and the
question of sin is thoroughly biblicist and propositional. In David Kelsey’s rubric,

35. Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the
Drama of Reading (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 1–2.
36. Like Peter Leithart’s comment in chapter 1, John Sailhamer brings this specific
charge against evangelicals: “The effect of overlooking the text of Scripture in favor of a focus on
the events of Israel’s history can often be a ‘biblical’ theology that is little more than a philosophy
of history, an exegetical method that is set on expounding the meaning of the events lying behind
Scripture rather than those depicted in Scripture itself.” John H. Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as
Narrative: A Biblical-Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 17.
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Grudem regards the doctrines of scripture as its authoritative voice. His definition of sin,
the violation of divine law, focuses on the individual’s act against God. He approaches
the biblical narrative text as history and therefore reads the act of Adam and Eve in
Genesis 3 as an isolated incident that is not informed substantially by the context nor any
literary features of the text.

SIN, SCRIPTURE, AND STORY IN THE THEOLOGY OF MARGUERITE SHUSTER

As was discussed above, Marguerite Shuster occupies a different sector of
Evangelicalism than does Wayne Grudem. She theologizes within the context of
Reformed, covenantal theology. It will be instructive to see whether her approach to
Scripture and theology or her feminine perspective shape her understanding of sin in
profitable ways. Some of her work has been done in conjunction with Paul Jewett.37 Her
stand-alone volume on sin was produced in part from the late Jewett’s notes and on the
basis of their previous collaboration.38 Before examining her definition of sin and the role
that Genesis 3–11 play in her formulation of it, we will consider her relationship to
feminist theology and its definitions of sin. Following that brief orientation we will turn
to examine Shuster’s handling of sin and the role that the narratives of Genesis 3–11 play
in her formulation of the doctrine.

37. We may have cause to reference her collaborations with Jewett: Paul K. Jewett, God,
Creation & Revelation, with sermons by Marguerite Shuster (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans,
1991) and Paul K. Jewett, and Margurite Shuster, Who We Are: Our Dignity as Human: A NeoEvangelical Theology, and with sermons by Marguerite Shuster (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996).
38. Marguerite Shuster, The Fall and Sin: What We Have Become as Sinners (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans Pub., 2004).
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Marguerite Shuster and Feminist Theology

Though the concerns of feminist theology are not of primary interest to Shuster,
she writes with an awareness of the many issues that animate feminist theology. At times
her work evinces the influence of feminist contributions to the theology of sin. In general,
however, her position vis-à-vis the feminist theological project is a contrary one. Shuster
acknowledges the feminist concern that “a traditional understanding of the Fall fosters
many evils rather than setting men and women on a good and true path.”39 Likewise she
acknowledges the important role that structures of sin play in the transmission of sin,
though she ultimately rejects the environmental explanation as insufficient on at least
biblical if not experiential grounds.40 She comments more extensively on several other
points that intersect with feminist hamartiological concerns.

The Imitation of Christ

In a provocative article Shuster confronts an issue near to the heart of feminist
critiques of traditional doctrines of sin: the misuse of the idea of the imitation of Christ.41
As we saw in chapter 2, feminist theologians like Rita Nakashima Brock react negatively
to a Christian piety of self-abnegation which they link directly to the identification of the
root of sin as pride and its remedy, the imitatio Christi, because of what they perceive to
be its negative effects on women. Shuster’s critique of the theology of imitation
popularized by such books as On the Imitation of Christ by Thomas à Kempis and more
39. Shuster, Fall and Sin, 56.
40. “The environmental view [of the transmission of original sin] has widely been seen as
seductive but as inadequate to the actual depth of evil (not to mention that the Bible does not
speak as if the environment is the fundamental problem).” Shuster, Fall and Sin, 203.
41. Marguerite Shuster, “The Use and Misuse of the Idea of the Imitation of Christ,” Ex
Auditu 14 (1998): 70–81.
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recently by Charles Sheldon’s In His Steps is a biblical critique rather than an experiential
one.42 She notes a “dubious selectivity” in the appropriation of elements of Jesus’s life
for imitation and identifies this as another example of “our ongoing tendency to
domesticate scripture, and indeed, to domesticate Jesus.”43 In the end Shuster links her
concern with the piety of imitation with the doctrine of sin. She writes: “I have an
overriding concern that imitation themes taken alone seriously underplay the effects of
the Fall on all of our faculties and endeavors.”44 She fears that the impulse to imitate
underestimates the severity and totality of our fallenness. Ultimately, she traces the point
back to Christ. “My fundamental point is that what we need, and what the NT offers us, is
first and foremost, not an example, but a Savior. My major caveat with respect to
imitation themes is that they tend to obscure that fundamental point.”45 Of course, at this
point it is clear that Shuster’s concern with the imitatio Christi is far different from that of
the feminist theologians. What is of interest, however, is how tightly linked the criticisms
are to the understanding of sin.

Sin and Gender

Though she does not deal with gender and sin at length, Shuster does comment on
this dimension of the fall and sin with the narrative of Genesis 3 as her starting point. She
notes that “since the judgment pronounced bore differently on men and women, it is
reasonable to conclude that differing circumstances would generate different
42. Sheldon’s book, written at the turn of the last century, enjoyed a recent popular
resurgence which was partially responsible for the “What Would Jesus Do?” movement within
evangelicalism. In taking aim at this manifestation of the imitation of Christ, Shuster shows
herself to be, like Brock, interested in popular piety not just theological abstraction.
43. Shuster, “Imitation of Christ,” 76.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., 74.
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temptations.”46 Yet Shuster sees no essential female characteristics embedded in the
narrative. Instead she observes: “The tendencies labeled in our day as particular problems
for women appear in the narrative itself as a result of the Fall rather than as due to the
intrinsic nature of woman—a rather remarkable bit of self-transcendence for the biblical
writer, who apparently did not blithely assume that the traditional place of women is part
of the very structure of creation.”47 This last assessment, of course, runs counter to the
common feminist claim that the biblical texts betray the social conventions of their day.
While we will see that she finds some material in the Genesis 3 narrative fruitful for
reflection along gender lines, she ultimately concludes that “both the fall narrative and
our human experience are too richly textured, and our sins too convoluted, to lend
themselves to entirely tidy categorization along gender lines.”48
Beyond the narrative of the fall itself Shuster is wary of the feminist tendency to
cast the discussion of sin in terms of gender. She echoes the concerns of Angela West and
others when she warns women against the danger of self-exoneration. While implicitly
acknowledging Valerie Saiving’s concern for the inclusion of gender in the discussion of
sin in principle, Shuster rejects the application of gender as the primary lens. “Swinging
from paying no attention whatever to possible gender influences on behavior, to relying
too exclusively on them, may allow one to fail to attend to the sins she actually commits,
either because her nemesis is stereotypically that of the other gender, or because she
absolves herself of responsibility for sins presumably ‘wired in’ by her gender identity on
the grounds that she cannot help them.”49 In so saying she clearly sets herself and her

46. Shuster, Fall and Sin, 155.
47. Ibid., 58.
48. Ibid., 58–59.
49. Ibid., 157.
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method apart from extreme positions like Mary Daly’s but even from more moderate
conclusions like those of Rita Nakashima Brock.

Feminist Definitions of Sin

Shuster explicitly rejects the notion that traditional definitions of sin need revision
because they rob humans (and especially women) of dignity and risk casting them into
despair. Even further, she denies that focus on individual sin should be discarded in favor
of attention to sin’s corporate and systemic dimensions. She writes:
Not, of course, that we should lose sight of the labors and insights of those
who have sensitized us to the devastating effects of structural and systemic
evils, including oppression and discrimination in their myriad forms. Sin is
not just a matter of small-scale nastiness. Nonetheless, loss of the category
of sin at the individual level more surely robs us of dignity and of hope
than does the most punishing ‘miserable sinner’ theology of another age.
After all, ‘miserable sinners’ retain the status of those who have
responsibility for their behavior and the prospects of a Savior who can
deliver them. Those who are only victims of governments, cultures,
psychology, or biology are shut up to whatever help compassion for their
state may (or may not) evoke, whatever healing a new technology may
provide, or whatever transformations the latest public reform efforts or
private bootstrap operations may produce—a set of options that should not
cheer the clear-eyed observer of human history. These efforts to protest
individual innocence, that is, come at an extremely high—not to mention
unbiblical—price.50
Later, Shuster explicitly counters feminist calls for more human-friendly
definitions of sin in terms of weakness or brokenheartedness rather than blame and guilt.
“We do not see it as merely fortuitous, and certainly not as indifferent, that many feminist
discussions of ‘sin’ have moved away from anything that traditionally merits that name
and in the direction of emphasis on our fragility and finitude.”51 After briefly

50. Ibid., 101.
51. Ibid., 157.
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summarizing the work of Rita Nakashima Brock as representative she concludes: “One
can hardly avoid the conclusion that either these authors wish to define what is
traditionally meant by sin out of existence, or else they are confusing sin and certain of its
effects.”52 Other than this censorious remark, Shuster’s comments on feminist theology
are cast more as a demurral from the feminist position rather than as a sustained
critique.53

Marguerite Shuster, Scripture and Theology
Due to the nature of her work, Shuster’s book does not offer an extended
treatment of her theological methodology at the outset as does Grudem’s. But since she
does regard it as essentially an extension of Jewett’s work, we can gather some sense of
method from his earlier volumes. Jewett’s discussion of theology as a science and the
challenges of theological language as well as his recognition of the contributions of
philosophy and history to the theological task make his account of the practice of
theology more nuanced than Grudem’s. He begins his work not with the doctrine of
Scripture but with the doctrine of God’s self-revelation in creation and providence, in
Jesus Christ, and finally, in Scripture where he addresses canon, inspiration and
inerrancy, articulating a nuanced but more or less evangelical position.
In a brief excursus Jewett interacts briefly with the idea of narrative theology. His
conclusion, which is borne out in Shuster’s handling of scripture, is that “the biblical
52. Ibid., 158.
53. Shuster also rejects the notion that sin, however defined, is endemic to the human
condition and intrinsic to creation. “To suggest that evil is intrinsic to the creation (or to say that
humankind fell not in, but into history) impugns the Creator: it implies that he lacked the power
or the will to make a world and human beings that were simply good, as Genesis 1 proclaims—
whether because of the limitations imposed by finitude or the recalcitrance of matter or
whatever.” Shuster, Fall and Sin, 5.
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story is to be understood historically, in contrast to those who accept the more radical
conclusions of historical criticism.”54 He allows that not all biblical narrative material can
be read in a completely historical way, however. “This does not mean that we will look
upon the Bible as a simple reporting of historical fact from cover to cover. Such an
approach, in our judgment, is fraught with difficulty, especially when applied to the
primal history of Genesis 1–11 with which the Bible begins, and to the Apocalypse with
which it ends. We do not understand the opening Chapters of Genesis as science nor the
book of Revelation as Monday morning’s headlines on Sunday. But neither is the biblical
story, for us, a fiction like the myths of ancient Greece.”55 Here we can see Jewett (and
Shuster) trying to carve out a more nuanced historical and genre attentive stance on
Scripture but we will have to see how this works out in practice.
Marguerite Shuster’s Theology of Sin

Though Shuster, unlike Grudem, theologizes in the context of covenantal
theology, quite quickly it becomes clear that this reference point does not have a
profound effect on the definition of sin that she offers. In explicating the conditions of the
covenant she declares that “The fundamental requirement of the covenant is
obedience.”56 If the primary demand of the covenant is obedience, then the fundamental
failure in the covenant is, by implication, disobedience. What is important to note is that
unlike Grudem, the foundation for Shuster’s thinking about the definition of sin is not
scripture directly (consider his reference to the definition of sin in 1 John) but rather the

54. Paul K. Jewett, God, Creation & Revelation, 16.
55. Ibid.
56. Shuster, Fall and Sin, 17.
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concept of covenant that she holds structures the divine-human relationship and provides
the best framework for understanding the biblical material. However, the end result is
essentially the same: sin is disobedience to divine law.
While we will offer a more sustained critique later, it is appropriate to pause here
and note that summarizing the requirement of the law as obedience runs afoul of Jesus’s
own summary of the covenant relationship, namely, love for God and neighbor (Matthew
22:36-40). Further, we observe the conceptual affinity between offering a “definition” of
sin’s essence and attempting to isolate the “fundamentum” of the covenant relationship.
Unlike many other evangelical theologians, the biblical terminology for sin does
not enter in to Shuster’s argument significantly. She appends to her work almost as an
afterthought a brief overview to the biblical vocabulary for sin. Interestingly for this
study, however, is the final summary she offers which turns out to be the final statement
in the book. After surveying the New Testament vocabulary for sin she summarizes: “In
each case, though, God’s order, norm, or standard has been breached.”57 One can see how
the biblical vocabulary continues to make its presence felt even in treatments that demur
from philological study as theological method.
Genesis 3–11 in Marguerite Shuster’s Theology of Sin

Unlike Grudem, Shuster gives prominent and extended attention to the narrative
of Genesis 3. “[T]he fall narrative has a kind of prominence due to its position in the
Bible, its familiarity, and the power of the story itself that requires us to come to grips

57. Ibid., 265.
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with what the story (and its place in the primal history) means.”58 Its importance for
Shuster is specifically as a fall narrative.59 While she acknowledges a scholarly trend to
dismiss the notion of a fall as theologically useful and the Bible’s silence with reference
to the idea, she asserts that the concept of the fall is necessary and warranted by the
narrative. “[W]e demur from the conclusion that it does not matter whether anything that
can be called a ‘fall’ occurred in the chronological past, but only that we recognize now
that things are out of joint.”60
In her examination of the fall she finds evidence for the motivators of pride and
unbelief. “While we cannot—must not—explain the Fall, we can reflect descriptively
upon its nature, as laid out in the biblical story. As an act, the seizing of the fruit was an
act of disobedience to the express divine command, a disobedience that the narrative
implies involved both disbelief in the divine word and a coveting of the divine
prerogatives (pride).”61 It is hard to see in these comments how Shuster has avoided
“explaining the Fall.” But in finding both pride and unbelief in the narrative, Shuster
brings together two streams of Christian thought.

The Fall, Historicity and Narrativity

Though she insists upon the importance of situating the origin of sin in the
chronological past Shuster avoids making any firm statement as to the historicity of the
58. Ibid., 5.
59. Shuster is aware of the debate both biblically and theologically regarding receiving
Genesis 3 as a fall narrative. “We must acknowledge that the contemporary predilection of many
biblical scholars and theologians to give short shrift to the Fall—even at a time when there is a
renewed interest in sin—does not lack reasons. It is true that the Bible itself does not speak
directly of a ‘fall,’ nor does the rest of the Old Testament or the Gospels refer to the events of
Genesis 3 as such as the source of human ills.” Shuster, Fall and Sin, 4.
60. Ibid., 5.
61. Ibid., 49.
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Genesis narratives. In this she differs from the strongly historical position that Wayne
Grudem takes. Indeed, her statements on the matter verge on the contradictory.
Referencing her earlier collaboration with Paul Jewett62 she denies that the early chapters
of Genesis contain “empirical, scientific reporting, or information about geography or
botany or zoology or scientific anthropology,” affirming instead that they give
“theological insight about the nature and destiny of humankind.”63 While not scientific, it
is still unproblematic for her to defend the historicity of the Fall because “to affirm the
historicity of the Fall is not fundamentally different than to affirm the historicity of other
central aspects of our faith.”64 At the same time she warns against attempting to “read the
meaning off the brute facts.”65 She elaborates on this warning by clarifying in what sense
she understands the events to be historical. “To say that the essential events to which the
primal history refers took place in time and space is not, however, to suggest that we can
date and locate them, or that we should assume the details of the account correspond
literally to historical events that we could have recorded if only we could have supplied a
video camera.”66 Rather, “We have access to that primal event through the symbols of the
narrative.”67 These words signal a posture toward the historicity of the text and a
procedure for interpretation that corresponds to Hans Frei’s categorization of the biblical
narratives as realistic narratives or Linkbeck’s remark that they are history-like even if
not likely history, though Shuster herself does not make these connections. Shuster
further confirms her conception of the biblical narratives in comparing the situation
62. Paul K. Jewett, and Margurite Shuster, Who We Are: Our Dignity as Human: A NeoEvangelical Theology.
63. Shuster, Fall and Sin, 11.
64. Ibid, 10.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., 9.
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between the narratives of Adam and Christ. “In speaking of neither Adam nor Christ,
neither Genesis nor the Gospels, however, can we get behind the narratives to a secure
grasp of the historical details.”68

The Covenant Context

Not surprisingly, given her Reformed context, Shuster puts the narratives of
Genesis 1–3 in the context of covenant and finds details within the narrative that accord
with the concept of the covenant. Orienting these narratives to covenant is part of a
broader theological reading strategy in which the specific narrative is read in light of the
entire canon.69 While she does not make an extended argument for the covenantal substructure of Genesis 1–3 she highlights those elements amenable to such a position. Since
she understands a covenant to be a relationship with God as its “supreme Disposer” she
finds the centrality of a probation and the overall brevity of the account to focus “on the
divine sovereignty of the arrangement.”70 The sovereign administration of this covenant
relationship is further verified by the apparent arbitrariness of the prohibition against
eating from the tree. The purpose of the prohibition was “to focus human obedience in
terms of the will of God alone. The first couple were to obey when there was no obvious
reason for the obedience other than the express commandment of God their maker.”71
Shuster later reiterates that understanding the prohibition is not important. “The key thing
is not that we should understand the reason for the command, as if we could stand apart
from it and judge for ourselves its validity, but that we be so related to the God who gave
68. Ibid., 8.
69. “We thus signal that we do read the primal history in the light of Scripture as a whole,
while also wishing to give due weight to the narrative as it stands.” Shuster, Fall and Sin, 6.
70. Ibid., 12.
71. Ibid., 18.
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it as to receive it gladly as the expression of his will for the structuring of our lives.”72 Of
course, “the fundamental requirement of the covenant is obedience.”73 Though put in a
slightly broader and therefore less abstract context than Grudem, we can see that the
emphasis on obedience is the same.

Reading Strategies
In contrast to Grudem’s sharply historical and literal approach to Genesis, Shuster
employs other reading strategies in the course of her treatment of Genesis 3. Though she
doesn’t apply any particular set of literary tools in her interpretation, she observes that
“the narratives [of Genesis 2–3] have a particular sort of literary artistry about them that
signals a kind of universal intent.”74 This universal intent prompts her to endorse a
cautiously existentialist reading of the text.75 “We are not wrong if when we hear Genesis
3:9 read—God calling out, ‘Where are you?’—we hear ourselves being addressed. Thus
far the existentialized view is proper. We argue only that it should not be so expressed as
to deny the historical givenness and definitiveness of the original event.”76 She further
defines the limits of the existential reading. In particular she is concerned that an overly
existential approach might undermine Adam and Eve’s individuality. “We are given our
humanity as individuals and so must think of human origins in terms of individuals. Even
though we have granted a certain limited validity to the existential approach to the
primeval history, the persons of that history are not simply ‘Everyman’ and

72. Ibid., 51.
73. Ibid., 17.
74. Ibid., 9.
75. “[I]t is not only proper but necessary to read the narrative existentially as well as in
terms of a past event.” Shuster, Fall and Sin, 28.
76. Ibid., 9.
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‘Everywoman’: note, for instance, that the story of Cain and Abel emphasizes the
different behavior of the two brothers.”77 This position contrasts sharply with those
readings of Genesis 3 that treat Adam and Eve as archetypes, a reading strategy
demonized by some feminists and employed by others. As we saw earlier, Shuster is also
eager to defend the reality of the Fall as an event in time. As a result she believes it is
incautious “so to existentialize the Fall as to assume that it changed nothing but instead
merely reveals the situation of Everyman and Everywoman at the moral crossroads; and
that we can therefore simply identify current conditions with those that always and
necessarily prevailed.”78 Shuster’s semi-existential approach to the text bears some
relation to a narrative approach to the text but develops the continuity of text and reader
differently than does a narratival approach since the present day reader is encouraged to
leap over the intervening narrative context to identify directly with Adam and Eve.
Shuster’s commitment to read the text canonically and theologically is revealed in
one or two places in her interpretation. For instance, though she does not develop the
point extensively she references the connection between Adam and Christ.
“Theologically speaking, the two Adams constitute the beginning and the end of the
human story.”79 Shuster does not develop what this connection might mean for
theological anthropology or for the doctrine of sin. Nor does she discuss the nature of the

77. Ibid., 13–14.
78. Ibid., 47. Such an approach contrasts with Rita Nakashima Brock’s reading of the
story as revealing humanity’s essential broken-heartedness.
79. Ibid., 8.
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Adam-Christ connection. But the reference does acknowledge the orientation of the fall
narrative to a grander narrative that is somewhat typologically connected.80
At a few points in her interpretation of Genesis 3 Shuster employs the language of
sacrament, if somewhat hesitantly. She writes of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and
Evil that “The Tree itself we might think of as sacramental, as a physical object used to
convey a spiritual reality.”81 Later she writes similarly of the Tree of Life: “We would
take the Tree of Life in the Garden as sacramental of this higher form of life.”82 She
develops this sacramental idea a bit further when she reasons why the way to this tree
was barred following the Fall. She compares the restricted access to the Tree of Life to
the limited access to the sacraments under the covenant of grace. “Since it is [the
sacraments’] function to be both sign and seal of the blessing of salvation, life restored in
Christ, it would be at best a meaningless and at worst a sacrilegious act to partake of the
outward sacraments in hopes of gaining the blessing when one has no inner conformity of
heart, no faith to bring to the sacrament.”83 She even briefly considers the idea of the
serpent as sacramental in a negative sense.
This brief survey reveals that Shuster employs a pastiche of reading styles or
interpretational devices in her approach to Genesis 1–3: existential, sacramental, semihistorical, and covenantal. And while her general approach to the narratives is perhaps
more narratival than historical, her ensuing reading, as will be made clear below is not
especially literary nor narratival in approach.

80. We should note that Shuster nowhere employs the language of typology. But what we
observe in her linking of the figures of Adam and Christ is consistent with a typological handling
of these characters.
81. Shuster, Fall and Sin, 18.
82. Ibid., 26.
83. Ibid., 27.
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Marguerite Shuster on Sin: Summary
As can be seen, Shuster’s take on sin is considerably more developed and nuanced
than that of Wayne Grudem. Unlike Grudem, who brings no overarching concept to his
reading of the texts, Shuster subsumes her reading under the rubric of covenant.
Accordingly, her definition of sin, though similar to Grudem’s in its focus on violation of
a divine standard, is couched in the concept of the covenant relationship. However,
Shuster does not develop the concept of the covenantal relationship much so one gets the
impression that the covenant is primarily one of obedience. This far too easily collapses
into Grudem’s more simplistic view. With a slightly looser stance to the historicity of the
text, Shuster has more flexibility to attend to the features of the narrative but instead of
any one approach she employs several lenses somewhat vaguely and offers comments
that are at turns existentialist, mythical, and sacramental.

WAYNE GRUDEM AND MARGUERITE SHUSTER ON SIN:
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

As we did with the feminist theologians in the previous chapter, we will critique
our two evangelical exemplars side by side as their similarities and differences highlight
important trends in evangelical theology. Once again we will consider the relationship of
their thought to narrative thought broadly, how it relates to the biblical meta-narrative,
and how it handles the Genesis narratives in particular. We will also consider how useful
their definitions of sin are in general.
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Defining Sin

As we saw, the definitions offered by Grudem and Shuster are essentially the
same: sin is disobedience, understood as deviance from the divine law or the covenant
demands. Shuster couches the law in the context of a covenant relationship but the results
are similar. Before we consider the shortcomings, we should ask what are the strengths of
this definition?
As Karl Barth comments, “When in the application of the method the thinking
and teaching are biblicist if not biblical, by a happy inconsistency they could and can
produce serious results.”84 And indeed, this definition produces serious results. It takes
very seriously the reality of individual sin. Linking sin to the law and covenant also
makes sense of much of the biblical material. Clearly much of the Pentateuch and the
prophetic literature enjoins the reader to lawfulness. Despite these strengths, however, in
terms of theological usefulness this definition has several weaknesses.

Sin and Humanity
Grudem’s and Shuster’s sin-talk implies certain anthropological commitments.
Just as the definitions of sin offered by the feminist theologians we surveyed narrow the
understanding of what it means to be human, so also do these evangelicals’ and
Grudem’s in particular. The human is bound by the law of God. Human existence is not
characterized so much by freedom and cooperation with the divine as it is by boundary
and obedience. This focus on prohibition and violation casts the divine-human

84. Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, vol. IV.1 of Church Dogmatics, trans. G.
W. Bromiley (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1956), 367.
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relationship in strongly legal terms. That is, the divine-human relationship is cast as a
law-giver to law-keeper (or breaker) relationship. While one cannot deny that legal
language is used at places in Scripture to depict aspects of the human condition, there are
many images of the divine-human relationship that cut against construing it primarily in
legal terms. Indeed, in the context of Genesis 1–2 the language of “image and likeness” is
used rather than language of any legally binding relationship.85 James McClendon warns
against the direction that these definitions lead: “Legalist theories defined sin as the
breaking of the divine moral law (thus Calvin), but these fell too easily into the
depersonalization of divine-human relations that the term ‘legalism’ reproaches.”86

Sin and Salvation

With the emphasis on law it is not surprising, therefore, that evangelical theology
has tended to emphasize legal language for salvation as well, specifically justification.
This attention to justification has a long, mostly post-Reformation history. But the
language of justification is surely metaphorical and therefore to privilege it over other
metaphors for salvation is ill-advised. We recall Gordon Fee’s observation concerning
Pauline sin and salvation language that no metaphor captures all of sin and salvation,
rather, images of sin and salvation come in matched pairs:
[N]o one metaphor [for redemption] embraces the whole of Pauline
soteriology. There are at least two reasons for this. First, here we are
dealing with another divine mystery which is simply too large to be
captured in a single metaphor. Second, and for me this is the important
point, in almost every case Paul’s choice of metaphor is determined by the
85. On the basis of Genesis 1:28 and 5:3 and even Luke 3:38 one might detect Father-son
imagery in Genesis.
86. Jr. McClendon, James Wm., “Sin,” in A New Handbook of Christian Theology, in A
New Handbook of Christian Theology, ed. Donald W. Musser and Joseph L. Price (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1992), 445.
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aspect of human sinfulness that is in immediate purview. Slaves to sin
(and law) are ‘redeemed’; those in enmity to God are ‘reconciled’; those
who are guilty of transgressing the law are ‘justified.’87
By defining sin so narrowly with reference to divine law, not only is the divine-human
relationship construed too narrowly, but much of the rich imagery for salvation in
scripture is sacrificed.
By contrast, Jesus’s own distillation of the law focuses not on obedience but love.
“You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all
your mind. This is the great and first commandment” (Matthew 22:37, 38). Indeed, Jesus
suggests that obedience flows from love: “If you love me, you will keep my
commandments” (John 14:15). This is much more in keeping with the divine character as
love (1 John 4:8).

Sin and Christ

Flowing from this issue is a further one: the link between sin and Christ. In
defining sin as violation of law there is no clear and implicit link to Christ. As we saw,
Grudem can link the law to the character of God but there is not a logical, direct link with
the person and work of Christ. With the emphasis on legal status and justification one can
make a clear link to the cross of Christ construed in a sacrificial, penal substitutionary
sense.88 Not surprisingly, therefore, evangelicals are at times at a loss to explain the need
for the life of Christ when it seems that his sacrificial death was all that was necessary.
87. Gordon Fee, “Paul and the Metaphors for Salvation: Some Reflections on Pauline
Soteriology,” in The Redemption, Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, O’, and Gerald O’Collins
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 51.
88. This is not to deny that there is a thread of New Testament thought that supports the
penal substitution theory of the atonement. Rather we acknowledge that this is not the only thread
but point out that evangelical decisions further up the theological chain result in this being
virtually the only option emphasized.
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Thus there is a crucicentricity to evangelical theology but not so much a christocentricity.
The focus on the law seems to make the person of Christ incidental to our understanding
of the nature of humanity’s plight and speaks only to its solution. But as Karl Barth and
others have suggested, “[O]nly when we know Jesus Christ do we really know that man
is the man of sin, and what sin is, and what it means for man.”89 Our evangelical
definitions of sin in their current form do not provide us a way forward to define sin with
reference to Christ.

Sin and Society
Because of its orientation to the individual and to the act, theologically Grudem’s
definition does not offer much of a lens for the examination and prophetic critique of
structures of sin or trends that fail to promote human flourishing. There is really no way
to talk about corporate sin with this definition. Feminist and liberation theologies have
rightly exposed systems of sin that enslave and oppress. It is not sufficiently nuanced to
suggest that these systems are merely collections of individual acts. To suggest so
contradicts the clear emphasis in Genesis 1 on the corporate nature of humanity’s
outworking of the imago dei as well as in the depiction of corporate sin and punishment
at the flood and the Tower of Babel, never mind the heavy emphasis on corporate sin in
the storyline of Israel.
Shuster’s incorporation of the concept of covenant seems promising at first since
the emphasis on covenant in Scripture is on the corporate people of God (in both
Testaments). However, Shuster never really develops these ideas; her definition of sin

89. Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, 389.
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though couched in the context of covenant seems as individualistic as Grudem’s and she
doesn’t develop the idea of the purpose of the covenant relationship—a holy nation, a
kingdom of priests—as a way to illuminate the deeper character of sin. In short, the
covenant remains a bit of an abstract concept.
It is also not clear that biblical law covers the gamut of ways in which humanity
may sin. There are many behaviors that the law does not cover, even in the context of
Israel and the Torah. Furthermore, the law in scripture is a shifting reality. The laws
recorded for Israel during wandering are distinct from those added on the eve of her
entrance into the land. It would be impossible to enumerate a complete list of laws to
articulate the full picture of the divine intention for humanity.
Finally, a further shortcoming of this legal definition of sin and salvation is that it
makes use of concepts of guilt that while familiar in many western societies, are
unfamiliar in other cultures. Some evangelicals have testified to the difficulty of
communicating the necessity and profundity of the redemption in cultures that do not
share modern, western conceptions of jurisprudence. Cultures where the concept of
shame is more common than guilt are often cited as particularly resistant to juridical
rendering of the cross.90 Perhaps an expanded definition of sin could bridge these
differences.

90. For an evangelical approach on these issues see Mark Baker and Joel B. Green,
Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in the New Testament and Contemporary
Contexts (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000.
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Sin, the Narratives and Narrativity

From these preliminary observations about the shortcomings of these definitions,
let us move now to consider the role that the narratives of Genesis 3–11 have in the
formulation of these theologies. What we will see is that their approaches to these texts
reveal their stance toward the issue of narrative more broadly.

Decontextualization
The single clearest criticism of both Grudem’s and Shuster’s theological
appropriation of the Genesis narrative is their almost complete decontextualization of it.
In his discussion of sin in Genesis 3, Grudem references the context of Genesis 1 and 2
minimally, only to get the prohibition that precedes the violation.91
Shuster’s treatment of the narrative of the fall is more extended than Grudem’s
and she attends to the details of the narrative more closely than he does. However, like
Grudem she reads the narrative of chapter 3 in isolation from the surrounding context.
The extra-textual category of covenant is far more determinative for her than are the
details of the surrounding context. She attends to chapters 1 and 2 more than he does but
primarily to troll for details that will undergird her covenantal reading of chapter 3.
Though her book length treatment of sin offers her more space to consider other biblical
evidence, the narratives following Genesis 3 receive virtually no attention whatsoever.
While many commentators have noticed the deluge of sin in these chapters the
theological commitment of both Grudem and Shuster cut them off from making much of

91. Grudem, of course, interacts with those chapters in his sections on creation and
humanity.
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the details. Once the covenant (Shuster) or law (Grudem) is breached there is not much
more to be said about sin.

Historicization

A further error that both make concerns the literary quality of Genesis 1–3.
Neither pays much attention to the literary features of the text, though Shuster is more
attentive than Grudem. Grudem’s principal category for the biblical text is historical, not
literary. As we saw, he insists on the literal, historical interpretations of the biblical
events. Viewed as an historical event, the fall of Adam and Eve can have a single
meaning apart from any surrounding events. In focusing so narrowly on this text, Grudem
is guilty of Crites’s charge of contraction. He has isolated a singular moment in the
narrative as that which is ultimately explicative. But this decision flows logically from
the categorization of the text as history rather than narrative. Context and literary features
are secondary to the event behind the narrative. His approach to narrative is not
especially attentive to literary features and he shows a preference for the more discursive
portions of scripture. Indeed, as we saw he holds that 1 John 3:4 “Sin is lawlessness” is
the biblical definition of sin. This definition is then brought to the text of Genesis 3 where
it is confirmed.
David Clines warns against the dangers of overlooking the narrative quality of the
biblical text and relegating it to some other genre: “When we say: this is myth, this is
legend, this is history, this is poetry, this is hyperbole, we are not looking at the story, but
straight through it, at what may be behind it.”92 John Sailhamer, himself an evagelical

92. Clines, The Theme of the Pentateuch, 104.
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reacts against such historicizing of the biblical narratives. He writes: “To say that the text
is an accurate portrayal of what actually happened is an important part of the evangelical
view of Scripture, but it does not alter the fact that God’s revelation has come to us
through an inspired text, and thus no amount of delving into the history of Israel as an
event apart from the text can take the place of the meaning of the scriptural text.”93
Because it is a text and a narrative text at that, to be faithful to it one must attend to its
literary features; it is the text that is revelatory, not the event.94

Story and Illustration
Grudem’s historical approach leads him to two movements that both run afoul of
a narrative sensitive appropriation of the text. First, using the categories provided by
Michael Root, Grudem puts the narrative of Genesis 3 in an illustrative relationship with
the reader’s life rather than a storied relationship. As Root explains, on this approach
“[t]he story illustrates certain redemptive truths about self, world, and God.”95 The reader
can make a direct link from the narrative to themselves: This is what sin is like. The story
of sin and the depiction of humans does not offer categories to help illuminate the present
93. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 18.
94. Grudem’s historical argumentation is on clearest display in his interaction with
William Webb on the topic of male headship in Genesis 2. Webb asserts that one must be careful
how much male authority should be read into Genesis 2 on the grounds that some of what is
portrayed there is for literary effect rather than to describe historical facts in the garden. Webb
suggests that evidence of patriarchy in the garden is for the purpose of foreshadowing the fall in
chapter 3. To this Grudem replies: “Webb is saying that patriarchy did not exist in the garden in
actual fact, but the author placed hints of it in the story as a way of anticipating the situation that
would come about after there was sin in the world. This then is also an explicit denial of the
historical accuracy of the Genesis 2 account.” Whether Webb or Grudem is right is immaterial.
What is clear is that Grudem essentially denies any literary or artistic features to the text as modes
of explanation of what the text means. Further, the literary relationship between the chapters is
not considered. Grudem, Evangelical Feminism & Biblical Truth, 115.
95. Michael Root, “The Narrative Structure of Soteriology,” in Why Narrative?:
Readings in Narrative Theology, Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf
and Stock, 1989), 266.
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but rather articulates realities, essences, and natures that purport to define the
contemporary person. Even more specifically it illustrates a proposition about sin—sin is
lawlessness— that is found elsewhere. There is a strange tension here for Grudem. On the
one hand, because of his historicist approach to the text, the narrative of Genesis 3 is a
discrete, unrepeatable event in history. At the same time, he wants to claim that “Their
eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is in many ways typical
of sin generally.”96 That is, he wants this sin to be representative somehow, but his
historical method does not offer any way for the contemporary reader to be in that sort of
relationship to the original event. Illustrations highlight one point of the text like Aesop’s
fable. But narratives invite the reader into a variety of themes and tensions.97 Thiselton
writes, “Models that stress ‘history’ are...insufficient, for history may be understood in
bland ways that do not preserve and convey the ‘dramatic tension’ that inheres in
Christian doctrine.”98 Indeed, Grudem’s rather bland reading of the narrative of Genesis 3
as an example of law violation overlooks many themes in the text that could prove
fruitful for examining the human condition: knowledge, blame, nakedness, shame,
covering and death.

96. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 492–93.
97. David Ford puts this observation in terms of the “middle distance” of the biblical
narratives where the perspective is neither too narrowly focussed on one character nor too broadly
construed. Grudem and Shuster’s approaches err toward the latter of these regarding which Ford
comments. “[I]f one takes too broad an overview and subsumes the particular people, words, and
actions into a generalization, a trend, or a theory, the middle distance loses its own integrity and
becomes, at best, evidence or supportive illustration.” David F. Ford, “System, Story,
Performance: A Proposal About the Role of Narrative in Christian Systematic Theology,” in Why
Narrative?: Readings in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones
(Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1989), 195.
98. Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2007), 68–69.
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Shuster’s thinking about the how to regard the historicity of the fall and even her
cautious existentialist approach to the text signal a step away from the sharp historical
literalism of Grudem toward a more narratival appropriation of the text. Similarly,
Shuster rightly recognizes the deep significance of the tree and the serpent but elects to
see them as quasi-sacramental rather than narratively informed. The on-going role that
both trees and serpents have to play in the biblical drama does not enter into her
consideration. Clines warns against this existentialist reading by suggesting a more
nuanced narrative approach. “The Pentateuch thus does not admit of a purely
existentialist reading, however deeply it probes the character of human existence and
however sharply it challenges the reader existentially. The theme of the Pentateuch is
entirely concerned with a future bound to a past out of which the present lives.”99

Story and Eschatology

In their handling of sin and Genesis 3 both Grudem and Shuster fall short of a rich
understanding of the narrative development of doctrine by finding a doctrine of sin fully
formed in Genesis 3. Thiselton critiques this method of theologizing on the basis of its
eschatological outlook. “An overrealized eschatology will err on the side of conceiving of
God (and doctrine) as ‘already defined.’ Here God becomes entirely ‘the God of
propositional revelation’ without as it were loose ends. This system is closed rather than
open.”100 There is no space for development in the understanding of sin and Grudem’s

99. David J. A. Clines, The Theme of the Pentateuch, 10 (Sheffield, Eng.: Dept. of
Biblical Studies, University of Sheffield, 1978), 116.
100. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 64 Thiselton goes on to warn about the
opposite danger, an error we diagnosed in Rita Nakashima Brock. “On the other hand, a onesided futurist eschatology risks conceiving of God as ‘not yet defined,’ akin to the God of process
theology.”
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definition of it. Sin is a violation of divine law and Genesis 3 handily illustrates just such
a definition.
But it is just these fixed senses of sin, the self and salvation that are a hallmark of
modernist thinking. Contemporary thought pushes toward construing the self and the
broader environment much more dynamically even if not always in the language of
narrative. Stanley Grenz says of the contemporary sense of the self: “[A]ny semblance of
meaning in the present is linked to at least a rudimentary sense of narrative continuity
with a meaningful past and a conceivable future, which gives the impression that the
person is en route from somewhere to somewhere and hence that the persons’s narrative
constitutes some type of a whole.”101 We conceptualize self and the world with some
sense of telos, of direction. Scripture evinces this eschatological orientation but the
definitions of sin and the human that these theologians present suggest no inherent
direction or eschatology.

Escaping the Story

As we saw in the previous chapter, Stephen Crites suggests that there are two
main ways that thinkers seek to “break the sense of narrative time”: abstraction and
contraction. The evangelical approaches to Genesis 3 and the topic of sin evince a form
of abstraction, “the formulation of generalized principles and techniques.”102 One move
that Wayne Grudem makes in particular reveals a departure from the biblical narrative.

101. Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of
the Imago Dei, Matrix of Christian Theology, vol. 1. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2001), 135.
102. Stephen Crites, “The Narrative Quality of Experience,” in Why Narrative?:
Readings in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon:
Wipf and Stock, 1989), 85.
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Grudem asserts that prior to the fall in Genesis 3 “sin was already in the world” through
the fall of Satan and the demons. This has a couple of effects. First, it equates demonic
and human sin such that there is nothing distinct about human sin. Attached as it is to
divine law, sin has become an abstract concept that can be applied in an undifferentiated
way to humans and spirit beings quite apart from the separate narratives that they inhabit.
Further, it distorts the flow of the biblical narrative. Nowhere is the fall of Satan and the
demons specifically narrated. It is, from the perspective of Genesis at least and perhaps
the entirety of scripture, irrelevant to the question of the human condition. But what it
does to the story of God with humanity is push the real entrance of sin into the world
before the events narrated in Genesis 3. Grudem treats this as if it is relevant back story
when clearly the biblical authors and the author of Genesis in particular did not regard it
so.
The single most significant hermeneutical and theological decision that Shuster
makes is to set the narrative of Genesis 3 in the context of covenant. This is her way of
orienting the events into a larger framework. There is little doubt that the context of
covenant provides more depth than does Grudem’s more atomistic reading. It also
provides useful links in moving forward through the canon. However, her use of
covenant appears to be an example of narrative avoidance through abstraction. Shuster
attempts to read the narrative through the lens of covenant and fits the narrative to that
setting. This requires a selective reading of the narrative, muting those elements that do
not accord with a covenantal reading. In particular it mutes the clear theme of the image
of God as that which is descriptive of the divine-human relationship and wherein the
humanity finds its identity and mission. Additionally, it requires one to read against the

157
grain of the narrative. The language of covenant, which is certainly thematic in the book
of Genesis and beyond, does not appear until chapter 6:18 with reference to the flood. To
assume that the narrative can be read better by importing the concept of covenant into the
narrative earlier than the narrator introduces it works against the plot function that the
narrator intends the theme of covenant to play. As it is written, covenant plays a role in
the administration of the divine-human relationship after it has been compromised. John
Goldingay notes: “By not speaking of the relationship between God and the first human
beings as a covenant, Genesis has perhaps implied that there was no need for formally
binding commitments before the time of human disobedience and divine punishment.”103

CONCLUSION: SIN, SCRIPTURE, AND STORY

The feminist theologians we surveyed in the previous chapter were driven in their
theological task and attitude toward scripture by their experiential theological
methodology. This resulted in their virtual dismissal of the biblical text and definitions of
sin that while tightly linked to their understanding of the human experience, ran
roughshod over the biblical material and the centrality of Christ even as they were able to
speak relevantly to particular human problems. In this chapter we have seen in two
evangelical theologians a similar distortion of the Genesis narrative and difficulty in
connecting sin, the self and Christ. Armed with a biblicist theology, a propositionalist
approach to doctrine and a historical and atomistic approach to texts, Grudem brings a
definition of sin as violation of God’s law to his reading of Genesis 3 and finds that the
narrative there illustrates his expectation. Shuster, reading the narratives through her
103. John Goldingay, Israel’s Gospel, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1. (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2003), 181.
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covenantal lens, similarly finds evidence of covenant and its breach—disobedience—in
the narrative. Neither looks much further in the Genesis narrative for help in
understanding sin. And for both, the simple, individualistic definition of sin has impact in
the coherence of their theology and, in particular, their ability to link humanity and its fall
with Christ and his remedy.
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CHAPTER 4
STORIES OF SIN:
THE NARRATIVE DEPICTION OF SIN IN GENESIS 3–11

To this point we have made the case that definitions of sin offered by various
feminist and evangelical theologians are inadequate and that this inadequacy can be
traced at least in part to their handling of narrative in general and in specific the narrative
of the so-called “fall” in Genesis 3. As we have seen this is because these theologians
tend to approach the text atomistically, that is, excised from its broader literary
framework, and historically (evangelicals) or ideologically (feminists), rather than
narratively. Furthermore, there has been a tendency to contract focus to single details or
to abstract concepts from their narrative embedding to serve explicative functions. As a
result, they tend to set the reader in an illustrative relationship with the narrative rather
than in a storied relationship. It is our purpose in this chapter to begin to redress these
moves by offering a more contextual and narrative-attentive reading of the depiction of
sin in Genesis 3–11. In the following chapter we will examine what such a reading offers
a theology of sin.
We will begin by demonstrating the narrative unity and character of Genesis 1–
11. We will highlight some of the overarching narrative movements in this section. Then
we will move to offer a reading of Genesis 3–11 with an eye to the depiction of sin.
Finally, we will draw together the data regarding the narrative presentation of sin in these
chapters.
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GENESIS 1–11 IN ITS LITERARY CONTEXT

While the theologians we have surveyed isolate individual narratives for
theological appropriation, commentators are almost unanimous in their recognition of the
unity of Genesis 1–11 and warn against its atomization. Nahum Sarna declares that “a
fragmentary approach to it cannot provide an adequate understanding of the whole. To be
preoccupied with the smallest units of literary tradition may have its purposes; but the
exercise is ultimately of limited value. A totality—things in combination—often
possesses properties and engenders qualities neither carried by nor necessarily inherent in
any of its discrete components.”1
What this survey will demonstrate is that Genesis 1–11 is both closely connected
to what follows yet distinct in important ways. Because of both this uniqueness and
connectivity, it is legitimate to approach it theologically as a textual whole.

The Role of Genesis 1–11 in the Book of Genesis

The structure of the Pentateuch and Genesis in particular has been a topic of
debate for centuries. Many early debates were driven by the findings of source criticism
and its identification of seams in the narrative that suggested the stitching together of
disparate sources by various redactors, most notably the Jahwist, Elohist, Priestly, and
Deuteronomist. In their pursuit of the early forms of Israelite religion in the earliest forms
of the text, these studies emphasized the disunity of the Pentateuch over its later unity. In
recent decades research has focused more on the final form of the text and attempting to

1. Nahum M. Sarna, Genesis = Be-Reshit: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New
JPS Translation, commentary by Nahum M. Sarna, JPS Torah Commentary. (Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society, 1989), xviii.
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discern and explain the structure of entire books (Genesis) or collections of books (the
Pentateuch). This is especially true of those methods of interpretation interested in the
literary character of the biblical texts.2 Once attention returned to the final form and
literary features of the text, the door opened to discover the structural, literary and
thematic connections tying the books together. Nevertheless, there is considerable debate
about the fundamental structural features of the book of Genesis as well as how the
various parts, and particularly Genesis 1–11, relate to the whole.

The Toledot Formula of Genesis

Much of the discussion of the structure of Genesis has focused on the so-called
“toledot formula.” Ten times in the book of Genesis a new section of the narrative begins
with the Hebrew phrase תֹולדֹות
ְ ( ֵא ֶּלהusually translated “these are the generations of...”.
These occur at Genesis 2:4; 5:1; 6:9; 10:1; 11:10 and 27; 25:12 and 19; 36:1 and 37:2 and
reference, respectively, the generations of “the heavens and the earth”, Adam, Noah, the
sons of Noah, Shem, Terah, Ishmael, Isaac, Esau, and Jacob. As the references make
clear the repetition of the formula is combined with an asymmetry in the length of the

2. Wenham judiciously expresses the contribution of the two approaches: “Literary
criticism tells us what the stories meant to the final editor; source criticism, how he composed
Genesis.” Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, Tex.: Word
Books, 1987), xxxiv. Meir Sternberg warns against simplistic rejection of source criticism’s
findings in favor of literary methods. “Not even the widely accepted constructs of geneticism, like
the Deuteronomist, lead an existence other than speculative. Small wonder, then, that literary
approaches react against this atomism by going to the opposite extreme of holism. But the
excesses and fruitlessness of traditional source criticism no more legitimate the waving aside of
its available data than they illegitimate its goals.” Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical
Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1985), 13.
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accounts and in the figures referenced.3 Further, it is important to note that in several
cases, the narrative following a toledot formula focus more on the descendants of the
titular figure rather than on the figure himself.
Many, though recognizing the importance of the formula, demur from according
it primary significance in understanding the book of Genesis. Gary Smith, for instance,
while acknowledging the attraction of the toledot formula for the interpretation of
Genesis, warns against overlooking other details. “The primary structural characteristic
that most identify is the recurring heading, ‘These are the generations of....’ A more
thorough look at the structural unity of the repeated and interrelated themes and phrases
indicates that a much more significant creative design is embedded in the structure of
Genesis 1–11.”4 And David Carr, though generally agreeing that the toledot formula is
intended as a structuring device, acknowledges that it is ultimately not up to the task. “In
sum, Gen 2,4(a) and the other genealogical headings throughout Genesis form an overall
structural framework for the book, yet they do not always fully master the material they
label.”5 A good example of this is in the toledot of Noah’s family which appears to be
broken off for the insertion of the narrative of the Tower of Babel, only to be picked up
again thereafter. It is likely that a thematic impulse is at work in the structuring of these
narratives, not merely the genealogical.
So opinions on the structural importance of the toledot formula vary widely from
viewing it as evidence of the documentary hypothesis (and therefore the fragmentary
3. Note that the fourth toledot references not one figure, but three (Shem, Ham and
Japheth), and that Shem receives his own toledot shortly thereafter.
4. Gary V. Smith, “Structure and Purpose in Genesis 1–11,” Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 20, no. 4 (D 1977): 310.
5. David Carr, “Biblos Geneseos Revisited: A Synchronic Analysis of Patterns in Genesis
as Part of the Torah (Part One),” Zeitschrift Für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 110, no. 2
(1998): 170.
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character of Genesis) to asserting it as the key to the interpretation of the entire book.6
For our purposes the toledot offers tidy textual divisions, the significance of which other
evidence may explain if the toledot formula itself does not. Accordingly, our focus will
be on the first five toledot sections: the heavens and the earth (2:4–4:26); Adam (5:1–
6:8); Noah (6:9–9:29); Noah’s sons (10:1–11:9), and Shem 11:10–26.7 For convenience
we will often refer to this as Genesis 1–11 though chapter 11 has six additional verses
beyond the last toledot.

Theme and Focus

Though the toledot formula provides a unifying structure to the entire book of
Genesis, readers of the book have long noticed the distinct stylistic and literary
differences between chapters 1–11 and the remainder of the book. There are features of
the text that are prominent in the primeval history yet absent in the remainder of the
book: genealogies, etiologies, and poetry. Westermann sees these features setting the
primeval narrative apart. “This is the only place in the Old Testament where genealogies
and narratives are put together in such a way. It is this that gives the primeval story its
unique character.”8
The focus of the material seems distinct as well. Wenham observes: “The opening
chapters have a universal perspective dealing with all mankind and are obviously related
in some way to other oriental traditions about creation, flood, and the origins of arts,
6. Woudstra offers a helpful, if brief, overview of the way in which the toledot formula
has been regarded. See Marten H. Woudstra, “Toledot of the Book of Genesis and Their
Redemptive-Historical Significance,” Calvin Theological Journal 5, no. 2 (N 1970): 184–89.
7. It is generally agreed that Genesis 1:1–2:3 represent a prologue to the book which is
structured along the lines provided by the toledot formula.
8. Claus Westermann, Genesis 1–11: A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1984), 3.
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crafts, and the nations. Chaps. 12–50, on the other hand, deal almost exclusively with
Israelite concerns.”9 Many others have voiced this observation.10 The stylistic and
thematic differences set the first eleven chapters apart from what follows.
Wenham regards Genesis 1–11 as essentially a prologue with the book’s emphasis
lying with the patriarchal narrative. “Clearly Gen 1–11 serves simply as background to
the subsequent story of the patriarchs, and their history is in turn background to the story
of Israel’s exodus from Egypt and the law-giving at Sinai which forms the subject matter
of Exodus to Deuteronomy.”11 As we have seen, it is certainly literarily distinct from
what follows it. Specific vocabulary from these early chapters is not thematic in the
remainder of the book. But Wenham overlooks how many of the themes of the prologue
are continued in the patriarchal narrative. This leads Lim to conclude that “Gen 1–11
functions not merely as a prologue but sets the stage for what is to follow. These chapters
are the ‘seed plot’ for the subsequent chapters.”12 Themes such as the conflict between
brothers, issues in child-bearing, and food shortages find their root in the primeval
narrative.13

9. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, xxii.
10. Robert Gonzales suggests the differences are threefold. “First, the primeval narrative
focuses on human history in general, whereas the patriarchal narrative focuses on Jewish history
in particular. Second, the primeval narrative follows a fast pace and spans long periods of time,
whereas the patriarchal narrative slows the tempo and spans only four generations. Third, many
scholars see a shift in thematic emphases.” Robert Gonzales, Where Sin Abounds, 2.
11. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, xlv.
12. Johnson T.K. Lim, Grace in the Midst of Judgment: Grappling with Genesis 1–11,
Beihefte Zur Zeitschrift Für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft (Berlin ; New York: W. de
Gruyter, 2002), 191.
13. While David Clines is convinced that the primeval narrative is sufficiently unique to
warrant its own theme distinct from the overall theme of the Pentateuch, he nevertheless sees that
some of its discrete themes can be traced deeper into the book of Genesis. “The universal famine
of the Joseph story is a counterpart to the primeval universal deluge; the strife between Joseph
and his brothers, which is resolved in reconciliation, brings to a happy conclusion the fraternal
rivalry that begins with Cain and Abel and runs throughout the patriarchal stories.” David J. A.
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On the basis of its plot Claus Westermann also finds the content of Genesis 1–11
to be distinct from what follows. “As for the content of the narrative sections, the three
groups described above (creation, achievements, crime & punishment) belong
exclusively to the primeval story; there is no sign of them in the patriarchal cycle, even
though the story of Sodom and Gomorrah has something of crime and punishment about
it.”14 In his ensuing analysis he focuses particularly on the trope of crime and
punishment. This is the distinctive feature of the primeval plotline. “The first sign that we
are dealing here with a special kind of primeval story is that, besides the creation stories
and genealogies, there are only stories with this particular theme,” viz. crime and
punishment.15
Summarizing these differences, Westermann concludes that they amount to a
demand for a separate interpretational approach.
[Chapters] 1–11 of Genesis must be regarded as a separate element of the
Pentateuch, that is, as a relatively self-contained unity, and not primarily
as a part of ‘Genesis.’ It is a relatively late component. The point of
departure of our exegesis then cannot be those literary types whose form
and content have been discovered in Gen 12–50. Such cannot be imposed
on chs. 1–11. Nor can we without more ado apply the theological plan
which draws together the patriarchal cycle to the story of primeval events.
We must recognize this story as a distinct unity, as a separate element of
the Pentateuch, and take it as our starting point.”16
These differences justify viewing the section as a distinct literary unit.

Clines, The Theme of the Pentateuch, 10 (Sheffield, Eng.: Dept. of Biblical Studies, University of
Sheffield, 1978), 85.
14. Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 19.
15. Ibid., 47.
16. Ibid., 2.
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The Role of Genesis 1–11 in the Pentateuch

For some time it has been generally acknowledged that in its final form Genesis
does not stand on its own but is part of a larger literary work, the Pentateuch.
Accordingly, it is legitimate to assess the character and role of Genesis 1–11 in light of
that larger whole.

The Structure of Genesis 1–11 and the Structure of the Pentateuch

Genesis 1–11 resists tidy genre categorization in part due to its terse style but also
because of the interspersing of poems and genealogical material between the narratives.
Some suggest that this confirms the patchwork nature of these early chapters. John
Sailhamer, however, sees these insertions as part of a larger strategy. The Pentateuch, he
argues, is meant to be read as a unity and Genesis 1–11 “form an introduction to both the
book of Genesis and the Pentateuch as a whole.”17 But, while he accords importance to
Genesis 1–11 in the overall structure of the Pentateuch, he is dismissive of the
programmatic nature of the toledot formula. He notes that the formula fails to cover the
entire Pentateuch or, even within Genesis itself, the Abraham narratives.
What Sailhamer proposes instead not only supports the unity of Genesis 1–11 but
answers some objections regarding the diverse genres encountered in those chapters:
narrative, poetry, and genealogy. Literarily, he calls attention to the alteration between
narrative and poetic texts. He sees a compositional strategy in miniature in Genesis 1:1–
12:3 that foreshadows a similar strategy that is pursued at the macro level of the
Pentateuch. In Genesis 1–11 he sees the pattern of narrative, poem, and epilogue which
17. John H. Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as Narrative: A Biblical-Theological
Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 81.
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sets up the following narrative. For instance, the narrative of the creation of the man and
the woman is followed by the man’s poem (Genesis 2:23) and an epilogue (Genesis 2:24,
25). This pattern repeats throughout Genesis 1:1–11:26.18 This pattern suggests that the
final editor of the Pentateuch intended these chapters to be introductory at least
stylistically and probably thematically, as we shall see below.

Theme of Genesis 1–11 and the Theme of the Pentateuch

Several scholars have attempted to discern the theme of the Pentateuch and the
role of various sections within it to contribute to that theme. We already observed that
Westermann sees these chapters as distinct from the rest of Genesis and the Pentateuch.
David Clines was one of the first to attempt to articulate a theme for the entire
Pentateuch. Clines was convinced that the Pentateuch should be approached as a
narrative whole.19 He therefore sought to offer an overarching theme on the basis of its
plot. He concluded: “The theme of the Pentateuch is the partial fulfillment—which
implies also the partial non-fulfillment—of the promise to or blessing of the patriarchs.
The promise or blessing is both the divine initiative in a world where human initiatives
always lead to disaster, and a re-affirmation of the primal divine intentions for man.”20
However, he further found that he could not easily reconcile Genesis 1–11 with that
theme. “Not only is its material temporally prior to the first statements of what is to be
the theme of the rest of the Pentateuch, and therefore hardly capable of being subsumed

18. John H. Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch: Revelation, Composition, and
Interpretation (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 35.
19. “The first way begins from the recognition that the Pentateuch is essentially a
narrative. To suppose that because it is ‘torah’ it is therefore ‘law’ is a fatal mistake.” Clines, The
Theme of the Pentateuch, 102.
20. Clines, The Theme of the Pentateuch, 29.
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under that theme, but also the tendency of Genesis 1–11 is apparently in quite a different
direction from that of the remainder of the Pentateuch.”21 After surveying the suggestions
on offer, Clines determined that the theme of the primeval narrative was CreationUncreation-Recreation. We will look at this theme more below.
Sailhamer agrees with Clines that the Pentateuch ought to be approached as a
narrative whole. He has spent more effort than most discerning its overall shape. He is
convinced that Genesis 1–11 serve as an introduction to both the book of Genesis and the
Pentateuch as a whole.22 He reads the Pentateuch as a narrative that contrasts the lives of
Abraham and Moses as representatives of faith and law, respectively.23 And though the
specific narratives of Genesis 1–11 appear infrequently in the remainder of the
Pentateuch, Sailhamer maintains that they are fundamental.24

Thematic and Typological Foreshadowing
Sailhamer’s observations about the role of Genesis 1–11 in the Pentateuch go
beyond the structural patterning described above. He sees a variety of themes in Genesis
1–11 that recur throughout the Pentateuch. The “seed” spoken of in Genesis 3:15 is an
important motif. The tension between good and evil in the early chapters foreshadows the
later distinction between clean and unclean. He goes on: “the tabernacle is portrayed as a
return to the Garden of Eden. The instructions given to Noah for building the ark

21. Ibid., 15.
22. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 81.
23. “[T]he Pentateuch is an attempt to contrast the lives of two individuals, Abraham and
Moses. Abraham, who lived before the Law (ante legem), is portrayed as one who kept the law,
whereas Moses, who lived under the Law (sub lege), is portrayed as one who died in the
wilderness because he did not believe.” Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 61–62.
24. Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 289.
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foreshadow those given to Moses for building the tabernacle.”25 Though we do not have
space to unpack all of Sailhamer’s claims, it is clear that there are strong textual and
thematic links between Genesis 1–11 and the remainder of the Pentateuch.
The relationship between the events narrated in Genesis 1–11 and the remainder
of the Pentateuch at times borders on the typological. Sailhamer writes: “In the writing of
historical narrative, events of the past often find new meaning and significance in relation
to certain issues and ideas present in the author’s own day.”26 Sailhamer believes that
typology is the best way to describe how the author understood the relationship between
these various events.27

THE NARRATIVE CHARACTER OF GENESIS 1–11

The observations above have already begun to hint that Genesis 1–11 exhibits
more than structural unity; equally compelling is the narrative cohesion of the text.
Attention to the literary features of the text quickly leads one away from textual or
theological atomization of the primeval narrative. As Thomas Brodie points out, these
methods of textual binding can be obscured if the text is approached as history. “If
Genesis is defined initially as history, even antiquarian history, then it indeed lacks unity.
But once allowance is made that the genre is more complex, that it uses history as a
mantle for artistry—literary art that is theology-oriented—then it begins to emerge as

25. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 39.
26. Ibid., 31.
27. “[O]ne can also view the similarities as part of a larger typological scheme intending
to show that future events are often foreshadowed in past events.” Sailhamer, Pentateuch as
Narrative, 37.
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unified.”28 Yet due to the apparently arbitrary interspersing of short narratives, poems and
genealogies it is not surprising that many have adopted an atomistic and episodic
approach to reading it. Brodie goes on, however, to argue that the format is intentional.
“What is essential is that Genesis is not a collection of episodes that are loosely
connected or poorly edited...Rather, it uses episodes and episodic technique as gradual
steppingstones within a larger narrative development of moving from myth to history,
from obscurity to clarity, from the fragmented world of expulsion and murder to a unified
account of acceptance and reconciliation.”29 Brodie is suggesting not mere literary
development but a development of a particular sort, one with a narrative cast and
direction. We will address briefly how the narrative character and plot of Genesis 1–11
hold it together as a unity.

Poetic Structure, Narrative Effect
We have already had cause to consider Sailhamer’s theory regarding the
relationship between the internal structure of Genesis 1–11 and the remainder of the
Pentatuech. Sailhamer also suggests that the poems in the primeval narrative have not
only a structural function but a literary one as well. The poems play an important role in
the closure of each episode since they represent “the final word of the central character of
that narrative.”30 The poems are not just a simplistic way for the narrator to editorialize.
“Instead, they express the author’s understanding of the events of the narratives as they
are mediated through the viewpoint of the central character(s). The reader sees the

28. Thomas L. Brodie, Genesis as Dialogue, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 11.
29. Ibid., 15.
30. Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 34.
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narratives as if he or she were one of the characters in the narrative. Rather than having to
rely on didactic comments by the author or the narrator, the reader learns the meaning of
the narratives firsthand, just as the characters within the narratives learn it by
experiencing it.”31 What Sailhamer is seeing is a distinctly narrative feature of these texts.
Not only are the texts moving from one to the next, but the style is designed to draw the
reader in as a participant. In addition to confirming the narrative connectivity of these
chapters, the pattern also sets them apart as a unity. Sailhamer concludes: “Viewed as a
whole, Genesis 1–11 follows a recognizable compositional strategy that links together an
otherwise loose collection of independent narratives. The strategy consists of attaching
poems to the end of each narrative.”32 This observation steers the reader away from
regarding these chapters as merely history and toward something richer.

Narrative Time and Characterization

We already noted the manner in which the content in the first eleven chapters of
Genesis differs from the remainder of the book. The distinct way these chapters handle
time and character set these chapters apart for narrative if not theological reflection.
Concerning time, the section offers little in the way of chronological markers common to
narrative. However, it employs genealogies effectively to develop the sense of history
and passage of time.
This distinct narrative focus can be seen particularly when the matter of
characterization is considered. While characterization is important for narrative, Genesis
1–11 presents a challenging case. As Brodie points out, “Characterization...appears

31. Ibid., 319.
32. Ibid., 35.
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slowly. There is only a minimum amount of characterization in chapters 1–11; Adam,
Eve, and Noah are scarcely sketched.”33 This is seen most sharply in contrast to the
narratives following Genesis 11 where Abraham, Jacob and Joseph are developed more
fully as characters. In Genesis 1–11, many characters remain nameless, and many that are
named, such as Abel and Lamech’s wives, Adah and Zillah, are little more than props in
narratives focusing on other characters. Where characterization occurs it is selective
though significant. For instance, the serpent is described as “more crafty than any other
wild animal that the LORD God had made” (Genesis 3:1). In contrast, the narrator
describes Noah as “a righteous man, blameless in his generation; Noah walked with God”
(Genesis 6:9).
That said, it is clear that the most fully developed character in these narratives is
God.34 God is depicted principally through action and speech, though the two are difficult
to separate at places. Humphreys notes that little or no physical description of God is
offered in Genesis or elsewhere in Scripture and that the reader is given little insight into
God’s internal mental processes.35 We shall see that the development of God’s character
is an important part of the reading of both the development of humanity and human
sinfulness.
The paucity of human characterization may be a unique feature of the narrative,
especially as compared to other biblical narratives where characters are developed more

33. Brodie, Genesis as Dialogue, 13.
34. Humphrys writes, “If the book of Genesis as a whole is an extended (by biblical
standards) narrative with a distinct plot, or at least a patterning that binds it into a whole, then the
character of God, through what he does and says, is critical to its development.” W. Lee
Humphreys, The Character of God in the Book of Genesis: A Narrative Appraisal (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 11.
35. Humphreys, The Character of God in the Book of Genesis, 12.
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fully. But it may also point in another direction. Westermann notes that the word for
“man” is thematic in Genesis 1–11. “The concentration of the word [ ]אדםin Gen 1–11 is
in marked contrast to Gen 12–50 where it occurs only in 16:12. This indicates that  אדםin
the Old Testament describes a human being without further qualification. The passages in
Gen 1–11 deal with the creation of humanity and the limitations of the human state.”36
Since many have noted the universal character of these chapters, is it possible that the
character that the narrator is seeking to develop is not Adam, Eve or Noah, but humanity?
If this is the case, then the material in these chapters is much richer in characterization.
Furthermore, such an observation steers the reader away from sharp characterization of
males and females as is common in feminist interpretation. In either case, these chapters
share a narrative style frugal in characterization that sets them apart from what follows.

Plot Structure

Shamai Gelander comments that the development of plot constitutes the most
compelling evidence for the unity of Genesis 1–11. “I would argue that Genesis 1–11 is
constructed so as to form a single linear narrative sequence. This can be demonstrated by
considering its literary features, but principally by unravelling the conflict of the linear
plot.”37 Clines and Westermann have adverted to the cycle of crime and punishment that
characterizes these chapters. But the development is more than merely episodic. In the
reading that we will offer below we will attend to features that stitch adjacent narratives
together. But here we want to sketch one of the overarching plot movements that
influences theological appropriation of the text.
36. Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 202.
37. Shamai Gelander, The Good Creator: Literature and Theology in Genesis 1–11,
South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1997), 6.
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Perhaps the most theologically significant literary features of Genesis 1–11 is the
clear parallels between creation and the fall and the flood and its aftermath. This is the
Creation–Uncreation–Recreation theme of which Clines wrote.38 The flood and what
follows seem consciously crafted to suggest a recreation and second “fall.” Brodie sees
this as one of the main structuring features of the primeval narrative. “[T]he drama of
Genesis 1–11 consists of two acts (1–5 and 6–11), and each act contains three two-part
scenes. In simplified terms, the three scenes of act 1 (chaps. 1-5) are grounded on Adam;
those of act 2 (chaps. 6–11) on Noah. The relationship between the two acts is one of
continuity and variation.”39 Sailhamer puts it in terms of fathers and sons: The narratives
of Genesis 1–11 “are aligned along a singly story line from Adam and his three sons to
Noah and his three sons.”40
Smith sketches some of the links between Genesis 1 and 2 and chapters 8 and 9
that reveal this relationship.
(a) Since man could not live on the earth when it was covered with water in
chaps. 1 and 8, a subsiding of the water and a separation of the land from the water took
place, allowing the dry land to appear (1:9-10; 8:1-13);
(b) "birds and animals and every creeping thing that creeps on the earth" are
brought forth to "swarm upon the earth" in 1:20-21, 24-25 and 8:17-19;
(c) God establishes the days and seasons in 1:14-18 and 8:22;

38. Clines surveys this theme as one of the possible overarching themes for the primeval
narrative. He prefers it to Von Rad’s “sin-speech-mitigation-judgment” cycle and a “spread of
sin, spread of grace” theme. See Chapter 7 “Prefatory Theme” Clines, The Theme of the
Pentateuch, 67–86.
39. Brodie, Genesis as Dialogue, 17.
40. Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 307.
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(d) God's blessing rests upon the animals as he commands them to "be fruitful and
multiply on the earth" in both 1:22 and 8:17;
(e) man is brought forth and he receives the blessing of God: "Be fruitful and
multiply and fill the earth" in 1:28 and 9:1, 7;
(f) man is given dominion over the animal kingdom in 1:28 and 9:2;
(g) God provides food for man in 1:29-30 and 9:3 (this latter regulation makes a
direct reference back to the previous passage when it includes the statement, "As I have
given the green plant"); and
(h) in 9:6 the writer quotes from 1:26-27 concerning the image of God in man.
The author repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the world is beginning again with a fresh
start. But Noah does not return to the paradise of Adam, for the significant difference is
that "the intent of man's heart is evil" (Gen 8:21).41
To these could be added the similarity between Adam’s naming and Noah’s
collecting of the animals. Indeed, the description of the waters prevailing on the earth in
Genesis 7:24 paints a picture of the earth’s return to its original watery chaos (1:2). In
Genesis 8:1 God sends a wind to cause the waters to subside and calling to mind the
Spirit hovering over the waters.
These clear parallels between creation from chaos and recreation after a return to
chaos are made even more significant by the way the episode between Noah and his sons
immediately after the flood parallels the “fall” narrative of Genesis 3. There are
remarkable formal parallels between the story of Noah and his sons and the account in
Genesis 3. In both a fruit lies at the heart of the story. Noah, like Adam is described as a

41. Smith, “Structure and Purpose in Genesis 1–11,” 310–11.
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“man of the soil.” In both stories the main characters end up naked.42 In both stories there
is a covering, by God in Genesis 3 and by Shem and Japheth in Genesis 9. Both stories
end with a curse.43 Tomasino concludes: “These parallels show that history truly does
repeat itself, albeit with an ironic twist or two. The story of Noah's drunkenness provides
us with both a new "Fall", and a new conflict between brothers. Thus, it gives further
evidence that world history from the Flood through the Tower of Babel is essentially a
replay of the history from creation through the Flood.”44 It remains to ask what, if any,
kind of advancement or development there may be in the depiction and understanding of
sin.
This narrative device raises important questions for the theological use of these
narratives. If the text consciously depicts a cycle of creation-fall-uncreation-recreationand fall, is it legitimate to isolate the first fall narrative as a theological starting point?
Might not this literary feature point towards a more literary and holistic approach to these
narratives? And if so, how might the image of sin be reshaped by this broader
perspective?

Obstacles to Unity

One of the potential obstacles to the thematic and theological unity of Genesis
1:1–11:26 is the interspersing of genealogies amongst the narrative episodes. From a
42. Tomasino notes that the aspect of nakedness in the two stories is almost a mirror
image. Adam and Eve ate and saw their nakedness, Noah drank and didn’t recognize his.
Anthony J Tomasino, “History Repeats Itself: The ‘fall’ and Noah’s Drunkenness,” Vetus
Testamentum 42, no. 1 (Ja 1992): 129.
43. There are differences as well. Westermann notes that unlike many of the other crime
and punishment stories God is not the one who punishes, rather Noah utters the curse. Further, the
sin of Ham is offset by the act of respect of his brothers, a feature lacking in any of the other
narratives.
44. Tomasino, “History Repeats Itself: The ‘fall’ and Noah’s Drunkenness,” 130.
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modern standpoint, the genealogies break up the flow of the narrative. Clearly, however,
the narratives of Scripture (Genesis or elsewhere) are distinct from those of contemporary
literature. Westermann regards the collation as the distinctiveness of these narratives45
and warns against overlooking them: “To devalue implicitly the genealogies or to leave
them aside must have far-reaching effects on one’s final understanding of and judgment
on the primeval story.”46 Heeding this warning we will have cause to consider briefly
what the genealogies of Genesis 1–11 contribute to the depiction of sin in these chapters
as we encounter them in our reading.
Robinson articulates the delicate role that genealogies have to play in preserving
the theological coherence of the Genesis narrative.
The delicate interplay between the narratives and the nonnarrative
genealogies places Genesis at a fluctuating, never specifiable point
between the complete predestination of events embodied in the strict
prophecy-fulfillment structure of the Odyssey and the nearly complete
autonomy of successive events familiar from modern plots. That point is
not meant to be fixed. Events retain their full contingency, characters the
moral control of their wills; yet somehow God is in charge, and creation
follows the will of its creator. The interplay of story and genealogy,
narrative and nonnarrative, is a literary strategy which, in a sense, defies
the restrictions and reductions of the neat logical oppositions of free will
versus determinism or contingency versus foreordination which, perforce,
we use in our analysis. Logic cannot affirm both sides of these oppositions
without contradiction. But the literary structure of Genesis has found a
way to maintain both sides and thus to give expression to a deeper
reality.47

45. “This is the only place in the Old Testament where genealogies and narratives are put
together in such a way. It is this that gives the primeval story its unique character.” Westermann,
Genesis 1–11, 3.
46. Ibid., 3.
47. Robert B Robinson, “Literary Functions of the Genealogies of Genesis,” Catholic
Biblical Quarterly 48, no. 4 (O 1986): 608.
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So according to Robinson, the genealogies combined with the narratives provide a
balanced narrative that evokes the tensions of human existence between determinism and
contingency.
The diversity and repetition found in Genesis has been seen by others as an
obstacle to its unity. Many have noted the shift from Elohim in chapter 1 to Yahweh
Elohim in chapter 2. Others point to the repeated narratives of Abraham and Isaac
surrendering their wives for self-protection. Wenham argues, however, that a literary
approach to the text alleviates many of those concerns. “Repetition, duplicate narratives,
varying names of God, and other changes in vocabulary were typically seen as marks of
different sources. But according to literary theory, such features may not be signs of a
change of author but of the skill of one sophisticated author intent on holding his hearer’s
attention by recapitulating the story at key points (repetition) and by introducing subtle
variation (contradictions).”48
The literary artistry is brought out in the use of repetition and theme words that
connect adjacent texts as well as bridge between more distant texts. Johnson T. K. Lim
comments succinctly that the “first eleven chapters (for that matter the Pentateuch as a
whole) is to be read as a unified narrative which is derived from the arrangement of texts
such as intertextual patters of repetition, verbal and thematic linkages and others. Within
that narrative coherence, there is a unified structure and a common purpose.”49 Themes
and vocabulary such as land/earth, naming, fruit and fruitfulness, the good, curse and
blessing are repeated in Genesis 1–11 and beyond. We will draw out some of these
recurring words in the reading below.

48. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, xxxvi.
49. Lim, Grace in the Midst of Judgment, 90.
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Summary: The Theological Unity of Genesis 1:1–11:26

The cautions from commentators combined with this survey of the structural,
literary, and thematic unity of Genesis 1–11 argues against atomization of the text and for
the approaching the text as a theological unity. Lim regards these chapters as the “seed
plot” for the remainder of the book.50 Sailhamer goes further and argues for the
fundamental character of these chapters for the theological development of the entire
Pentateuch. “The function of this composition of Genesis 1–11 is to present these various
theological themes and viewpoints at the beginning of the Pentateuch and thus to provide
a context for the development of these themes in the remainder of the book.”51 Standing
as the Pentateuch does at the head of the canonical literature, it is not illegitimate to
suggest that these chapters represent the foundational material for the theological
storyline of Scripture as a whole.52
A NARRATIVE ATTENTIVE READING OF SIN IN GENESIS 1–11

We turn now to read Genesis 1–11 attending to its literary quality and with special
attention to the depiction of sin. Several readings of Genesis 1–11 on offer seek to attend
to the literary features of the narrative. There are many themes and threads to trace
through these chapters. Our focus is specifically on how sin is depicted in the various
50. Ibid., 191.
51. Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch, 314.
52. One may object to describing these chapters as fundamental when the characters and
events narrated therein are so infrequently referenced in the remainder of the Hebrew Bible and
only scarcely more so in the New Testament. This assessment overlooks not only specific
passages that do echo these narratives but, more importantly, the number of themes in the Hebrew
Bible that have their source in these chapters: rivalry between brothers, exaltation of the younger
over the older, garden and tree imagery, flood imagery for judgment, Edenic tranquility and
shalom. One could perhaps argue that these events, rather than being recalled become part of the
scenery and setting against which the later narratives are played out.
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episodes in which it appears and whether there is a discernible development of sin over
the course of the 11 chapters.
True narrative criticism focuses on matters of setting, narrative time, character,
plot and plot gaps, and speaks of the implied author and readers.53 While we may have
cause to consider some of these features (especially plot), the narratives of Genesis 1–11
differ from the narratives later in Genesis and certainly from those in the longer narrative
works of the former prophets (Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings). Accordingly, the standard
tools of narrative criticism will be of less use than the more general tools of literary
readings. From the discussion of the literary unity of the text we have already observed
some of the literary devices used in Genesis 1–11. Before proceeding to the reading,
however, we will briefly comment on the presence of the more specifically narrative
features.
The presence of a discernible plot sets narrative apart from other biblical genres
and is especially important to careful orientation of discrete narratives within a whole
work. While other features common to narrative may not play a significant role in
Genesis 1–11, plot is a key feature of these chapters and the argument of this dissertation.
Key words, repetition, and other structural features help the reader to discern the plot line
and steer away from an atomization of the text. According to Sidney Greidanus, “To
discover the plot line, one should ask: What is the conflict in this story and how is it

53. For a basic survey of narrative criticism focused more on its New Testament
application see Mark Allan Powell, What is Narrative Criticism? Guides to Biblical Scholarship.
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990). Some of the classic works focusing attention on Old
Testament narratives are: Shimeon Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible, 70 (Sheffield, England:
Almond Press, 1989), 295; Adele Berlin, Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative Bible
and Literature Series, 9 (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1983); J. P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art in
Genesis: Specimens of Stylistic and Structural Analysis, 2 (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press,
1991); and Sternberg, Poetics of Biblical Narrative.
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resolved?”54 However, identifying a singular plot in Genesis 1–11 is not easy. Due to the
important place that these chapters fill in the book of Genesis, the Pentateuch and
Christian Scripture they are rife with plot possibilities. Greidanus goes on to say that the
“various plot lines [in Genesis] don’t neatly follow one after the other but are interwoven
with overarching plots.”55 We will need to come to some conclusions, at least tentatively,
regarding the plot of Genesis 1–11 and how the depiction of sin relates to it.
To set the stage, we will consider chapters 1 and 2 for what they reveal about the
characters, the setting, and any hints they may offer regarding the plot of what is to
follow. We will then proceed through the narratives tracking the theme of sin and its
development. In particular we will ask how sin is depicted in each account and what its
reference point is.

Genesis 1–2 - The Narrative Background

Though there is some disagreement regarding how to divide Genesis 1–11 as a
literary unit, it is generally agreed that more significant plot movement begins in Genesis
3:1 with the introduction of the serpent. However, a case can also be made for the unity
of 2:3–3:24. Interpreters offer a variety of ways of regarding chapters 1 and 2. On the
basis of the toledot formula in Genesis 2:4, many regard chapter 1 as an introductory
prologue. Thematically, however, it is evident that chapters 1 and 2 present partially
overlapping accounts of creation.56 As befits a good narrative, it is difficult to find a neat
dividing point between the introduction and the action proper. When reading for unity, it
54. Sidney Greidanus, “Detecting Plot Lines: The Key to Preaching the Genesis
Narratives,” Calvin Theological Journal 43, no. 1 (Ap 2008): 65.
55. Ibid., 69.
56. The account in chapter 2 is commonly regarded as the older account and it attributed
to the Yahwist. Chapter 1 is the work of the Elohist.
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makes sense to regard these chapters as introductory and offering important background
information on the main characters and the setting of the drama that is to unfold.
However, the manner in which the two chapters do this is distinct with the creation
narrative of chapter 2 being more closely related to the narrative that follows it.57

The Setting

Both creation narratives provide background for the ensuing narrative in the form
of setting and the introduction of the principal character: God. Humanity is presented in
chapter 1 but is not thematic. As a created entity, the earth is depicted as having an origin
and being under God’s control.58 The sequence and ordering of the days of creation in
chapter 1 speak to an ordered and orderly creation.59 This is in contrast to the “formless
void” of Genesis 1:1. God’s action of separating suggests the setting of boundaries and
separate spheres of operation. There are several details in the narrative that suggest that
the creational setting of the narrative is inscribed with limitations and boundaries. Day
and night, land and sea, sky and land are all separated. One day is set apart for blessing
and rest. Many trees are given; one is prohibited. The garden is bounded by rivers.
The earth itself is not an isolated, inert, inactive set for the drama. The land is not
set off from heaven as two totally separate realms. Wenham suggests that the alteration
between heaven (days 1, 2, and 4) and earth (days 3, 5, and 6) in the creation account
57. In a unique approach to the structure of Genesis, Thomas Brodie sees chapters 1 and
2 as the first of several “diptychs” throughout the book of Genesis. These facing panels should be
read together. We will see that this approach is most useful with the first four chapters but
becomes less clear as the narrative proceeds. Brodie, Genesis as Dialogue, 15–19.
58. Much has been written concerning the manner in which the creation narratives
undercut various aspects of the worldviews and cosmogonies of the nations surrounding Israel.
This is doubtless true but not relevant for our study.
59. Westermann suggests that this sequencing mimics the genealogies and presents
creation as a set of generations. Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 81.
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communicates the interlocking relationship of the heavens and the earth.60 What is more,
the creation accounts present the earth as participating in the act of creation. Though
blessed with fecundity, the created order is not depicted as perfect and complete. Rather,
it needs to be put under dominion (Gen 1:28). Chapter 2 presents this more starkly
suggesting that the ground was in need not only of rain but of someone to till it for it to
become productive (2:5). These observations cut against theories of the inherently perfect
and paradisiacal character of the pre-fall world. As we shall see, the setting, the created
world, serves as more than merely backdrop for the narratives that follow.
A final description of the creational backdrop of the narrative is God’s repeated
assessment of its goodness.61 Six times in chapter 1 God sees his creation and sees that it
is “good”, טֹוב, (vv. 10, 12, 18, 21, 25) or “very good”, טֹוב ְמאֹד, (v. 31). In the context of
the well-ordered creation, “good” refers to fitness to its purpose.62 Sailhamer specifies
that purpose when he suggests that “the ‘good’ is that which is beneficial for
humankind.”63 These usages inform the following chapters and God’s first assessment
that something was not good (i.e. Adam’s loneliness) as well as our understanding of the
significance of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Further, the depiction of the
land as good yet in need of cultivation leaves space for both appreciation of its inherent
qualities and for some sense of its development and perfection going forward. That is,
there is space for narrative, teleology, or eschatology.

60. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 7.
61. Insofar as time may be regarded as part of the setting there are a few observations
about time in the introduction. The celestial lights are given for the purpose of setting apart day
and night, times and seasons. Furthermore the seventh day is set apart as holy, thus sanctifying
time.
62. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 18.
63. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 88.
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The Characters
The principal character in the narrative is God. In the first creation account, God64
is depicted as powerful. God is principally revealed through his action, though most of
these actions in chapter 1 are “speech-acts.”65 God creates,66 separates,67 names, fashions,
sees and blesses.68 In chapter 2 God is presented more intimately related to the creation as
he fashions man from the dust and breathes life into him, then recognizes his loneliness
and remedies it. God blesses and commissions humanity and provides for its needs
through the giving of the trees of the garden. The characterization of God is of double
significance because of the light it throws upon the description of humanity.
The introductory chapters of Genesis narrate what amounts to three creation
narratives of humanity each building on the previous. In each, humanity’s identity is
clarified with via its relationship to something else: to God as image bearer (1:26-28), to
the ground and creation as steward (2:7-17), and to a human other as partner (2:18-25).69
Each of these narratives is important in establishing the human identity and we will see
that they are a crucial reference point in the following narratives.

64. The title “Elohim” is used some 35 times in 1:1-2:3. In chapter 2:4–3:24, the title
changes to “Yahweh Elohim”. From 4:1 on the title is shortened to “Yahweh.”
65. The text uses the phrase “and God said” ten times leading some interpreters to make a
link to the decalogue.
66. The word create ()ב ַרא
ָ is used six times in 1:1-2:3 and is predicated only of God.
67. God separates light and dark (1:4), waters above and below (6, 7), and day and night
(14, 18).
68. God speaks blessings over sea creatures and birds (1:22), the humanity (1:28), and the
Sabbath day (2:3).
69. Interestingly, in each of these “creation narratives” multiple elements are present.
Animals are created on the same day as humans in narrative 1 and both male and female are
mentioned in parallel. In creation 2 where humanity’s relationship to the soil is emphasized he is
animated by the divine breath. Finally, prior to the creation of the woman, the man is presented
with animals as possible helpers before finding none suitable.
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The first creation narrative says of the human characters that they are made in the
image and likeness of God (מּותנּו
ֵ )ב ַצ ְל ֵמנּו ִּכ ְד,
ְ a description that has been the subject of a
great deal of speculation.70 Within the narrow confines of the narrative the best clues to
the significance of the imago dei are those describing what God is like. Indeed, in
succeeding chapters humans are presented imitating several of the actions ascribed to
God in chapter 1. In chapter 2 the man names the animals. In chapter 4 the woman
celebrates her reproductive capacities like Yahweh’s.71 And in chapter 3 it is the
woman’s God-like assessment that the fruit is “good” that precipitates their eating.
It is also legitimate to find at least some of the meaning of the “image of God” in
the phrases immediately following where humanity is given dominion over the creation
and commanded to be fruitful, the so-called cultural mandate. Asselin summarizes, “This
first chapter of Genesis presents Elohim as an active and absolute sovereign over the
universe and all its parts...In other words, man is God’s image because he shares God’s
power and dominion over creation.”72 From a narrative perspective, one would not expect
the text to reveal the significance of humanity’s identity in its fullness at the beginning of
70. The literature both exegetical and theological on Genesis 1:26–28 and the imago dei
is forbiddingly vast. Various positions have enjoyed consensus if briefly. Early positions making
a sharp distinction between “image” and “likeness” have been abandoned, in favor of regarding
the words as roughly parallel. At present there is a general consensus that what is in view are not
abstract qualities of God such as reason or other such capacities. There is also some agreement
that there is royal representation imagery behind the language of “image and likeness.” Further,
many see at least the broad outlines of the meaning of the image in the call to exercise dominion.
More recently there has been increased attention to the relational aspect of humanity and
therefore to understand the imago dei as in some sense relational. In addition to the
commentaries, there are several articles that survey the history of interpretation. See, for instance,
David J. A. Clines, “The Image of God in Man,” Tyndale Bulletin 19 (1968): 53–103.
71. Eve’s statement in 4:1—“I have produced a man with the help of the Lord”—is
subject to both positive and negative interpretation, either acknowledging God’s help or touting
her own creative capacities. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 111. Sailhamer opts for the
negative reading while Gonzales reads it positively. Sarna suggests that Eve’s statement, unique
in calling a baby “man”, is influenced by Adam’s wordplay on the words for man and woman in
2:23. Sarna, Genesis, 32.
72. David T Asselin, “Notion of Dominion in Genesis 1–3,” Catholic Biblical
Quarterly 16, no. 3 (Jl 1954): 282.
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the story. Indeed, the significance of what it means to be human and in the image of God
will unfold in the succeeding chapters. Stanley Grenz agrees: “Genesis 1:26–28 does not
define the imago dei in detail but rather opens the door to the possibility of the answer
emerging from the broader biblical narrative in which the creation story is placed.”73
In both the first and second creation narratives humanity is depicted in close
relationship with the created order. Indeed, it can be said that it was created and ordered
for them. Bruce Waltke writes, “The word land connotes that which is benevolently
ordered by God’s sovereignty in the interests of human life and security.”74 They are
commissioned with exercising dominion over it (1:28) and then later the man is placed in
the garden to work and keep it (2:15). In chapter 2 the man is formed from “the dust of
the earth” (ן־ה ֳא ָד ָמה
ָ )ע ָפר ִּמ
ָ and this connection is underscored by the word play between
( ֳא ָד ָמהsoil) and ( ָא ָדםman). The significance of this link will be seen in key places in the
narrative such as humanity’s fate to return to the dust ()ע ָפר
ָ and Abel’s blood crying out
from the ground ()א ָד ָמה.
ֳ Finally, among the penalties for sin in these chapters are
elements that relate to the ground: Adam and Eve are expelled from the garden to work
the ground, Cain is cursed from the ground, humanity’s corruption leads to the
destruction of the land with flood,75 and the people at the tower of Babel are dispersed
over the face of the earth/land ()א ֶּרץ.
ֶּ 76

73. Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of
the Imago Dei, Matrix of Christian Theology, vol. 1. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2001), 223.
74. Bruce K. Waltke and Cathi J. Fredricks, Genesis: A Commentary (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2001), 62.
75. In the prelude to the flood in Genesis 6:6, 7 both the words for land ()א ֶּרץ
ֶּ and ground
()א ָד ָמה
ֳ are used.
76. John Sailhamer makes a convincing case for translating the term  ֶּא ֶּרץas “land” rather
than “earth”. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 86. See also Genesis Unbound: A Provocative
New Look at the Creation Account, (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Dawson Media, 2011).

187
The description of the creation of humans in Genesis 2 adds considerably to the
cryptic statement in 1:26–28 both regarding the nature of humans and their task.
Furthermore, the human is placed in a specific plot of ground that he is to tend and keep
and which is designed to furnish his needs. That this task will not be a merely agrarian
one may be hinted at as well. Regarding the apparent digression concerning the lands
surrounding the garden in 2:10–14, Kidner comments: “There is a hint of the cultural
development intended for man when the narrative momentarily (10–14) breaks out of
Eden to open up a vista into a world of diverse countries and resources. The digression,
overstepping the bare details that locate the garden, discloses that there is more than
primitive simplicity in store for the race: a complexity of unequally distributed skills and
peoples, even if the reader knows the irony of it in the tragic connotations of the words
‘gold’, ‘Assyria’, ‘Euphrates’.”77
But chapter 2 also presents the human in an intimate relationship with another like
unto him.78 While some have attempted to find something subservient about the
description of the woman as a “helper fit for him”, there is increasing agreement amongst
commentators that the term communicates equality. More importantly, Sailhamer notes
that read in the context of God’s repeated declaration of the goodness of creation, his

Westermann suggests something similar: “The verbs indicate the creation of a world that is meant
to be a living space for humankind, not the world in the sense of the universe.” Westermann,
Genesis 1–11, 87.
77. Derek Kidner, Genesis: An Introduction and Commentary, Tyndale Old Testament
Commentaries (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1975), 61.
78. One should distinguish the man’s act of recognition when presented with the woman
(2:23) from Adam’s act of naming Eve (3:20). The man’s word play between the Hebrew words
for man, איׁש,
ִּ and woman, ישה
ָ א,
ִּ suggests that this is a recognition of fundamental sameness. It is
only after the first sin and the pronouncement of separate consequences that Adam names Eve in
light of her specific reproductive role, and thereby emphasizes the difference between them.

188
preparation of the woman for the man is an “archetypal example of God’s knowledge of
the good.”79 This provides important background to the events of chapter 3.
Finally, the way the narrator presents the creation of humans in chapters 1 and 2
both exalts their status and qualifies it. Many commentators argue that the organization of
the material such that humans are created on day six presents humanity as the climax of
the creational process. At the same time humans are created on the same day as land
animals which modifies slightly the exalted position. Similarly in chapter 2 humanity is
presented as both unique among the animals in that they are animated by the breath of
God, but humbled by being derived from dust. The very presence of these distinct
descriptors suggest the possibility of tension between the poles of humanity’s honor and
its humility.

The Plot

As we suggested, many regard the introduction of the character of the serpent in
chapter 3 as the beginning of plot possibilities.80 This is particularly true with the
prediction of enmity between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent in
Genesis 3:15. However, even in the context of chapters 1 and 2 there are hints of
narrative possibilities. In chapter 1, for instance, the commissioning of humanity to a
particular task opens up both the possibilities of success or failure. Because the imago dei

79. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 101.
80. Michael Root writes: “The fall, of course, is not the first event in the Bible. But only
the entrance of sin into the created world is seen as initiating narrative movement. The fall is then
analogous to the murder in a stereotyped mystery novel. It may not occur on page 1, but it sets the
narrative tension that impels the plot’s movement and whose resolution constitutes the story’s
end.” Michael Root, “The Narrative Structure of Soteriology,” in Why Narrative?: Readings in
Narrative Theology, Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock,
1989), 269.

189
is described not as a static nature per se but rather something that must be worked out in
action; it is possible that it will not be.
In chapter 2 further narrative possibilities open up. For one, there is a subtle
theme of problem and resolution in the passage. Genesis 2:5 presents the “problem” of a
land barren of plant life for lack of rain and someone to keep it. These problems are
resolved in the ensuing verses with the sending of a mist (2:6), the formation of the man
from the dust (2:7), and the causing of trees to grow (2:9). Further, the chapter relates the
problem of the man’s loneliness. Here the chapter links with the previous chapter’s
drumbeat of God’s assessment of his creative acts as “good” and even “very good.” In
that context, God’s first declaration in chapter 2 that the man’s solitary existence is “not
good” echoes loudly. Indeed, a significant portion of the chapter is given to resolving this
problem, first through the parade of animals before the man and finally through God’s act
of creative surgery. The two chapters come together to reinforce that God knows the
difference between good and not good and takes action to resolve it. This foreshadows, if
dimly, the direction of the narrative.
The reference to the pre-creational state as “formless and void” hints at the
possibility that it could return to such. In fact, similar language is used in the midst of the
flood narrative to depict the earth’s return to a watery chaos swept over by a divine wind
(8:1).81

81. Sailhamer suggests that the intent of the phrase “formless and empty” in describing
the land is to highlight its uninhabitability. He then calls attention to similar language used in
Isaiah 45:18 to describe the land of Israel after the exile. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 85.
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Summary

These introductory chapters offer crucial context for the interpretation of the
narratives to follow. Westermann summarizes an important aspect of the depiction of
creation: its forward looking orientation rather than static existence. “Everything that God
makes or creates is given a destiny. For the earth or the world there is no need for this;
but everything else, on the earth or in the world, is given a purpose; their significance is
established with their creation (the purpose of plants and animals is only mentioned
later). Creation is not just making something which is then there; it is an action which has
a goal; it is an event whose aim is to give each object of creation a meaning and
function.”82 By speaking in terms of destiny, Westermann captures the forward moving,
narrative development of the story and creation itself.

Genesis 3:1-24 - Fall and Fallout

It is doubtful that any chapter of scripture has been subjected to more scrutiny
than this one.83 This testifies to humanity’s perpetual struggle to understand its own
condition. Among the vexing features of this and subsequent narratives is the absence of
commentary. The stories are told very briefly and the reader is often left to puzzle out the
meaning and even the narrator’s stance. Brueggemann’s warning is sage: “The themes
and tones of the story move in so many different dimensions that it diminishes what is
82. Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 88.
83. Brueggemann asserts that despite the amount of attention the text of Genesis 2–3 has
received that it “is an exceedingly marginal text”, an assessment he bases on the virtual silence of
the rest of the OT regarding this text. He goes on to debunk the ways the text has been used: as a
“fall” narrative, as a story on the origin of evil or death, as a narrative of human sexual
awakening. Walter Brueggemann, Genesis: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching,
Interpretation (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982), 41.

191
given when we press the story too far toward any single meaning or intent.”84 Of course,
much theological interaction with the text has done just that.
The story is well known and briefly recounted. The woman (and the man) are
engaged in a conversation about the forbidden fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil by a serpent. The serpent denies the divine warning of the consequences of
eating and suggests instead that the fruit will make them wise like God. They both eat.
The immediate consequence is an awareness of their nakedness, which they try
ineffectually to cover. This is followed swiftly by divine interrogation and penalties
imposed on all three participants. Finally, God covers the couple and expels them from
the garden.

The Narrative Context

When appropriated for theological reflection such as the interpretations surveyed
in previous chapters, Genesis 3 has often been almost completely excised from its
context. We have noted, however, that these narratives are tightly constructed making
such decontextualization inadvisable. What are the bounds of the Genesis 3 narrative? Is
it legitimate to interpret it in isolation from what precedes and follows?
Though we have characterized chapter 2 as part of narrative background, there is
good reason to link chapter 3 quite tightly with chapter 2. First of all, chapters 2–4
constitute the first toledot section. Second, the themes of the garden, trees, and
relationship are thematic in both chapters 2 and 3. From a narrative perspective,
Brueggemann analyzes chapters 2 and 3 into four scenes bounded by placement in and
exile from the garden. Also, there is clearly a movement from the relational harmony of
84. Brueggemann, Genesis, 44.
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chapter 2 to the disharmony of chapter 3. Brueggemann ties these themes together:
“Thus, the garden (scene I) exists for community (II). When the community is violated
(III), the goodness of the garden is lost (IV).”85 The chapters are similarly held together
by the theme of the trees and eating. Chapter 2 introduces the tree of life, the tree of
knowledge of good and evil, and the trees given for food. All three of these are present in
chapter 3. Further early in chapter 2 the man is placed in the garden and at the close of
chapter 3 he is expelled.86 We will also see, however, that chapter 3 is tied quite tightly to
chapter 4.

The Narrative

In addition to excising the narrative from its context, historical and mythical
readings often reduce the details of the narrative—the tree(s), the serpent, nakedness, and
death—to literal features or symbolic concepts. However, as the beginning of a cohesive
narrative we should expect the features of this episode to be richer and deeper than this
and contribute to the overall flow of the narrative and the depiction of sin in particular.
Chapter 3 begins with the introduction of a new character to the drama. While the
other characters have been introduced through the narration and activities of the
preceding chapters, the serpent is characterized more succinctly and directly as “crafty”
()ערּום.
ָ This term can have positive or negative connotations. It also offers a play on the
word “naked” (רּומים
ִּ )ע
ֲ used to describe the human pair in the preceding verse perhaps
85. Brueggemann, Genesis, 45.Ibid., 45.
86. Wenham, adapting Walsh, sees seven scenes in Chapters 2 and 3, each set apart by
the balance of narrative and dialogue. At the heart of the two chapters is the narrative of the
eating of the tree in 3:6-8. What this structure reveals is that the narratives can have both tight
internal structures while also being closely linked together with subsequent narratives. Chapter 2
echoes chapter 1. Chapter 3 links to chapter 2. We will see that chapter 4 echoes chapter 3.
Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 51.
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intending to highlight a contrast between their innocence and the serpent’s subtlety. Such
direct characterization is rare in the primeval narrative and therefore likely important.87
Sailhamer thinks it is crucial to the narrator’s depiction of the sin: “The description of the
serpent as ‘crafty’ is in keeping with several features of this story which suggest that the
author wants to draw a relationship between the Fall and the human quest for wisdom.”88
Of course, in the history of interpretation, the serpent has been connected with
Satan.89 In the near context the snake represents the animal created order at least; the
narrator specifically refers to him as a creature of the field. That the human pair should
parlay with him is striking in view of the near context in which the man found no suitable
companion amongst the beasts of the field paraded before him. How does an animal now
become a conversation partner?
Whatever else the serpent might come to represent in the narrative of Scripture,
the curse between the woman and the serpent speaks at the very least to a breach in the
peaceful relationship between humans and the animal order and therefore a complication
in their mandate to exercise dominion.90 Fretheim strikes the balance: “[T]he text speaks
of no supernatural being and no language of evil is used for it. It is simply identified as a
87. “Now, explicit characterization of actors in the story is rare in Hebrew narrative, so it
seems likely that in noting the snake’s shrewdness the narrator is hinting that his remarks should
be examined very carefully.” Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 72.
88. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 103.
89. Most contemporary commentators reject out of hand any facile connection between
the serpent and Satan though some conservative commentators still make the connection (Waltke
and Fredricks, Genesis: A Commentary, 90). John C. Collins stakes out a somewhat middle
ground by suggesting not that the serpent is Satan himself but his that “a competent reader from
the original audience would have been able to infer that the snake is the mouthpiece of a dark
power.” John C. Collins, “What Happened to Adam and Eve?” Presbyterion 27, no. 1 (Spring
2001): 28.
90. Brueggemann is perhaps the most reticent to ascribe any special significance to the
serpent but his conclusion is driven by a desire to be faithful to the constraints of the narrative.
“Whatever the serpent may have meant in earlier versions of the story, in the present narrative it
has no independent significance. It is a technique to move the plot of the story.” Brueggemann,
Genesis, 47.
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beast of the field. This means that the serpent is firmly grounded within God's creation; it
is neither primordial nor transhistorical. At the same time, it shows that the serpent is
transpersonal, as does talk about the seed of the serpent and God's judgment upon it. This
is more than simply the externalization of an inward struggle.” In short, when seen in the
broader context of Scripture, the character of the serpent is ripe for narratival
development.
Like the serpent, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is pregnant with
significance but resistant of tidy summary.91 Again, when viewed within the confines of
the narrative, we must relate the tree first to God’s declarations of what is good and not
good. Bonhoeffer warns against simplistic interpretations of tree and serpent. “The
ambiguity of the serpent, of Eve, and of the tree of knowledge as creatures of the grace of
God and as the place of the voice of evil must be maintained as such and must not be
crudely torn asunder in an unambiguous interpretation.”92 There is simply not enough
information in the narrative to explain the tree’s significance. Brueggemann asserts that
the “trees are incidental to the main point that God’s command is a serious one.”93
Fortunately, a full explanation is not necessary to understand the thrust of the narrative.
Much is made of the dialog between the serpent and the woman.94 Often the text
is dissected to address the changes made to the divine word by both the serpent and the

91. Wenham offers a brief overview of the possible significance of the tree: consequences
of obedience or disobedience, moral discernment, sexual knowledge, or omniscience. He decides
for divine wisdom but that which is inscrutable to humanity. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 63.
92. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Interpretation of Genesis 1–3
[and] Temptation (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 65.
93. Brueggemann, Genesis, 45.
94. Several characterize it as the first theological discussion and note the dangers of
God’s word becoming the focus of abstract debate.
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woman.95 Moving away from focus on the prohibition, Sailhamer suggests that the topic
of the conversation is “the question of the knowledge of the ‘good.’”96 This is a helpful
narrative observation since it puts the discussion squarely in the context of the repetition
of God’s declaration of the good in chapter 1 and the creation of the woman in chapter 2
as a remedy for the man’s “not good” rather than focusing on the tree as a legal
abstraction The question seems to be whether, to paraphrase 2 Peter 1:3, God has indeed
given them everything good and necessary for life and godlikeness. The pair conclude
otherwise, that there are other goods—the fruit’s beauty, its potential nourishment, and its
provision of knowledge. Sailhamer concludes, “The thrust of the story, with all its
simplicity, lies in its tragic and ironic depiction of the search for wisdom.”97 The wisdom
on offer is to be in service of the human identity; per the serpent, the fruit will assist them
in being who they already are, like God. This is important because it is precisely here that
many interpretations inject the notion of pride—that the couple wanted to be like God.
But it is not necessary (or helpful) to introduce such psychologizing; the offer seems to
be within the ambit of their own identity and destiny as image bearers.98

95. Hamilton notes that the messiness of the dialog is heightened by ambiguity within the
text as though the issue itself is ambiguous and therefore any discussion of it would necessarily
be. Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1–17, New International Commentary on
the Old Testament. (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1990), 189.
96. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 103.
97. Ibid., 104.
98. Hamilton, for instance, reads covetousness into the woman’s deliberations: “Here is
the essence of covetousness. It is the attitude that says I need something I do not now have in
order to be happy.” But the text says nothing about Eve trying to remedy a shortage of happiness.
Her judgment may be patently wrong but her motivations are opaque. Hamilton, Genesis 1–
17, 190.
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As Wenham points out, the narration of the act is remarkably brief in contrast to
the narration that precedes it and the judgment to follow.99 Narratively, the act itself is
central but minimally developed.
The Narrative’s Depiction of Sin

Traditional interpretations focus on this event as the historical beginning of sin in
the human race or as a mythic representation of the nature of sin. As we have seen, much
attention is focused on the violation of a clearly stated divine prohibition and the hubristic
motivation of divine likeness. Feminist interpreters have accused the narrative of pinning
blame on the woman and therefore read against it or discard it. It is impossible to deny
that the narrative presents the man and woman violating a specific divine prohibition.
God’s question, “Did you eat of the tree...” puts a fine enough point on it. However, there
are a host of details of the passage that temper this blunt assessment. What is this sin
really about? Is it principally a hubristic violation of a divine law? Who or what is the sin
against? The narrative does not seem to cast it so neatly.
So often, interpretations of Genesis 3 fail to read it in context of the surrounding
materials. The divine prohibition is presented as an abstract concept. However, there are
contextual features that mitigate somewhat against reading the nature of the sin so
simplistically. First, the prohibition is given in the context of vocation of tending to the
trees/garden and God’s gracious provision of trees for food and a helper for the task.
Further, these elements are given in the shadow of the broader description of humanity as
99. Wenham also regards 2:4-3:24 as a unity. Rather than break it down by scenes as
does Brueggemann, Wenham divides it according to its narrative and dialogical parts and
compares the presence and activity of specific characters. The result is nearly chiastic with God’s
action and human passivity present in prologue (2:5-17) and conclusion (3:22-24) and the
narration of the human action at the climax (3:6-8). Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 50.
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image bearers and tasked with dominion and procreation. That is, the prohibition
regarding the tree is a subset of the command to tend the garden which is itself a subset of
the mission of the imago dei in ch. 1. Brueggemann wisely warns that these elements
should not be separated. Commenting on Genesis 2:14-16 he writes:
These three verses together provide a remarkable statement of
anthropology. Human beings before God are characterized by vocation,
permission, and prohibition. The primary human task is to find a way to
hold the three facets of divine purpose together. Any two of them without
the third is surely to pervert life. It is telling and ironic that in the popular
understanding of this story, little attention is given the mandate of
vocation or the gift of permission. The divine will for vocation and
freedom has been lost. The God of the garden is chiefly remembered as
the one who prohibits. But the prohibition makes sense only in terms of
the other two. The balance and juxtaposition of the three indicates that
there is a subtle discernment of human destiny here.100
Interpretations that view the prohibition in abstraction from its context result in
distorted readings of the human, the divine-human relationship, and of the nature of sin
and redemption. Brueggemann concludes that the narrative “insists...that the freedom of
human persons to enjoy and exploit life and the vocation of human persons to manage
creation are set in the context of the prohibition of God.”101
It is true that the prohibition regarding the tree relates also to humanity’s
relationship with God. But Westermann ties relationship with God to humanity’s identity
as divinely appointed steward.
The meaning of the command becomes clearer when it is compared with
the duty imposed on the man in v. 15b. The duty of tilling and keeping the
garden is something comprehensible; the command need not be
comprehensible, and such is the case here. The meaning is this: the
command remains the word of the one who commands. One can only hear
it while one hears in it the one who commands and is obedient to him. The
command then opens up the possibility of a relationship to the one who
commands. By the command something is entrusted to the man; he is
100. Brueggemann, Genesis, 46.
101. Ibid., 52 (Emphasis original).
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given an area of freedom which the animals do not possess; it is not a
limitation but an enlargement of his potential.102
Read in context, the command is not an abstract point but is intimately related to
humanity’s commission to till and plant and implies an aspect of the divine-human
relationship. Westermann’s comment protects against a strictly negative
conceptualization of the tree by placing it in a much broader nexus of identity,
relationship, and destiny.103
Is the sin one of prideful disobedience? As suggested above, Sailhamer is
convinced that at the heart of the narrative is the question of what is good for humanity
with the thrust of chapters 2 and 3 being that “God will provide the ‘good’ for human
beings if they will only trust him and obey him.”104 We already mentioned that he sees
the depiction of the serpent as “crafty” pointing in this direction. It is also relevant to note
that to a certain extent the woman is already exercising some sense of the knowledge of
good and evil in her evaluation of the tree. “A narrative clue already points to the
woman’s assuming God’s role of ‘knowing the good’ even before she ate of the fruit—
that is, the description of the woman’s thoughts in the last moments before the Fall.”105
Sailhamer believes that the depiction of the sin is not so much as of rebellion but of folly,
foolishly thinking one could surpass God’s evaluation of the good. Sailhamer concludes,
then that “the temptation is not presented as a general rebellion from God’s authority.
Rather, it is portrayed as a quest for wisdom and ‘the good’ apart from God’s

102. Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 224.
103. Bonhoeffer suggests that the prohibition regarding the tree which was given to
Adam as a grace is only experienced as “law” when passed through the serpent’s distorting filter.
“The prohibition which Adam heard as grace becomes law.” Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 64.
104. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 104.
105. Ibid.
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provision.”106 Brueggemann ties together Adam’s “I was afraid” with the matter of
relying upon God’s goodness and demonstrates that it moves beyond Genesis 3. “It is the
same answer that will be given by Abraham (20:11) and then by Isaac (26:9) and by all
who cannot trust the goodness of God and submit to his wise passion.”107 Whether we
find this ultimately convincing or not it certainly has the virtue of attending to more
features of the narrative than many interpretations.
Sailhamer’s reading is sensitive to many details of the text but one further
observation may sharpen it. It is not a generic “good” that in is view but specifically the
goods necessary for the fulfillment of the human call to live out the image of God in
dominion and procreation. Many features of the text relate to the matter of the human
destiny as the text has thus far revealed it. The consequences of their behavior touch on
every feature of humanity’s role and identity revealed to this point. In particular, their
calling to exercise dominion and to fill the earth is complicated in consequence of their
sin. As Wenham states succinctly, “The sentences on the man and the woman take the
form of a disruption of their appointed roles.”108
The communal and cooperative aspect of the human identity and mission implied
in the shared bearing of the image from chapter 1 and highlighted by the special
preparation of a “helper” in chapter 2 are problematized in the narrative of chapter 3. In
chapter 2, the man was given a specifically designed helper in the woman after ruling out
all other possibilities through the parade of animals. That helper was God’s “good” for
the man to cure his loneliness and cooperate in the fulfillment of the human mission. In
chapter 3 these relationships are all complicated. First, the serpent postures himself as a
106. Ibid.
107. Brueggemann, Genesis, 49.
108. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 81.
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further helper and voice, illuminating and clarifying their calling. The man and woman
subjugate themselves to his word rather than exercising dominion over him as a beast of
the field. Then, the woman who was to be a help becomes a snare. Note that God rebukes
the man for listening to the voice of his wife, not the voice of the serpent (3:17). There is
almost the sense that the man has sinned against God and that the woman has sinned
against the man. The breakdown of the image bearing community is further described in
3:16 as desire and rule rather than help and oneness.
The punishments reveal important details of the nature of the crime. As
Brueggemann notes, “There is strange slippage between the crime and the
punishment.”109 First, the human pair experienced shame in their nakedness indicating
breakdown in their sense of self and of the other, a breakdown confirmed by the trading
of blame. Further, they experienced fear in their relationship with God. Then both
experienced limitations specific to ways in which they were to live out their calling as
humans: procreation and creation care.
The fullest expression of their punishment is the concept of death.110 Death was
mentioned in chapter 2 but less as threat and more as boundary. It is on the serpent’s
forked tongue that mention of death becomes a threat.111 Since no one physically dies in
the text the reader is led to assume either that God performs an act of preservation112 or
that something more than physical demise is in view. Brueggemann says of death that it
109. Brueggemann, Genesis, 48.
110. Wenham suggests that expulsion would have seemed worse than death to the
original audience. “The expulsion from the garden of delight where God himself lived would
therefore have been regarded by the godly men of ancient Israel as yet more catastrophic than
physical death. The latter was the ultimate sign and seal of the spiritual death the human couple
experienced on the day they ate from the forbidden tree.” Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 90.
111. Brueggemann, Genesis, 48.
112. “The miracle is not that they are punished, but that they live.” Brueggemann,
Genesis, 49.
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“comes, not by way of external imposition, but of its own weight. So the nakedness of
3:7 and the hiding of 3:8 already manifest the power of death, even before the Lord of the
garden takes any action.”113 Wolfhart Pannenberg similarly notes that “These are not
penalties imposed from without and having no connection with the nature of sin. The
conflict of sinners with creation, with other people, and even with themselves follows
from the nature of sin as a breaking of the relationship with God. There is an inner logic
here. The law of nature that leads from sin to death takes place without any special divine
intervention.”114 Given how closely related the effects of their sin are to the very
substance of their human identity, it makes sense to regard the concept of death presented
here as that which is contrary to human identity. Of course, physical death signals the end
of the individual’s narrative.
Another angle to assess it from is in the context of the three foundational
“creation” narratives that precede it that we argue shape the identity of the individual:
created in God’s image, created as creation caretaker, and created as relational. All three
axes are involved in the event of chapter 3 and humanity suffers loss in all three areas,
rendering them less capable of living out their identity vis-à-vis these reference points.
They have been expelled from God’s presence, experience conflict with one another, and
are diminished in their capacity to produce and reproduce.
So, yes, sin here is depicted as the violation of a divine prohibition. But the
texture of the story and the surrounding details suggest that God is not necessarily the
main reference point of the sin. He is, but almost as a step removed as he is present to
them in their identity and relatedness. Sin is deeply related to humanity’s identity as
113. Ibid., 49.
114. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 of Systematic Theology, trans.
Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 270.
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described in the preceding chapters, their identity as image bearers, an identity carried out
in part in procreation and dominion. Because of their mishandling of their role, they
experience complications in the pursuit of it. Oddly, however, their expulsion, in its way,
expedites certain aspects of the commission to be fruitful and fill the earth. Though exiled
from the garden, they are still positioned to fulfill the mandate to fill and subdue the
earth. Sin and punishment do not negate nor finally thwart their call as humans.
While we will reserve most of our theological reflection on the narrative depiction
of sin for the following chapter, it is appropriate to pause here and ask, “Is this sin
paradigmatic?” It does conform to our experience that violation of God’s word brings
consequences. On the one hand, we might think that few of our sins come with such
dramatic and person altering consequences. This would be true if we were to think of the
lasting effects on humanity that Adam and Eve’s sin had. Its place in the biblical
narrative is part of the explanation for this drama, but something must be related to the
nature of the sin. The sin had apparently nothing to do with cultivation and procreation,
but that is where the consequences are felt. But if we look at the consequences of their sin
diminishing their capacity to fulfill their identity and calling as humans as they
understood it than we see that our own sins are similar in their impact.

Genesis 4:1-26 - Mounting Violence

Hard on the heels of the expulsion from the garden the narrative moves to the
birth of Adam and Eve’s two sons: Cain and Abel. There is nothing to indicate the
timing, yet this episode keeps important themes moving forward, not least of which is the
human fulfillment of the mandate to be fruitful and multiply even in the aftermath of the
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curse.115 But the narrative contributes far more to the plotline of human depravity than it
does to positive themes of human fulfillment of the imago dei. Sarna comments, “The
first recorded death is not from natural causes but by human hands, an ironic comment on
the theme of chapter 3.”116
This story is scarcely less well-known than that which precedes it. The crisis
arises when the brothers, Cain and Abel, spontaneously offer sacrifices to God. To Cain’s
frustration his sacrifice is rejected while his brother’s is accepted. God meets Cain in his
anger and both warns and encourages him to do right. Instead, Cain lures his brother to
the field and kills him. When confronted again by God, Cain is obtuse and unrepentant.
Like he had on Cain’s parents, God issues both a judgment of expulsion and a form of
divine protection. Cain exits the scene to build a life and a city.

The Narrative Context

Since we are interested in demonstrating the literary and therefore theological
unity of Genesis 3–11, it is here, between chapters 3 and 4 that the links are perhaps most
important. If it can be demonstrated that chapter 3 is tightly linked with what follows, it
serves our case against the theological isolation of Genesis 3. What we will see is that the
literary clues suggest that we read the narrative parallel to the previous one rather than in
a strictly chronological or causal relationship.

115. Considerable debate swirls around Eve’s post-partum proclamation “I have gotten a
man with the help of the Lord” (4:1). Commentators divide over whether it is an expression of
cooperative humility and therefore positive or if it should be rendered “I have gotten a man just
like the Lord”, suggesting hubristic independence. Either reading fits into the narrative, though
the latter one contributes to the plot line of human self-advancement better.
116. Sarna, Genesis, 33.
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In a brief but detailed article, Alan J. Hauser examines the links between Genesis
4:1–16 and chapters 2 and 3.117 He notes the many structural118 similarities between the
stories:
1. the main characters are described by their functions (keep garden/companion,
farmer/shepherd),
2. there are two characters “created” and depicted in close relationship with one
another though the relationship ends in alienation;119
3. there is warning prior to the misdeed in both accounts;120
4. God confronts the characters after the events and interrogates them;121
5. God pronounces a sentence on each, and Cain’s sentence echoes that of Adam
in that there is a curse on the ground;
6. the characters are exiled from their present location,
7. the characters are separated from God,
8. and at the close of each narrative the characters dwell “East of Eden.”122

117. Alan J. Hauser, “Linguistic and Thematic Links Between Genesis 4:1-16 and
Genesis 2–3,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 23, no. 4 (December 1980): 297–
305.
118. Wenham analyzes the two accounts structurally as well and notes symmetry in their
alternating between narrative and dialogue in a concentric arrangement that focuses attention on
the decisive moment when man/woman and Cain/Abel are alone and the sin is committed.
Compare Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 50 and 99.
119. Hauser (and others) note the repeated reference to Abel as Cain’s “brother” seven
times in the relatively brief narrative. This repetition suggests the importance of the characters’
filial relationship as a part of the thrust of the narrative.
120. Further linking the passages, God’s warning to Cain, “Its desire (ׁשּוקתֹו
ָ )ת
ְ is for you,
but you must master it ()ת ְמ ָׁשל־בֹו,”
ִּ
(4:7) echoes the vocabulary describing the relationship
between the man and woman in 3:16, “Your desire (ׁשּוקתֹו
ָ )ת
ְ shall be for your husband and he
shall rule over you (ל־בְך
ָ )יִּמ ָׁש.”
ְ
121. Note the similarity in God’s questions to Adam and Eve—“Where are you?” (3:9)
and “What is this you have done?” (3:13)— and to Cain—“Where is your brother?” (4:9) and
“What have you done?” (4:10).
122. Hauser, “Linguistic and Thematic Links,” 297–98.
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Hauser concludes, “These structural similarities suggest more than a causal relationship
between the two stories. In fact it would appear that the numerous key elements in the
stories have been deliberately paralleled in order to lead the reader to relate major motifs
in one account to major motifs in the other.”123 Wenham goes a step further in explaining
the relationship between the stories. Though their differences must not be overlooked, he
asserts that the “similarities between chaps. 3 and 4 confirm that the former should be
read as a paradigm of human sin. Fratricide illustrates in a different way how sin
works.”124 When the similarities and differences are taken into consideration the point of
the parallel narratives becomes clearer. Wenham continues: “Clearly, then, though the
writer of Genesis wants to highlight the parallels between the two stories, he does not
regard the murder of Abel simply as a rerun of the fall. There is development: sin is more
firmly entrenched and humanity is further alienated from God.”125 Goldingay similarly
comments regarding the author’s intention that the “parallels in the motifs in these
opening stories in Genesis is a pointer to their being formally sequential but substantively
parallel.”126 We will consider later whether Wenham’s or Goldingay’s statements express
the development of sin fully enough, but for now, it suffices to notice that the narratives
are tightly linked literarily and thematically.127 It is important to note that the narrative

123. Ibid., 298.
124. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 100.
125. Ibid.
126. John Goldingay, Israel’s Gospel, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1. (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2003), 151.
127. There are a host of other verbal connections that link the stories and serve to show
how the events in chapter 4 build upon what happened in chapter 3. In recounting the birth of
Cain, the narrator uses three terms loaded with significance in light of chapter 3: know, conceive
and bear. Knowing was a central theme of chapter 3. Now a new type of knowledge is introduced
and one that must be seen in light of the complications to human knowledge presented in chapter
3. Part of God’s judgment upon the woman involved pain in conception and childbirth. “The
repetition of these words in 4:1 points back to both the sentence in 3:16 and the act that lead to
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does not suggest that the connection between these events is simple causation; there is a
more textured relationship between them, the full significance of which is not easily
articulated propositionally.

The Narrative

Though brief, the Cain-Abel narrative is a tightly structured unit. Brachter
analyzes the story’s plot with a modified version of Clines’ sin–speech–judgment–
mitigation plot structure. She sees an introduction (4:1–2), temptation (4:3–7), sin (4:8),
discovery (4:9–10), judgment (4:11–12), mitigation (4:13–15), and expulsion (4:16). This
more detailed structure highlights the parallels with the preceding narrative.
The occasion for Cain’s transgression arises with the rejection of his offering and
the acceptance of his brother’s. The narrator offers no specific reason for this rejection
though many have been suggested.128 It is likely that Hauser is right that the narrator’s

the sentence. This is another means used to tell the reader that all that takes place in 4:1–16 is a
consequence of the fall.” Hauser, “Linguistic and Thematic Links,” 299.
128. The options divide between whether the problem lies in the offering itself or if it lies
in Cain. The most popular suggestion is that the offering was rejected because it was not a blood
sacrifice. However, the text calls them both offerings and it is not necessary that Abel’s was a
true blood sacrifice (Sailhamer, Pentatuech as Narrative, 112). Others suggest that Abel’s
offering was of higher quality than Cain’s (See, for instance, Hamilton, Genesis 1-17, 223). This
requires a bit more reading into the text than is warranted. Sailhamer argues that the story
functions in the Pentateuch as a guide for proper worship and that what is at issue is Cain’s heart
attitude. God rejects Cain’s offering because it is given with an impure heart, the extent of the
impurity being revealed by the later developments. Nahum Sarna appears to combine the two by
suggesting that the “fatness” of Abel’s sacrifice indicates its quality which in turn reveals the
purity of his intention (Sarna, Genesis, 32). Both Westermann (Genesis 1–11, 296) and
Brueggemann (Genesis, 56) root the difference in the immutable decision of God. Frank Spina
forwards the idea that the problem with Cain’s offering is that it came from the ground which
had been cursed (“The ‘Ground’ for Cain’s Rejection [Gen 4]: ‘adãmãh in the Context of Gen 1–
11,” Zeitschrift Für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 104, no. 3 [1992]: 319–32). And Jack P.
Lewis offers a lengthy history of the interpretation of their sacrifices (“The Offering of Abel [Gen
4:4]: A History of Interpretation,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 37, no. 4
[December 1994]: 481–96).
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interest lies in Cain’s response rather than with Yahweh’s rejection.129 Brueggemann
insists that God’s freedom is central to the story. “Essential to the plot is the capricious
freedom of Yahweh. Like the narrator, we must resist every effort to explain it.”130
Furthermore, the apparent arbitrariness of God’s rejection of Cain’s offering parallels the
apparent arbitrariness of the prohibition to eat from the tree in chapter 2–3.131 This
ostensible divine caprice combined with the paucity of reflection on the mechanics of sin
point to the inexplicability of both the occasions and causes of sin in human experience, a
theme we may have cause to revisit in the next chapter.
In a move similar to the previous episode, the narrator again reveals to us Cain’s
emotional life. In the aftermath of his rejection Cain was very angry ( )וַ יִּ ַחר ְל ַקיִּ ן ְמאֹדand
his “face fell” ()וַ יִּ ְפלּו ָפנָ יו.132 The importance of these emotions is underscored by their
exact repetition in God’s question to Cain (4:6). As opposed to the case of his parents
where the emotions described were a result of their sin, in Cain’s case the narrator
weaves them into the story as an ingredient in his sinful act. Whereas Adam and Eve
were moved to sin by (faulty) reason, Cain is moved by twisted emotions. This is an
129. Hauser, “Linguistic and Thematic Links,” 300.
130. Brueggemann, Genesis, 56.
131. If the rejection is arbitrary, then the scenario can be seen as a sort of test of Cain’s
character as the tree was a test of Adam and Eve’s trust. Of course, the depiction of Yahweh
making this selection arbitrary is unsettling to some readers. Joel N. Lohr shows how the LXX
translation of the Hebrew text subtly implicates Cain and his offering (and thus influenced NT
interpretation) and Angela Y. Kim reveals how later interpreters inserted the idea of envy into the
text to deflect attention away from Yahweh’s caprice. Lohr rightly points out that the “caprice” is
better seen as the first instance of the theme of God’s election of the younger over the older, a
theme frequently attested in Genesis. See Joel N. Lohr, “Righteous Abel, Wicked Cain: Genesis
4:1–16 in the Masoretic Text, the Septuagint, and the New Testament,” Catholic Biblical
Quarterly 71, no. 3 (July 2009): 485–96; and Angela Y. Kim, “Cain and Abel in the Light of
Envy: A Study in the History of the Interpretation of Envy in Genesis 4.1–16,” Journal for the
Study of the Pseudepigrapha 12, no. 1 (April 2001): 65–84.
132. There is a difference of opinion as to whether the expression translated “he was very
angry and his face fell” refers to anger or depression. Sarna and Hamilton lean toward depression,
whereas Wenham sees his anger as a common precursor to violent action. We need not decide the
case because it is clear that both anger and depression can be ingredient in sinful acts.
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important development in the depiction of sin in Genesis 3–11. As we will see below in
the narrative of the Tower of Babel, collective emotional concerns can contribute to sin
as well.

The Narrative’s Depiction of Sin

Traditional interpretations of the Cain narrative focus on the swiftness with which
sin has escalated to point of fratricide. Cain’s behavior is seen as emblematic of the
human tendency toward violence. In both historical and mythical readings, this narrative
is accorded less symbolic significance than the preceding. The narrative analysis above
suggests that the stories may be more parallel than sequential. What is Cain’s sin? Who
or what is it against? How does it relate to the narratives preceding it? While the original
and contemporary readers are aware of various divine prohibitions against murder, how
does the narrative depict what is sinful about Cain’s attack of his brother Abel?
Is Cain’s sin against God? As in the preceding narrative, God seems more
shocked—What have you done? (4:10, cf. 3:13)—than offended. God is depicted first
warning Cain against sin’s presence, then querying him about his brother, and finally
imposing both judgment and mitigation upon Cain. Whereas Adam and Eve were sent out
from the garden of God’s presence, Cain leaves the divine presence himself (4:16). The
sin is presented against God only by extension.
A clue to the reference point of sin in this narrative is to be found in the drumbeat
of filial relationship made by the repetition of the word “brother” through which the
narrator puts heavy emphasis on the intimate human and familial relationship that existed
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between these two men.133 This is further heightened by Cain’s question, “Am I my
brother’s keeper?” The term “keeper” ()הׁש ֵֹמר
ֲ is related to the term Yahweh God
originally used to define Adam’s task in the garden (2:15)—to tend it and to keep it
(ּול ָׁש ְמ ָרּה
ְ )ל ָע ְב ָדּה.
ְ As a brother and a sharer in the divine image and mandate, a case could
be made that Cain was indeed his brother’s keeper. But even if not, surely there are
postures between “brother’s keeper” and “brother’s killer” that Cain could have taken and
not violated his human calling. The relational hairline fracture observed between the man
and the woman in chapter 3 has become a fraternal compound break in chapter 4.
As with Adam and Eve’s sin it is impossible to keep discussion of the nature and
effects of Cain’s sin on the plane of divine-human or human-human relationships alone.
There are multiple features of the text that indicate that Cain’s sin was profoundly related
both to the ground and to his own self-perception. Cain’s relationship to the ground is
integral to the story. As a tiller of the ground (like his father) he brought a gift from the
ground. His punishment (again, similar to that imposed against his father) involves the
ground’s recalcitrance in yielding its abundance. But the link between his crime and his
punishment is not arbitrary on God’s part; it is directly related to a role that the narrator
(and Yahweh) depict the ground playing in the narrative. The setting of this crime is
specifically named “the field” ()ש ֶּדה.
ָ This term has been used earlier in the narrative to
describe the location of the plants and shrubs (2:5) as well as the source of food for Adam
after being exiled from the garden (3:18 - “the plants of the field”). As a farmer, the field
was Cain’s domain and that is where he led Abel to kill him. But the ground plays a

133. Bruce Waltke notes that the word “brother” occurs seven times in Gen. 4:2–11 and
foreshadows the family tensions that will be thematic throughout the book. Waltke and Fredricks,
Genesis: A Commentary, 98.
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further role. Yahweh says that the ground has been involved in Cain’s deed by receiving
Abel’s blood and then crying out in testimony against him (4:10–11). So God’s judgment
against Cain is not just specifically targeted against something precious to him, it is a fit
punishment due to humanity’s (and Cain’s) identity as steward of the land/ground and the
role that the ground was forced to play in Cain’s act. Ellen Van Wolde suggests that the
rhythm and rhyme of v. 11 emphasizes Cain’s link with the ground and concludes:
“Cain’s brothers’s blood ()דמי אחיך, which flows from the hand of Cain into the earth,
breaks the link between the  אדםCain and the אדמה.”134 In violating one human
relationship, Cain sacrifices another.135
As with the previous episode, the “slippage” between crime and punishment is
telling. We can say that God’s punishment of Cain is based not so much on the fact that
Cain has broken a law (indeed no law has been articulated) or even rejected the divine
word of warning (though he has in fact done so) but because his act has transgressed his
role as one charged with dominion of the land and in integral relationship with other
image-bearers. Cain has failed to act humanly and has forced the ground to play a role it
was not intended to play either. Hauser ties these points together well. “In 4:10...the
writer emphasizes that Abel has been returned to the ground prematurely, violently and
unjustly. Abel’s blood, which bears his ravaged life, cries out from the ground in protest

134. Ellen van Wolde, “The Story of Cain and Abel: A Narrative Study,” Journal for the
Study of the Old Testament 16, no. 52 (December 1991): 34.
135. Van Wolde finds several features of the narrative that speak to Cain’s “negation” of
his brother. Abel’s name means “breath, or vapor.” Cain’s denial of knowledge of his brother’s
whereabouts. Cain’s “empty speech” to his brother (v. 8). Of this last detail (a point of contention
in the text), she says, “This ‘empty’ speaking would then suggest, or testify to, the negation of the
existence of the other as equal, as a brother, and it can be seen as point ahead to the actual
elimination of the other.” van Wolde, “The Story of Cain and Abel: A Narrative Study,” 35.
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against the murder. As a result Cain, who heretofore had made his living from the
ground, now has become an enemy of it.”136
A few important details about the depiction of sin in this narrative are inscribed in
God’s comment to Cain in 4:7, “If you do well, will you not be accepted? And if you do
not do well, sin is crouching at the door. Its desire is for you, but you must rule over it.”
The first part of this parallels the clear prohibition against eating from the tree and what
would happen if it were violated. However, there are several differences. First, “doing
well” in this case is far less clear than formerly. What must Cain do well? The word
translated “do well” is the verbal form of the noun “good”. Presumably Cain knows what
the “good” is.
Just as important for the depiction of sin is the last phrase: “but you must rule
over it.” In the introduction to the next significant narrative God will assess the plight of
humanity dismally: “The LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth,
and that every intention of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually” (6:5). But
here, God seems to suggest that Cain has every chance to master the sin that crouches at
the door. Brueggemann says of Cain, “He is not the victim of original sin. He can choose
and act for the good. Such an affirmation by the narrator suggests that chapter 3 must not
be permitted to control chapter 4. Cain in this story is free and capable of faithful
living.”137 So while Wenham may be correct that by the end of the primeval narrative the
narrator appears sympathetic to an Augustinian account of original sin,138 at this early
stage he seems more sanguine about humanity’s condition. Though there is a difference
136. Hauser, “Linguistic and Thematic Links,” 302.
137. Brueggemann, Genesis, 57.
138. “[A] close reading of these chapters does suggest that the author of Genesis would
have been in general sympathy with the interpretation of St. Paul and St. Augustine.” Gordon J.
Wenham, “Original Sin in Genesis 1–11,” Churchman 104, no. 4 (1990): 321.
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of vocabulary between this term and those used in 1:28 to describe humanity’s dominion
over the creation, it is appropriate to make a connection between the ruling aspect of the
imago dei and what Yahweh calls Cain to in this passage. He is to exercise the power that
he has to dominate the sin rather than being taken in by it. Just as his parents should have
exercised dominion over the serpent (described as a beast of the field), so Cain’s proper
response to the situation is cast in the terms of fulfilling his identity as a human.
This leads to perhaps the most striking feature of the presentation of sin in this
narrative: the zoomorphic depiction of sin as an animal “crouching at the door.”139
Brueggemann says, “Sin is not a breaking of the rules. Rather, sin is an aggressive force
ready to ambush Cain. Sin is larger than Cain and takes on a life of its own.”140 Indeed,
one could say at this point that sin is depicted as a character in the narrative, a character
who, like God, interacts with the other characters in deep and decisive ways yet without
denying the freedom of those characters.
As our analysis suggests, it is impossible to limit the point of the narrative to a
simple statement. Brueggemann captures much of the tension that the narrative evokes:
The narrative is not for moral instruction. It enables us to reflect upon the
enigmatic situation in which we are set. Every person is willy-nilly set
between a sister/brother with whom we compete and a God who acts
toward us in seemingly capricious ways. It is not only the problem of the
brother, for Cain had quickly resolved that. Nor is it only the problem of
God. It is the brother and God together that create conflict for Cain and
finally lead to his unbearable destiny. We try as best we can to separate
‘the human predicament’ from the God question. Things are then bearable.
But this narrative insists that they converge and cannot be separated.141

139. “If Genesis 3 brings us up short by portraying a snake acting like a person and
speaking, then Genesis 4 does the same by portraying the abstract reality ‘sin’ acting like an
animal and making its bed at the doorway of Cain’s life or of his home.” Goldingay, Israel’s
Gospel, 151.
140. Brueggemann, Genesis, 57.
141. Brueggemann, Genesis, 61.Ibid., 61.
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What Brueggemann emphasizes is that it is not enough to say that as humans we are
caught up in different types of relationships. Rather, it is the way that those relationships
overlap and intertwine (particularly between us, our brother and God) that is the stuff of
human experience and the nexus in which sin and temptation occur.
It is common for interpreters to respond in shock at the fact that humanity has
arrived at murder in just its second generation.142 This is taken to suggest an acceleration
of the seriousness of sin and its grip on humanity. However, the textual details we have
examined above suggest that the sins are parallel as much as anything. Wenham attempts
to capture the relationship between the narratives. “These similarities between chapters 3
and 4 confirm that the former should be read as a paradigm of human sin. Fratricide gives
a further illustration of the way sin works.”143 They are told in parallel because they
function together to depict the character of sin. Wenham goes on to suggest that these are
not just parallel illustrations but rather present a complex development. “Clearly then
though the writer of Genesis wants to highlight the parallels between the two stories, he
does not regard the murder of Abel simply as a rerun of the fall, there is development: sin
is more firmly entrenched and humanity is further alienated from God.”144 We shall see
that this narrative development continues.

142. Gonzales is more dramatic than most. From chapter 3 to 4 “human sin not only
moves from the first generation of human beings to the second, but there is a marked increase in
sin’s odious nature. What began as a seed planted within the hearts of the primoridal man and
woman has taken root in the second generation and grown into an ugly weed of human hubris that
will rapidly spread throughout the earth, turning what God intended to be a paradisiacal Garden
into a howling wasteland of evil and misery. So begins the spread of sin!” Unfortunately,
Gonzales overlooks that chapter 4 ends on a positive with the establishment of Yahweh worship
and the godly line of Seth and chapter 5 is structured to highlight Enoch and Noah, both righteous
men. Gonzales, Where Sin Abounds, 64.
143. Wenham, “Original Sin in Genesis 1–11,” 314.
144. Ibid.
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The Narrative Aftermath

Following the narrative of Cain and Abel is a brief genealogy which, like several
of the Genesis genealogies highlights certain events or individuals. In this case, seven
generations of Cain’s descendants are listed with editorial comments about the first and
last of them. First, in apparent defiance of God’s judgment upon him to be a wanderer,
Cain builds a city and names it for his son Enoch. In the seventh generation, Lamech
fathers three sons all of whom are heralded for contributions to human cultural
development: Jabal was the father of nomadic livestock herders, Jubal made
advancements in music and instrument making, and Tubal-Cain is said to have developed
metallurgy. However, these evidences of human cultural development are overshadowed
in the narrative by Lamech’s crass and violent behavior.
Building off of God’s promise to avenge Cain, Lamech boasts to his wives that he
has enacted his own vengeance for lesser crimes—“I have killed a man for wounding me,
a young man for striking me” (Gen. 4:23-24)—and threatens a tenfold increase on God’s
promise of vengeance. Though the text contains no editorial comments on this vignette,
attention to literary detail clarifies the narrator’s stance. First, Lamech is described as
having two wives. This contrasts sharply with the recent divine provision of one wife for
Adam. To underscore this context, Lamech’s boast is recorded as poetry. His poem of
boast and threat contrasts dramatically with Adam’s poetic exaltation at the creation of
the woman. Clearly the author intends the reader to recognize the decline in relational
harmony and the increase in human belligerence.145 That this narrative comes at the close

145. Wenham notes that monogamy is implied by the creation of the woman in chapter 2.
“Had Adam been supplied with several wives, he could have been fruitful and multiplied even
quicker! The creation of one Eve thus shows that monogamy is more important than rapid
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of a genealogy implies that these characteristics were in development along the familial
chain.146 Cain’s use of violence against his brother becomes Lamech’s claim to violent
self-preservation and taints the harmony of the marital union with a threat. Lamech takes
to himself the role of meting out vengeance that God so recently claimed as his own.

Summary
Cain’s sin is presented as committed against God, another, the self, and the
ground. Sin appears as an external force that one can and should resist. Out of anger,
Cain acts using powers intended for one thing to accomplish another. He has failed to be
fully human and receives the fruits of this failure in the very areas that constitute his
humanity. Sin then appears to grow in his family line furthering the violence and
compounding it with Lamech’s appropriation of the divine right of vindication. Cain’s sin
seems to be focused against other humans than against God, but the consequences
suggest that Cain has also sinned against the ground and himself.

Genesis 5:1–32 - Genealogy of Grace

The brief genealogy of Cain is paralleled by a longer genealogy in chapter 5.
Rather than being headed by a narrative of violence, it starts with a reference to the line
of Seth (5:4, cf. 4:25, 26) and a reiteration of the fact that humanity bears the image of

multiplication” (Gordon J. Wenham, Story as Torah: Reading the Old Testament Ethically, Old
Testament Studies. [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000], 31). This further implies that there is a
hierarchy of value in the various aspects of human identity. Procreative fruitfulness is not a good
in an abstract sense but within the bounds of the relational identity of the couple.
146. “The song may suggest that in the family of the undisciplined murderer, vengeance
runs rampant, uncontrolled, and without limits. It fits the general theme of Gen. 3–11.”
Brueggemann, Genesis, 65.
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God (5:1, 3) as if to assure the reader that despite the despicable behaviors recorded in
the preceding chapters the creational mandate is still in force.
The similarity in names between the two lists encourages the reader to compare
them. Whereas the Cain’s genealogy spans seven generations and ends with a violent
Lamech, Seth’s genealogy spans ten generations and ends with a Lamech who doesn’t
threaten but hopes for rest through the work of his offspring Noah. The repetitive
structure of the genealogy highlights both the ongoing blessing of procreation and the
unavoidable consequences of sin in death.147 Further, whereas Cain’s genealogy speaks
of escalating violence, the Enoch from Seth’s genealogy offers a different possible end
for humanity than death.148 Though cryptic, these features help to move forward the
drama through many generations to give the impression of the ongoing conflict between
what humanity was made to be and the ways in which it fell short of that destiny. As
suggested earlier, the parallel placement of these genealogies invites the conclusion that
humanity has two possible narratives before it.

Genesis 6:1–8 - Cosmic Chaos

Sarna expresses the sentiment of most commentators when he writes of Genesis
6:1–4: “The account given in these few verses is surely the strangest of all the Genesis
narratives. It is so full of difficulties as to defy certainty of interpretation. The perplexities
arise from the theme of the story, from its apparent intrusiveness within the larger

147. “The sentences are as monotonous and have the same effect as those of Gen 1 ,
presenting as they do the steady, ongoing rhythm of events which stamp the course of human
existence—birth, length of life, begetting, death; all that is essential. The real significance of what
is happening lies in the continuity of successive generations.” Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 7.
148. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 118.
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narrative, from its extreme terseness, and from some of its vocabulary and syntax.”149 It
is unlikely that we will solve these complexities. However, by reading the episode in its
narrative context we can make some cautious comments on how it contributes to the flow
of the narrative and even the depiction of sin.150

The Narrative

The story appears to relate two events that may or may not be related: the sexual
intermingling of “the sons of God/the gods” and the “daughters of men”, and the rise of
the Nephilim.151 After both (6:3 and 5–7), God offers commentary on human behavior
similar to that uttered in 3:22 and later in 11:6–7. Both of these comments regard
humanity’s condition and contribute significantly to the depiction of sin.
Much of the debate centers on the identification of the “sons of God/sons of the
gods” (להים
ִּ י־ה ֱא
ָ ֵ)בנ
ְ and the nature of the sin.152 Three main options have been put
forward: (1) the “sons of God” are angelic beings and the sin is the disordered mingling
of what God has separated; (2) the “sons of God” are the godly line of Seth and the sin is
intermarriage with the ungodly line of Cain (or “the daughters of men”); or (3) the “sons

149. Sarna, Genesis, 45 Breuggemann is even more pessimistic about the prospect of
understanding the narrative. “The meaning of the text is disputed and likely the effort taken in
understanding it will not be matched by gains for exposition in the listening community.”
Brueggemann, Genesis, 71.
150. Within the broader context of the Pentateuch, Wenham suggests that this narrative
“foreshadows the aversion to intermarriage with Canaanites and Hittites, a recurrent theme in the
patriarchal stories.” Wenham, Story as Torah: Reading the Old Testament Ethically, 27.
151. It is ultimately unclear whether one should regard the Nephilim as the offspring of
these unions or if the reference to them is more of a chronological reference. We need not decide
this here because the subsequent divine assessment offers a clear picture of the sinful state of
humanity quite apart from deciding that particular.
152. There are other issues in the text as well, such as the identification of the Nephilim
and the apparent contradiction of the limiting of human lifespan to 120 years when the
genealogies of chapter 10 and 11 record longer lifespans.
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of God” are kings or other rulers and the sin is the abusive use of authority to pleasure
themselves and multiply their progeny.153 Other positions and variants have also been
forwarded.154 Each has strengths and weaknesses as well as fruitful points of contact with
the current narrative. Many who espouse the “angelic” interpretation see the passage
fitting with the depiction of God separating domains in Genesis 1 and regard the passage
as yet another example of humanity attempting to better itself by transgressing divine
boundaries.155
At the very least it is clear that the passage is another “crime and punishment”
episode with God intervening to limit or judge the sin. The limitation of human life to
120 years is to be read in the near context of chapter 5 where the remarkable lifespan of
individuals allowed for considerable reproductive fecundity, but also, apparently, for
considerable growth in corruption. The reference to God’s spirit ()רּוח
ַ in contention with
humanity (6:3) recalls the animation of earthen humanity with the divine breath (2:7).156

The Narrative’s Depiction of Sin

What all the readings share is that the sin involved the distortion of the
fundamental human relationship of marriage. This is sin’s reference point, the divine
institution of marital unity. While it is common to depict a self-advancing motivation for
the sin, a move which would make the sin more directly against God, the cryptic nature

153. Most commentators offer some summary of the options and their pros and cons. See,
for instance, Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 139–140; Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 371–372).
154. By dividing the text differently John Sailhamer offers a distinct interpretation of
Genesis 6:1–4 that smooths some of the difficulties created by the traditional interpretations.
155. So understood, this interpretation avoids the apparent conflict of the “sons of God”
being the initiators while the “daughters of men” appear to be those who are punished.
156. The term for breath used in 2:7 is נְ ָׁש ָמה. The two words are paired in 7:22.
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of the passage makes this uncertain. In focusing on the distortion of human relationship
this episode shares a theme with Lamech’s bigamy and advances it. Interestingly, in the
near context here, as there, the distortion of marriage is coupled with violence (4:23-24
and 6:11).
In the context of the preceding chapter’s repeated formula of characters living
many years after their first offspring and “having other sons and daughters,” the limiting
of the human lifespan to 120 years would suggest that God is not only trying to decrease
the time in which persons may commit sin but is also actively curtailing human
reproduction. The blessing is not revoked, but limited. If so, then the sin-judgment
combination resembles that of the fall in the garden and the Cain-Abel narrative where
we saw the consequences limit the human capacity to live out its humanness. Since
humanity has distorted the reproductive relationship for its own gain (be that the pursuit
of pleasure or of cosmic advancement), God responds with a judgment that restricts
humanity’s capability to fulfill its human mandate. Once again, then, humanity is
depicted transgressing its own identity as human-in-the-image-of-God and human in
relationship with the other, and ends up losing at least some of its ability to live out that
identity.
We see a further development in sin over earlier chapters in the divine declaration
that “that every intention of the thoughts of [humanity’s] heart was only evil continually”
(6:5). From the woman’s reasoned deliberation in Genesis 3 and Cain’s responsibility to
master sin in chapter 4 humanity has now moved to a position of entrenchment in sin and
sinful reasoning. No longer external to humanity, sin is now woven into all their
reasoning and behavior. Accordingly, God determines to take drastic measures. In
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keeping with the previous narratives, the effects of humanity’s sin will be felt beyond the
bounds of humanity as God declares that the consequences will be felt by “man and
animals and creeping things and birds of the heavens” (6:7). This again highlights
humanity’s intimate connection to the created order; the condition and fate of the steward
cannot be separated from that of the creation under dominion.

Genesis 6:9–9:17 - Corruption, Catastrophe and Cleansing

We have already addressed how the narrative of the flood functions in Genesis 1–
11 as an uncreation-recreation story and some of the implications that has for the careful
theological appropriation of these narratives. Here we turn to examine more closely the
narrative of the flood to see how sin is depicted and what these narratives add to the
images of sin already encountered in the text thus far. For our purposes we can divide the
text into three sections: prologue to the flood (6:1–8) which we covered above, the flood
narrative proper (6:9–9:17), and the epilogue (9:18–29), which we will address in a
separate section.157 It turns out that the prologue and the epilogue have more to say about
sin specifically than does the flood narrative itself.

The Narrative

The familiar story of the flood is bounded by two short and perplexing narratives:
the episode of the sons of God and the daughters of men and Ham’s dishonoring of his

157. Here I am following Wenham’s division (Genesis 1–15, 136ff). Sailhamer regards
6:1–4 as an epilogue to the genealogy of chapter 5 and begins the flood narrative at 6:5
(Pentateuch as Narrative, 120). Sailhamer’s handling of Genesis 6:1–8 is unique and offers a way
through some of the problems the text presents. While I find the reading compelling, since it
stands outside the historic handling of the text interaction with it here would require more space
than this project warrants.
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father. God embarks on a creation cleansing program and reestablishes humanity and the
created order through Noah. The themes of judgment and salvation are pronounced. The
details and vocabulary seem explicitly chosen to echo the creation and commissioning at
the beginning of the primeval narrative.
The Narrative’s Depiction of Sin

Properly speaking, the theme of sin is absent from the flood narrative. As we have
seen the narrative itself is cast as an uncreation-recreation story. However, the narrative
does underscore several points that have been made previously. First, humanity’s
responsibility to exercise dominion is presented in detail in God’s instruction to Noah
regarding the collection and protection of the animals. Much as the animals were paraded
before Adam to be named, so Noah parades the animals into the ark.
This positive portrayal of humankind’s intimate relationship with the created
order is in the context of the grievous effects that humanity’s sin will have on that same
created order; it will be undone. It is not that the violence and corruption detailed in the
prologue has occasioned the judgment of humanity alone. Humanity’s corruption has
spilled over into the land itself; all must be purged. This again hints at the inadequacy of
defining sin in legal terms and principally between God and man.158 The relationships are
more complex than that model allows.

158. Some would argue that the symbiotic relationship between humanity and the created
order was embedded in the covenant between God and Adam. We have already examined some
of the problems with construing the original divine human relationship in terms of covenant.
Goldingay’s comment is apposite: “By not speaking of the relationship between God and the first
human beings as a covenant, Genesis has perhaps implied that there was no need for formally
binding commitments before the time of human disobedience and divine punishment.”
Goldingay, Israel’s Gospel, 181.
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Though humanity’s sin and its consequences have been severe, the blessing and
commissioning of humanity after the flood using much the same language as that
employed in chapters 1 and 2 makes clear that humanity’s destiny is still intact (Gen. 9:17). Noah and his descendants are called to continue the work of imaging God in the world
through stewardship and reproduction. God’s establishment of a covenant (9:8-17)
suggests an important development in the divine-human relationship.

Genesis 9:18-29 - Old Sins in a New Creation

After the magnitude of the flood and before the decisive events at the Tower of
Babel is a brief narrative that has attracted far less attention than most in Genesis 1–11,
the narrative of Noah and his sons. Most of the attention has been focused on the vague
description of the nature of Ham’s sin against his father. However, as we observed
earlier, this narrative plays an important role in the plot of sin as it depicts a “second fall”
after the second creation following the uncreation of the flood.

The Narrative

The story is compactly told. Noah, enjoying the fruits of his labors in the vineyard
becomes inebriated and exposes himself (wittingly or not). Ham chances upon this scene
and invites his brothers to increase their father’s shame by viewing him. Instead, Shem
and Japheth go to great lengths to hide their father’s nakedness without seeing it. Noah,
aroused from his stupor, pronounces a curse upon Ham’s son Canaan and a blessing on
Shem and Japheth’s descendants.
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There are remarkable formal parallels between the story of Noah and his sons and
the account in Genesis 3 to the point that it would not be inaccurate to describe this story
as a new “fall” after the renewal of creation.159 Rather than being a clumsy copy of the
original story, the narrative stands on its own but is clearly related to the earlier tale. In
the one brief narrative both the story of Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel are
recapitulated with distinct emphases.160 These parallels offer important interpretive clues
and move the story of sin forward in important ways.
In both a fruit lies at the heart of the story. Noah, like Adam is described as a
“man of the soil” (9:20). In both stories the main characters end up naked.161 In both
stories there is a covering, by God in Genesis 3 and by Shem and Japheth in Genesis 9.
Both stories end with a curse. There are differences as well. Westermann notes that
unlike many of the other crime and punishment stories God is not the one who punishes,
rather Noah utters the curse.162 Further, the sin of Ham is offset by the act of respect of
his brothers, a feature lacking in any of the other narratives.163 Tomasino concludes:
“These parallels show that history truly does repeat itself, albeit with an ironic twist or
two. The story of Noah's drunkenness provides us with both a new ‘Fall’, and a new
conflict between brothers. Thus, it gives further evidence that world history from the
Flood through the Tower of Babel is essentially a replay of the history from creation

159. Wenham, Story as Torah, 35.
160. Wenham notes the similar effects in the families: “As in Adam’s case the son’s
behavior is even more reprehensible than the father’s and leads to dissension among the three
brothers.” Wenham, Story as Torah, 35.
161. Tomasino notes that the aspect of nakedness in the two stories is almost a mirror
image. Adam and Eve ate and saw their nakedness, Noah drank and didn’t recognize his.
Tomasino, “History Repeats Itself: The ‘fall’ and Noah’s Drunkenness,” 129.
162. Noah’s act of cursing Canaan (whether right or wrong, the narrative neither overtly
censures nor approves Noah’s act) shows humanity acting like God.
163. Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 483.

224
through the Flood.”164 It remains to ask what, if any kind of advancement or development
there may be in the depiction and understanding of sin.

The Narrative’s Depiction of Sin

Like most of these narratives, the narrator offers no explicit commentary on the
events of 9:18–26. Rather, the similarities and differences between this narrative and the
“first fall” assist the reader in interpreting the narrative. Noah follows the type of Adam
and Eve in being overcome by a fruit and being exposed as naked. In covering their
father, Shem and Japheth mimic the behavior of God. Ham most closely resembles the
serpent whose actions lead to the exposure and shaming of another character.
Noah is never censured for his behavior; the focus seems to be directly on
Ham.165 But the attentive reader will recognize that, aided by the wine, Noah’s attitude
toward his nakedness is quite different from that of Adam and Eve. Beginning from
chapter 2 one can follow a progression from “naked and not ashamed” through “naked
and ashamed” to “naked and without shame.” Whether one ought to regard this as “sin”
or not from the perspective of the narrative, it is clear that in the presentation of humanity
this is a less than favorable development. Furthermore, the fact of human nakedness has
opened up the possibility of a new way to sin that Ham embraces: shameless exploitation
of another’s shame.

164. Tomasino, “History Repeats Itself: The ‘fall’ and Noah’s Drunkenness,” 130.
165. Most of the commentators survey the biblical witness on the topic of wine and
drunkenness. While drunkenness is rarely labeled sin directly, it is clearly regarded as folly. With
an eye to the broader narrative context of Genesis, however, Hamilton points out that in the two
cases of drunkenness in the book of Genesis—this text and the story of Lot and his daughter
(19:31ff)—the results of drunkenness are some form of debauchery and even familial breakdown.
(Hamilton, Genesis 1–17, 321).
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Further, the setup of the sinful encounter once again puts humanity in direct
relationship with the land/soil. On the one hand, Noah’s advances in viticulture and
viniculture may be read as a proper expression of dominion over the created order; Noah
is presented fulfilling his calling as image bearer. But too soon he comes under the effects
of his wine and it begins to exercise dominion over him. What is Ham’s sin? We need not
speculate about the possible sexual nature of Ham’s sin.166 While there are several
arguments for finding a more nefarious sexual significance behind the phrase “saw his
father’s nakedness” it is better to honor the vagueness of the narrative.167 In the broader
context where the experience of shame was presented as one of the first and most
intimate effects of sin, the notion of preying on someone else’s shame (or lack of) for
your own titillation is sufficiently reprehensible to warrant an individual narrative. That it
happens in the context of familial relationship only exacerbates the impropriety.168 As
such it fits within the ongoing storyline of the breakdown of family (and human)
relationships.169 For our purposes, the vagueness of the narrative regarding the exact
nature of Ham’s sin is felicitous. By not narrowing his behavior to some specific act of
166. John Bergsma and Scott Hahn survey the options—voyeurism, paternal incest, and
castration—and suggest a fourth possibility, maternal incest, with Canaan cursed as the offspring
of the illicit union. John Sietze Bergsma and Scott Walker Hahn, “Noah’s Nakedness and the
Curse on Canaan (Genesis 9:20–27),” Journal of Biblical Literature 124, no. 1 (Spring
2005): 25–40.
167. Links are made, for instance, with the similar situation of the inebriated Lot in
Genesis 19 and with the clearly sexual meaning behind the phrase “see the nakedness of” in
Deuteronomy.
168. Gonzales notes the narrative’s relationship to the Decalogue: “Fundamentally,
Ham’s sin is an intentional act of contempt accompanied by a mocking disclosure to his
brothers—both actions the original audience would interpret as blatant violations of the fifth
commandment (Exod 20:12).” Gonzales, Where Sin Abounds, 85.
169. “The outrage of Ham and his punishment by the father’s curse is to be seen in the
context of the narratives of crime and punishment in Gen 2–11. J’s intention becomes clear: he
wants to speak of one’s culpability in the three basic communities of human relationships—
between man and woman (2–3), brother and brother (4:2–16), parents and children (9:20–27).”
Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 494 Goldingay clarifies that these stories should be set parallel,
rather than conceived as some sort of logical development. Goldingay, Israel’s Gospel, 185.
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sexual treachery, the narrative can serve a broader significance in warning against the
ways that humans are prone to dishonor one another and to exploit each other’s weakness
and shame for their own purposes. As such the narrative serves as a better lens through
which you evaluate a host of human behaviors.

Summary

Though in one sense sin does not feature significantly in the flood narrative, in
another sense this is the most dramatic depiction of sin in the entire primeval narrative.
The narrative is the story of judgment and cleansing for human corruption of itself and
the earth. Humanity has so corrupted itself and the earth that an almost complete restart
of the story is necessitated. Humanity’s identity and destiny is squarely in view in both
the story line and some of the minor details. Not only did their collective behavior bring
judgment on them and the earth, but other developments further limited their
effectiveness in carrying out their identity through procreation and dominion. The
epilogue reveals that corruption and relational breakdown are recalcitrant and endure
even after the cataclysmic cleansing.

Genesis 10:1–11:26 - Towering Offense

The final episode in the primeval narrative is the narrative of the Tower of Babel.
Because of its apparent explicatory powers it has received attention similar to that of the
fall and Cain and Abel. It is an incredibly brief and compact story that provides a fitting
close to the primeval narrative and an introduction to the patriarchal narratives to follow.
Its depiction of humanity is both poignant and borderline pathetic.
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The Narrative Context

The final account in the primeval narrative is bounded by genealogies. The
genealogy of chapter 10, the so called “Table of Nations”, differs from previous
genealogies in that its focus is more on groups than individuals.170 That said, similar to
the previous genealogies (ch. 4, 5) it includes editorial insertions that contribute to the
flow of the primeval narrative. Whereas the genealogy of Cain’s descendants in Gen. 4
commented on the cultural developments of Lamech’s children, Jabal, Jubal, and TubalCain, so the genealogy of Gen. 10 comments on the hunting and city-building prowess of
Nimrod. Rather than being an irrelevant insertion, the reference to Nimrod prepares for
the narrative to follow. It is important to note that Nimrod, founder of Babel, was a
descendant of Ham.171 While some find the narrative’s placement abrupt or intrusive, for
our purposes the table of nations which precedes the Babel account and the genealogy of
Shem that follows it serve to accentuate the narrative.172 Surrounded by a sea of

170. Sailhamer finds a reference to the upcoming Tower narrative in the division of
Shem’s descendants at Peleg and Joktan. Of the dividing of the land during Peleg’s time
Sailhamer writes: “Thus, not only is the land divided in the confusion of languages (11:1), but
more fundamentally, two great lines of humanity diverge form the midst of the sons of Shem.
Those who seek to make a name (shem, 11:4) for themselves in the building of Babylon and those
for whom God will make a name (12:2) in the call of Abraham” (Sailhamer, Pentateuch as
Narrative, 102). Sailhamer argues that the point of the genealogy here is to emphasize human
unity. “Humanity in its totality is closely circumscribed. The author does not want the reader to
lose sight of the unity among human beings.” This is particularly important since the narrative
will soon narrow its focus to one family line, that of Abraham. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as
Narrative, 130.
171. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 133.
172. Some detect faulty editorial work in this since Babel is mentioned in 10:10 prior to
the etiological tale in question. However, we should not make too much of this. With its
references to known locations, the table of nations is beginning the transition to history.
Additionally, Wenham suggests that the story of the tower of Babel corrects what might be a
faulty understanding of the table of nations. To him, the table of nations is essentially positive and
depicts humans living in harmony. The Babel account corrects that interpretation. He also sees
this continuing a pattern in early Genesis of positive events or accounts being followed by
negative ones. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 242.
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genealogy, the narrative of Babel stands as prominently as the tower at its center. The
author draws attention to the passage in this way.
Babel, then, serves as the last of the fundamental human narratives. In chapter 12
the focus of the narrative narrows to consider the life and experience of one man and his
family, namely, Abraham. The book becomes the story of the patriarchs and the
(pre)history of the people of Israel rather than a prehistory of the human race. The tower
of Babel stands on this border and serves as a transition. On the one hand it tells its story
with the same universal conception as the preceding chapters. On the other, by including
the name of an historical city which plays a significant role in the rest of the OT, it serves
to begin the fade from mere primordial mythology into something more akin to history.173

The Narrative

The story is so tersely told that recounting it requires more language than does the
original. Humanity, driven by fear of dispersal and a desire for a lasting name, essays to
build a city with a tower. Before the project proceeds very far, God descends to survey
their work. To prevent future fatal human collaborations, God confounds their language,
effectively dispersing them.
As many have noted Genesis 11:1–9 is rife with wordplay which befits a narrative
that comments so directly on language. Similar sounding words are placed together: “let
us make bricks” – נִּ ְל ְבנָ ה ְל ֵבנִּ ים, “bake them thoroughly” - ()נִּ ְש ְר ָפה ִּל ְש ֵר ָפה, “tar” and
“mortar” –  ַה ֵח ָמרand ח ֶֹּמר. Additionally, the all-important “place” ()ׁשם
ָ is the basis for
173. Westermann wrote that Genesis 11:1–9 is not prehistory in the same way that the
rest of Genesis 1–11 is because it focuses on the actions of one group. He evaluated this fact as
evidence that “11:1–9 is clearly part of the transition from primeval event to history.”
Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 543.
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their foray into “the heavens” ()ש ֵמיִּם
ָ for the purpose of making a “name” ( ) ֵׁשםfor
themselves. The story was also crafted with a paucity of vocabulary. This makes for
wordplay between the fear of the people not to be “scattered” ( )נָ פּוץand Yahweh’s
ultimate end for them—scattering (יצם
ָ )ה ִּפ.
ֱ David Cotter and others have noted the play
between the words name ()ׁשם
ֵ and there ()שם
ַ in the passage as well. Wanting to dwell
there to make a name for themselves, they end up with neither. Hamilton notes another
wordplay. “The order of the consonants in Heb. nābĕlâ, ‘let us confuse’ (i.e., n-b-l), is the
reverse of the consonants in lĕbēnîm, ‘bricks’ (v. 3) (i.e., l-b-n). Does the reversal of the
sounds suggest a reversal by God of the human machinations? Will he unbrick what they
brick? Will the wrecking crew undo what the building crew has accomplished?”174
More than a few commentators have recognized implied humor in the contrast
between humanity’s upward aspirations and the divine need to descend, to “go down”, to
assess their project. The humans’ self-assessment and the divine assessment are
diametrically opposed. There is further irony in the passage. Though one stated aim is “to
make a name” for themselves, the passage contains no names and vaguest indication of
where they undertook their project. The only proper name included, Babel, is a farcical
play on words, turning Babylon, “the gate of the gods”, to Babel, “confusion.”175
In fact, the passage plays out much like several other incidents in early Genesis
where an event is narrated and God shows up immediately thereafter. All of these other
incidents are clearly sinful: Adam and Eve eating of the tree, Cain murdering Abel, and
174. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1–17, 356. Fokkelman presses this
wordplay even further. “Interpreting this, we see that the reversal of the order of sounds reveals
another reversal: God reverses what the men make; the men build, God pulls down; opposed to
men’s construction we find, hard and direct, God’s destruction. Even without this chiasmus the
reversal was in the story, but in this way it becomes pressing, of a particular directness, almost
oppressing.” Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis, 15.
175. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 241.
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the intermarriage between sons of God and daughters of men. It seems safe, therefore, to
conclude that the building of the tower includes some underlying immorality that would
justify divine punishment.

The Narrative’s Depiction of Sin

If so, what is the sin? Against whom or what is it committed? How does it relate
to the earlier narratives? Though they express it in different ways, most traditional
interpretations come to the conclusion that it has to do with human pride. In seeking to
make a name for themselves, the humans have overstepped their bounds.176 Westermann
suggests that like Adam and Eve in the garden, humans were no longer satisfied with the
limited state of their existence but wanted to force their way into the realm of the
divine.177 We are, however, forced to deduce this from the text; no explicit judgment is
given.
A more concrete suggestion for the nature of the sin here is based on
consideration of the near context. Some think that what God reacts to is humankind’s
resistance to the mandate to disperse and populate the earth made after the flood.178 This
understanding makes good sense when read in light of the original statement of
humankind’s purpose as image bearers—to “be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth
176. Wenham likens the sin with that which preceded the flood. “Building a tower that
would reach up to heaven has analogies with the intermarriage of the sons of God and human
women in 6:1–4; both acts illicitly blur the boundary between God and mankind, and so attract
divine wrath that affects the whole human race.” Wenham, Story as Torah, 36.
177. Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 552.
178. P.J. Harland argues that how one approaches the text determines whether one reads
the narrative as presenting a vertical sin (hubristic attempt to attain god-like status) or a horizontal
sin (fearful attempt to avoid dispersal). He demonstrates that those who separate the text into
component parts prefer the former interpretation whereas those who interpret the passage more
literarily and in its context tend toward the latter. (P. J. Harland, “Vertical or Horizontal: The Sin
of Babel,” Vetus Testamentum 48, no. 4 [1998]: 513–33).
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(1:28).” This reading also makes sense of the placement of the “table of nations” before
the account of the Tower of Babel. The division of humanity into nations and cultures
was a part of the divine design for humanity. Nevertheless, humanity, as it had multiple
times already in the narrative, sought to circumvent the logical outworking of its own
identity. This also contrasts with the way the primeval narrative ends and the patriarchal
narrative begins. Hamilton notes that chapter 11 begins and ends with stories of people
moving and settling (vv. 2 and 31). But there is a difference: “With the first group, and
their insistence on their selfishly conceived project, God is most displeased; but to the
second group God promises great blessing.”179 This echoes the function of the earlier
genealogies in depicting humanity’s two possible paths.
An important detail to note in this narrative is the collective behavior of humanity.
As in the prelude to the flood and in contrast to the narratives of the garden, Cain and
Abel, and Noah and his sons, the “character” in question here is not an individual but
humanity collectively. In fact the Tower narrative develops the collective depiction of sin
from Genesis 6.180 There God reacted against what could be considered the collected
behavior of individuals. Here in chapter 11, the behavior is more the individual behavior
of the collective. One can also see an advance in the depiction of God and humanity
pitted against one another. In chapter 6 God thwarted humanity by decreasing their
lifespan. In the Tower narrative God again thwarts humanity but this time by dividing
their language.

179. Hamilton, Genesis 1–17, 351.
180. It is instructive to note the shift from “sons of God” in chapter 6 to “sons of men” in
chapter 11. Either two groups are being depicted or the steady movement away from God is
shown.
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Again we see the misuse of a feature of human godlikeness—language—resulting
in the loss or diminution of that capacity. The centrality of language in this brief narrative
and their dependence upon speech for their project, recalls the Genesis 1 creation
narrative where God created through speech.181 In this narrative, humans retain this
aspect of godlikeness while at the same time humanity loses this capacity as a simple
feature of their existence. Having used their linguistic unity in service of purposes
contrary to their identity, God moves them toward fulfilling their destiny by complicating
a feature of their corporate identity further complicating their ability to fulfill the human
destiny.
Mark Boda summarizes well how the narrative of the tower depicts sin when
considered in context.
Much has been made of the Tower of Babel incident as one of the
quintessential stories of wickedness in the Bible, especially related to the
hubris of humanity; however, it appears that the sin in this passage is not
pride but rather humanity’s failure to obey the creation mandate in Gen
1:28. There humanity was commanded to fill the earth and subdue it rather
than settle down in one concentrated place. In this way, the building of the
city resonates with the practices of the line of Cain, who also built cities
(4:17).182
One could almost argue that Boda is suggesting that the city builders at the tower of
Babel are typologically related to Cain.

Summary

The sin of Babel is the least tidy of all. There is a mixture of motives that cannot
be simply captured under the term “pride.” What the narrative does make clear is a
181. The specification of earthy building materials possibly recalls God’s own creation of
the man from the earth.
182. Mark J. Boda, A Severe Mercy: Sin and Its Remedy in the Old Testament, Siphrut
(Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 23.
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marked conflict between divine decree for humanity and human designs for themselves.
Interestingly, the outcome both advances and diminishes humanity’s pursuit of their
identity and destiny. Just as Adam and Eve’s expulsion from the garden and Cain’s exile
served the purpose of pressing humanity beyond its own chosen borders, so too the
disruption of human language served the forward movement of the narrative by pressing
humanity to disperse into all the earth.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: THE DEPICTION OF SIN IN GENESIS 1–11

Having concluded our narrative-sensitive reading of Genesis 1–11 we are in a
position to summarize our findings. How is sin depicted in the plot of Genesis 1–11? Is
there any clear reference point for the sins such as divine law or human nature? These
conclusions will be used to address questions of sin in systematic theology in the
following chapter. In particular we will look at the idea of “the fall”, the development of
sin in the narrative, the character of sin, and the implied reference point for sin. We will
develop these themes in the following chapter.

Vocabulary for Sin

As we begin our examination of the summary of sin in Genesis 1–11, it is relevant
to note that of the large lexicon of sin in both Hebrew and Greek very few occur in
primeval history.183 The most common OT word for sin, ח ָטאת,
ַ occurs in Genesis 4:7 in
the divine warning to Cain. The LXX renders this with a word in the ἁμαρτια word
183. For a brief survey of the vocabulary and use see Robin S. Cover, “Sin, Sinners (Old
Testament),” in Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 6, David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday,
1992), 31–40 and David R. Seely, Sin, Sinners (New Testament), vol. 6 of Anchor Bible
Dictionary, David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 40–47.
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group. In the same narrative, the term עֹון,
ַ iniquity, is used, though translations differ over
whether to render this as “guilt” or “punishment.” Is Cain saying that his iniquity is too
great or is he using the term metonymically to refer to the punishment for his sin? The
LXX’s αἰτία leans toward the latter. As Cover notes, “Metonymic usages of the term
illustrate clearly the relationship in Hebrew thought between ‘sin’ and resultant ‘guilt’
and ‘punishment,’ since ‘awôn may denote any of these three senses (or all three
meanings) in a single passage.”184 One could conclude that Cover’s analysis of ‘awôn
applies to the depiction of sin in Genesis more broadly. In Genesis 6:5, 11, and 13, the
cause of the flood is said to be humanity’s evil ( ָ)ר ַעתand violence ()ח ָמס
ָ (LXX: κακίαι
and ἀδικία respectively). Both in God’s assessment of the antediluvian condition and in
his covenant with Noah, the text makes repeated use of the term ׁש ַחת,
ָ both in the sense of
corruption or ruin (6:11, 12 [2x]), and God’s response to it, destruction (6:13, 17; 9:11,
15). This exhausts the vocabulary for sin and evil in the primeval history. So while many
have argued that sin is a major theme in Genesis 1–11, such an argument must be made
on bases other than lexical.185

184. Cover, “Sin, Sinners (Old Testament),” 32.
185. It could be argued that “curse” is more thematic than sin in Genesis. The word for
curse, א ַרר,
ָ occurs five times in Genesis 1–11: at 3:14, 17; 4:11; 5:29 and 9:25. Bartholomew and
Goheen suggest that these five uses find their thematic counterpart in the five-fold use of the
word for bless ) ( ָב ַרךin God’s promises to Abraham (Genesis 12:1-3). Craig G. Bartholomew and
Michael W. Goheen, The Drama of Scripture: Finding Our Place in the Biblical Story (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 55.
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Fall or Falls?

From a narrative perspective it is fair to ask if the narrative as it stands supports
the traditional notion of a fall.186 The evidence is mixed. First, we observed that literarily
it is difficult to separate between Genesis 3 and Genesis 4. As Wenham says, “They are
formally sequential but functionally parallel.” Further, the narrator does not suggest any
causal relationship Genesis 3 and 4. Rather, as Brueggemann pointed out, the text depicts
Cain with every chance of resisting this sin. These details complicate the traditional
reading of Genesis 3 as fall and everything else as details. The chapters following 3 and
4, however, perhaps suggest not a fall but a division of humanity, namely, those that call
upon the name of the Lord and those that don’t. The parallel genealogies of the line of
Cain (ch. 4) and the line of Seth (ch. 5), and their corresponding conclusions—violent
Lamech and righteous Noah—hint as much. Humanity, it seems, has two ways to live.
Further complicating the picture of a momentary cataclysmic fall is the clear
creation-uncreation-recreation structure of the narratives. After the recreation following
the flood we saw that the narrative of Noah, his wine, and his sons recapitulates many of
the details of the narrative of Genesis 3–4. So there is in a sense a second (Cain) or third
fall (Noah, Ham). Further we observed the depiction of individual sin (Adam and Eve,
Cain, Lamech, Ham) and corporate sin (sons of God and daughters of men, Babel). So
one might argue that there are both individual falls and corporate falls.187

186. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address comprehensively the debate
regarding whether Genesis 3 presents a “fall” or not. Beyond the simple answers of “yes” and
“no” (Barr, Breuggemann, Westermann), are a variety of positions such as those that suggest that
it is an upward fall, an improvement in human development (Irenaeus).
187. In the face of feminist accusations we should note that the narrative does not in any
way suggest the woman’s responsibility for the fall in an isolated way. There are not two falls:
that of the woman and that of the man. Rather the focus of the narrative is on humanity as a unity.
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All this supports the contention that if one must speak in terms of a fall, it is best
to read the entire section, Genesis 3–11, as that fall, rather than Genesis 3 in isolation.
Fretheim is moving in this direction when he notes that Genesis 3 can be seen to be a
“fall” from a vantage point later in the narrative.
In summary, chapter 3 witnesses to an originating sin that begins a
process, an intensification of alienation, extending over chapters 3–6, by
which sin becomes "original" in the sense of pervasive and inevitable with
effects that are cosmic in scope. However generalizable the story in
chapter 3, it alone cannot carry the weight and freight of the traditional
view; the fall is finally not understood to be the product of a single act.
But it is a beginning of no little consequence and chapters 3–8 together
witness to a reality that subsequent generations can with good reason call a
fall.188
What is important to note is that the Genesis 3 is the beginning of a process, a process
that is ratified at every turn in the narrative.
We should point out that the notion of a fall from a primal state of perfection is
not overtly supported by the text. We noted that the creation including the paradisiacal
garden is depicted not in a state of primal perfection but rather in need of cultivation and
development. It might be safe to assume that humanity, too, bears marks of needing
development of various sorts.189 As Terrence Fretheim remarks: “The charge given

Bonhoeffer captures this: “Eve only falls totally when Adam falls, for the two are one. Adam falls
because of Eve, Eve falls because of Adam, the two are one.” (Bonhoeffer, Creation and
Fall, 75) This would be the corollary to the idea that Adam wasn’t fully human until Eve was
created.
188. Terrence E. Fretheim, “Is Genesis 3 a Fall Story?” Word & World XIV, no. 2
(Spring 1994): 153.
189. Many contemporary interpreters point to Irenaeus’s concept of the human race in
need of maturation as a model more in keeping with the presentation of the narrative and
narrative theology more broadly.
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humans to fill the earth and subdue it means that God's creation is not a static state of
affairs; its becoming is part of God's creational intention.”190

The Character of Sin

Like a good story, the narratives of Genesis 1–11 depict the main characters of
God and humanity in a variety of ways and even developing as characters through the
narrative. These presentations are not always simple to reconcile. Sin has a variety of
faces in these narratives. Though certainly not complete, Boda’s summary of the
depiction of sin in Genesis 3–11 highlights several aspects of sin. “Throughout Genesis
1–11, sin is described as violating God’s command (chaps. 2-3), disobeying God’s
creation mandate to fill the earth (Genesis 11) and exercise dominion (Genesis 3),
seeking to become like God (Genesis 3), and murdering (Genesis 4, 9:46). At first, sin is
described as an external condition that must be mastered (Genesis 4), but soon it invades
humanity’s inner being resulting in an earth filled with violence (Genesis 6).”191

Sin as Law-breaking

Is sin depicted in Genesis 3–11 as law-breaking? We admitted that in the case of
Adam and Eve the presentation of sin comes closest to being shown as a simple violation
of a divine ordinance. However, the language of law is not used, though a case can be
made that there are courtroom overtones in the interaction between the man, the woman
and God. It is true that some of the sins committed in these chapters are codified as law

190. Fretheim, “Is Genesis 3 a Fall Story?” 147. On this point, Fretheim, as do many
commentators, point to Irenaeus’s concept of the primal pair as the human race in need of
maturation.
191. Boda, Severe Mercy, 32.
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later in the Pentateuch. But in these chapters, for the most part, there are no laws that
serve as a reference point for the sins. Rather, as we have shown throughout the reading,
the reference point for most of the sins is the description of God and humanity in chapters
1 and 2, including the imago dei, the call to procreation, dominion, stewardship, and
human relationality.

Sin as Pride

In addition to depicting sin as violation of a law of God, many theologians have
suggested that the root or essence of sin is pride. Do the narratives bear this out? Again,
the evidence is mixed. In the account of Adam and Eve, the diagnosis of pride requires
more reading into the narrative than is judicious. As Sailhamer suggests, it makes as
much sense to read the narrative as an example of folly—relying on human discernment
to achieve the goal of God-likeness. In the case of Cain, one can deduce the emotion of
wounded pride, though the narrator focuses on anger and despondency. In desiring to
“make a name” for themselves, the participants in the Tower of Babel narrative would
appear to be emblematic of the sin-as-pride concept. However, that simple
straightforward analysis is problematized in the narrative by the addition of their apparent
anxiety “lest we be scattered.”192 In short, diagnosing pride as ingredient in these
narratives requires more psychologizing than strict interpretation.

192. Source critics, of course, might take these almost contradictory goals as evidence of
the amalgamation of distinct narratives. Westermann surveys the evidence on the question of the
unity of the Tower narrative. See Westermann, Genesis 1–11, 536–39.
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Sin as Mistrust

Since at least the time of the Reformers, it has been suggested that the root of sin
is failure to trust, or lack of faith. Terrence Fretheim’s reading is typical:
The primal sin is thus not disobedience, pride, rebellion, or violence, or
even the desire to become like God; each is symptomatic of a more
fundamental problem of trust. There is no storming of the heavens
language here, no desire to take over the divine realm or run the universe,
no declaration of independence and no celebration of a new-found
autonomy. And that, of course, may be precisely the point. Temptation
and sin are often quiet, seemingly innocent realities, associated with that
which seems far removed from obvious sins. Mistrust is never initially
visible.193
On the face of the narratives themselves it is necessary to do a considerable bit of
psychologizing of the characters to arrive at this conclusion; faith is not thematic in any
direct sense in these chapters. However, when the narratives are placed within the context
of the entire book of Genesis and beyond to the Pentateuch where faith is thematic, it is
not unreasonable to inject some sense of it.194
Commenting on both mistrust and pride as roots of sin, Pannenberg notes that the
motives behind our sin are often opaque.
In the situation of the universal failure to achieve our human destiny that
theology calls sin, unbelief is not always, then, the theme as the final
basis. It is this only in encounter with the God of historical revelation.
Again, the concrete starting point of sinning does not lie in the naked
hubris of our human wanting to be as God. At many points this hubris is at
work only implicitly in desire and in anxiety about our lives. When it
comes out into the open, it can have destructive and even murderous
effects. But in the everyday manifestations of sin its true nature and the
depths of its wickedness are for the most part concealed.195

193. Fretheim, “Is Genesis 3 a Fall Story?” 151.
194. See especially John Sailhamer’s argument that the Pentateuch as a whole plays the
faith of Abraham off against the law of Moses. Sailhamer, Meaning of the Pentateuch.
195. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 252.
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Under those circumstances it is not surprising that sin is so often depicted in narrative
rather than analyzed theoretically. Corruption is, therefore, not only a static concept but
one that will be worked out in the succeeding narrative.

Sin as Corruption

At the climax of the first sequence of narratives, the introduction to the flood, we
observed that language of corruption was used. The image here is one of taint or stain,
imagery that is developed much more fully later in the Pentateuch. What this language
does is capture the tight link between humans and their environment by underscoring the
widespread effects of their sin in the created order.
But the concept of corruption communicates something about the behaviors going
forward, it predicts behavior. “Corruption is thus a dynamic motif in the Christian
understanding of sin: it is not so much a particular sin as the multiplying power of all sin
to spoil a good creation and to break its defenses against invaders.”196

Sin and Violence

In the same context as the above, the manifestation of sin as violence is
highlighted. The immediate context of chapter 6 does not explicitly mention violence,
unless some violence is implied in the manner in which the sons of god took the
daughters of men to themselves. However, the most significant preceding narrative is that
of Cain and then its echo in Lamech, both stories of violence. The reader is led to assume

196. Cornelius Plantinga, Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 32.
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that the escalation that occurred between Cain and Lamech typified human development
through the generations listed.
How is violence sin? Up to the point that Cain responds with violence toward his
brother, God had not revealed his power in that way. Even in the aftermath of Adam and
Eve’s sin, God’s response was grace and a limitation of his powers. Cain and Lamech
express the fullness of their powers and, indeed, in inflicting death surpass their authority.
Even if there is not enough information to say that the story has depicted God as the sole
disposer of life and death, it is enough to note that murder is contrary to the call to fill the
earth. Further, it extends the power of domination beyond the creation to other beings a
confusion of at least two of humanity’s fundamental relationships.
Insofar as it is shown as a feature of humanity the feminist theologians are right to
highlight it as relevant. However, violence is not thematic in these chapters. Furthermore,
God’s response, the flood—an undeniable act of divine ‘violence’—mitigates against
simplistic application of the term to describe the human condition.

Sin as Character

As we observed earlier, the standard Hebrew vocabulary for sin is for the most
part absent from these chapters. Where it does occur, therefore, its presence is
remarkable. This is especially the case in the first instance of the word “sin” in Scripture.
As we noted, in Genesis 4, in the context of God’s warning to Cain, sin is depicted as a
beast crouched and ready to pounce on unsuspecting Cain. As Breuggemann commented,
“Sin is not a breaking of rules. Rather, sin is an aggressive force ready to ambush
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Cain.”197 What is important to note is that this malevolent force is not depicted within
Cain but is somehow external to him. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore that this
“animal hunger” is a very real part of the narrative. The combination of the serpent in
chapter 3 with the crouching enemy of chapter 4 goes far to present sin as an alien
element in the story-world whose presence the human characters must reckon with.
In short, the ultimate motivations for most of these sins are varied and inscrutable.
There is fear and anxiety, pride and desire, grasping and ignorance. The narrative depicts
the inextricability of these desires and motivations.

The Development of Sin
Since at least the time of Von Rad’s Genesis commentary it has been customary
to characterize the depiction of sin in Genesis 3–11 as an increasing tide, an avalanche of
sin.198 Wenham picks up the image: “The opening chapters of Genesis describe an
avalanche of sin that gradually engulfs mankind, leading first to his near-annihilation in
the flood, and second to man’s dispersal over the face of the earth in despair of achieving
international cooperation.”199 Some demur from this position. On our reading it is safe to
say that there is development in sin but that avalanche might not be the best way to
describe it. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the sin at Babel is more egregious than that of
Cain. The consequences may be more dramatic in one sense, but they are similar in
another. Both are cast out and both are marked for their own good: Cain with a brand
against revenge and the Babelites with linguistic diversity to protect them from their own

197. Brueggemann, Genesis, 57.
198. Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, trans. John H.Marks, Old Testament
Library. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), 105.
199. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, li.
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success in deviousness. It might be better to say that the narrative depicts a series of
roughly parallel crime and punishment narratives. Once again the creation-uncreationrecreation theme mitigates against a straightline narrative development in sin. If anything,
a double crescendo might be discernible from Adam to the violence that precipitated the
flood and again from Noah to Babel. We should note that this development may also be
read from individual to corporate.
Another aspect of the development is the development of new ways to fall short
of humanity’s calling even as that calling is pursued. The first sin leads to the first
creative act: the preparation of fig leaf coverings.200 Procreation and the first act of
Yahweh-worship lead to the first murder. The cultural advancement of music is
immediately followed by a crass song of abuse. Waltke remarks on the tension: “This
family line is a tragic image of sin’s distortion and destruction. The arts and sciences,
appropriate extension of the divine cultural mandate, are here expressed in a depraved
culture as a means of self-assertion and violence, which climaxes with Lamech’s song of
tyranny.”201 Noah’s advancements in viticulture and viniculture result in his shameful
exposure. The Tower of Babel narrative highlights specific technology (bricks and
mortar) but in the context of its misuse.
By the same token, developments in the presentation of God’s character afford the
characters new ways to image the divine positively and negatively. We saw this most
clearly in the case of Shem and Japheth mimicking the divine act of covering nakedness
200. Leon Kass writes: “Like any invention, it tacitly asserts the insufficiency of the
world and expresses the human urge to do something about it...By taking up the needle, the
human beings, whether they know it or not, are declaring the inadequacy of the Garden of Eden.”
In the aftermath of sin, human energies originally designed to establish dominion are conscripted
in the fight against humanity’s sinful condition. Leon R. Kass, The Beginning of Wisdom:
Reading Genesis (New York: Free Press, 2003), 90.
201. Waltke and Fredricks, Genesis: A Commentary, 100.
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even as their brother acted contrariwise to the character of God. Indeed, the shift in
human self-understanding in the shame of nakedness opened the door to a new way of
sinning that Ham illustrates: the sin of exploiting another’s shame. There are other
examples. To Cain God presents himself as avenger; Cain’s descendent, Lamech,
arrogates the role of vengeance to himself. In chapter 3 God reveals himself as a God
who can both bless and curse. Later, Noah will do both as well.
There are two lines of development here. First, as God is revealed, human
characters (and readers) are given more content with which to invest the imago dei and to
evaluate human behavior. At the same time, advances in humanity’s embrace of the
cultural mission open up new vistas for sin.

The Reference Point for Sin

As we saw in the evaluation of both feminist and evangelical theologians, the
question of who is the focus of sin is an important theological question. Feminist
theologians found sin to be primarily against the other, while Evangelical emphasize
offense against God. What does the narrative suggest? In that way that narrative does so
well, the narratives of Genesis 3–11 do not give a single, clear answer to this question.
When the man and woman eat of the tree, God does not seem particularly personally
offended. Indeed, as most of the consequences pertain to them and to the ground, a case
can be made that they have sinned against themselves and the ground rather than against
each other or God. Obliquely the narrative depicts their separation from God in their
hiding and the discontinuation of God’s garden walks. In the case of Cain, it is clear that
Cain’s sin is against his brother, but again the ground and Cain himself are transgressed
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as well. Noah may sin against himself, and Ham’s sin, while ostensibly against his father,
redounds to his own son’s hurt.
What draws these various notions together is humanity’s identity and purpose as
described in chapter 1 and 2 and particularly the pregnant concept of the imago dei and
the concomitant call to steward the earth. Because humans are in God’s image, sin
against another human is a sin against God. And since the human identity includes such a
close connection to the earth both in essence (from dust) and function (stewardship), sin
against God or another human being always implies some measure of estrangement from
the ground. Further, since the human is in the image of God, both individually and in
some sense corporately, one cannot sin against God or the other without deeply marking
himself. The narratives of Cain and Ham (and perhaps also Lamech) illustrate this
poignantly.
In keeping with a literary and narrative reading, we have looked for reference
points from earlier in the narrative to answer the question of how sin is depicted and what
the reference point is. By and large, the narratives make sense as a series of stories
depicting how humanity does and does not live out its identity as sketched in chapters 1
and 2. In fact, one can make a case that the plot of these chapters is the success or failure
of humanity both individually and corporately to live out the identity and commission
sketched for it in chapters 1 and 2. That is the main crisis. What the narratives show is a
fitful mix of success and failure.
We may tie this understanding of the reference point of sin to narrative
development of sin as well. As God as a character is more fully revealed, so also are new
vistas for human behavior both positive and negative presented. For instance, as God is
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revealed in Genesis 3 as one who covers shame, so Shem and Japheth image this aspect
of God in covering their father just as Ham rejects it. Similarly, in the Cain and Abel
narrative, God shows himself as the one who avenges Cain. Immediately thereafter,
Lamech arrogates such authority to himself and applies it far more broadly. Whereas God
promises to exact vengeance sevenfold on anyone who kills Cain, Lamech threatens
seventy-sevenfold vengeance on those who merely mistreat him. The narrative presents
this expression of divine likeness as problematic.
Chapter 3 builds on the characterization of God from chapters 1 and 2 by showing
God as one who judges and curses. Noah emulates this in cursing Canaan for the sin of
Ham. The text neither explicitly condones nor censures Noah’s act though the reader is
left wondering if this is the best possible outcome. Indeed, in light of God’s curses in
Genesis 3 it is notable that God cursed the serpent and the ground but did not directly
curse the humans. Noah does. Is this a salubrious development? Or should it be read as
yet another example of human overextension of their divine likeness?
The divine-likeness reference point is highlighted perhaps most clearly in the
Tower of Babel narrative. Afraid of dispersal (a specific aspect of the human identity) but
emboldened by their linguistic and technological capacity, humanity undertakes a
building project that stands in stark contrast to God’s construction project in chapters 1
and 2. Working as God did with words and mud they form an image (the tower) which
they hope will secure for them security and a name. This application of their divine
likeness is in service of a goal diametrically opposed to the goals embedded in that
identity: imaging God, not self, and expanding that image, not localizing it.
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CONCLUSION

This chapter has covered considerable territory. From a brief defense of the
literary, narrative and theological unity of Genesis 1–11 we moved to a reading of the
narratives that attended to important literary features as they pertained specifically to the
depiction of the human and human sin. What we discovered is that sin is depicted in a
variety of ways. While ultimately sin is resistant to tidy summary, we argued that the best
summary and even expression of the plot of these chapters is the matter of humanity
living in light of its identity as individuals and a collective commissioned to bear the
image of God and exercise his presence in the world through dominion and procreation
by appropriately applying the God-like attributes they possess.
In short, the narratives depict the systematic rejection and distortion of the human
identity as it is rooted in the character of God and worked out in relationship to others,
oneself, and the world. The conclusion at the close is that humanity must be remade. In
various ways and for various reasons humanity has failed to be the divine image. The
question at the close of the primeval narrative is “Can humanity find its way back to its
true identity and destiny? And if so, how?” The answer begins in chapter 12 with
Abraham and God’s promise to redefine him and reestablish him and his descendants as
renewed humanity in right relationship with God, others , and the world (land), with
given a destiny (“in you all the families of the earth will be blessed”) (Genesis 12:1–3).
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CHAPTER 5
SIN, STORY, AND THEOLOGY

To this point we have discussed the state of sin-talk and evaluated closely the
theology of sin in two feminist and two evangelical theologians. We addressed their
methodology and in particular their handling of literary features of biblical narrative and
more broadly their use of narrative modes of thought. From that evaluation we moved to
offer a reading of Genesis 1–11 that sought to attend to the literary and narrative features
of the text. In the previous chapter we summarized how Genesis 1–11 depicts sin. We
turn now to consider what contributions this reading brings to theology. How might it
supplement or correct the definitions or descriptions of sin? We will begin by assessing
some basic advantages of approaching Genesis 1–11 as a theological unity as it regards
the theology of sin. Then we will explore the relationship between sin and the depiction
of the human that we uncovered in our reading. This will lead us to consider the way in
which a description of sin indexed to a narratively understood conception of the human
destiny offers us a link between sin and Christ. We will return at the end to see how the
narratives of Genesis 1–11 oriented in the grander narrative of sin and human destiny can
serve as “types” and therefore be especially useful in theological critique.

THEOLOGIZING WITH GENESIS 1–11 AS THEOLOGICAL UNITY

It is certainly not new for commentators to recognize the unity and importance of
Genesis 1–11. Several have noted the way in which the chapters work together to depict
the human situation. Gerhard Von Rad recognized the unique status of Genesis 3–11 as
quite possibly the only biblical example of a detailed harmartiology. “In contrast with this
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[the Old Testament’s lack of theorizing about sin], the Jahwist’s great hamartiology in
Gen. III-XI about the way in which sin broke in and spread like an avalanche is
undoubtedly something exceptional: for never again did Israel speak in such universal
terms of sin as exemplified in standardized models, and yet at the same time in such great
detail.”1 What is less common, however, is to find theologizing about sin that takes
seriously this literary and thematic unity. Some, like Wolfhart Pannenberg, acknowledge
the way these chapters function collectively.
Dogmatics should also consider that according to the story, sin does not
attain by one event its dominion over the human race. It does so in a
sequence that reaches first a climax with Cain’s murdering of his own
brother Abel and the final climax in the event of the flood. We are not to
look at Gen. 3 in isolation and derive from it the idea of a single fall. We
are to look at the whole process whereby sin increases in the race and God
takes countermeasures against its aggression to preserve the race from the
ruinous consequences of its own acts. This approach is more in keeping
with the biblical text in these stories of the early days of human history.2
Nevertheless, as we have demonstrated, many approaches to the text have blunted its
force considerably by atomizing it or mythologizing it.

Sin in Genesis 1–11: Basic observations

After the survey of these chapters what becomes most clear is that the depiction of
sin in those chapters does not summarize simply. While evidence to support the usual
definitions and motivations can be found there, it is reductive to claim that sin, as
presented narratively is pride, mistrust, selfishness, or violence. It is in the nature of
narrative to eschew simple definitions. In particular, these approaches leave little to no

1. Gerhard von Rad, The Theology of Israel’s Historical Traditions, vol. 1 of Old
Testament Theology, trans. D.M.G Stalker (Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 2005), 154.
2. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 of Systematic Theology, trans.
Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 263.
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room for the possibility of the development of the concept of sin throughout the course of
the biblical narrative and into the present.

Genesis 1–11 and Feminist Definitions of Sin

There are several observations from our reading of the image of sin in Genesis 3–
11 that we can easily put into conversation with our feminist and evangelical theologians.
For instance, we saw that sin is depicted as both individual and corporate rather than one
or the other as their definitions suggest. For our feminist theologians we note that taken
as a whole, the narratives seem to have more to say about male sin (Cain, Lamech, sons
of God, Ham) than female sin, though in truth the matter of gender seems not to be
thematic. Though we will develop it further below, we might also observe that sin seems
to develop and accumulate, concepts difficult to relate to the evangelical definition of sin
in particular.

Genesis 1–11 and Evangelical Definitions of Sin

Regarding the evangelical definition, we observe that Genesis 3–11 is short on
direct divine command; most of the infractions are not depicted with reference to some
previously stated law (though we acknowledge that many of the prohibited activities
would later be codified as law). Further, we saw that though there are many acts of sin in
the primeval narrative, sin is talked about in ways other than individual acts.
What is clearest of all after this reading is that just as few of the individual
narratives are simply summarizable, neither is sin. Sin in Genesis 3–11 is
multidimensional. As Emil Brunner writes of Genesis 3, “[Adam’s] sin is composed of
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the mingled elements of distrust, doubt, and defiant desire for freedom. It is impossible
for us to reduce it to a single formula; even in its inmost center it is tainted with
ambiguity.”3 Karl Barth similarly suggests that sin is equivocal at its heart.4 The
ambiguity of sin in these chapters cautions against reductionistic definitions.

SIN AND THE IMAGO DEI

In our reading of Genesis 1–11 we saw that the clearest reference point for sin in
those narratives is the description of the human as laid out in chapters 1 and 2, which is
often summarized as the imago dei. Among other things, humanity in those chapters is
depicted as physical, spiritual, verbal, sexual, and relational. They are commissioned to
be stewards and caretakers of the land and garden and to reproduce in order to spread the
influence of God’s reign and presence throughout the world. The sins depicted in Genesis
3–11 represent deviations from this identity and destiny by both individuals and groups,
by overreaching the limits of the image, failing to achieve it, or abusing powers necessary
for its accomplishment. The motivations for these deviations are various: pride, fear,
anxiety, mistrust, ignorance, selfishness, etc. It may be said that the persistent effort
throughout these chapters is for humanity to mistake the extent to which it has the power
to define itself in the context of its story. As Christof Gestrich comments, “For man’s

3. Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology, Olive Wyon (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1947), 132.
4. “It belongs to the very nature of evil that it is equivocal in its appearance.” Karl Barth,
The Doctrine of Reconciliation, vol. IV.1 of Church Dogmatics, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Peabody,
MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1956), 398.
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calamity is the fact that he cannot make himself human, but imagines that he can.”5 Sin is
failing to be human and all things that thwart others from doing so.6

Emil Brunner on Sin and the Imago Dei

Few theologians have made as conscious a connection between sin and the imago
dei as Emil Brunner in his Man in Revolt. While Brunner’s definition of sin fits
substantially within the tradition, his orientation of it to a broader theological framework
is done consciously with reference to what humanity is designed to be. To be human, for
Brunner, is essentially to be responsible, responsible to use one’s power in service of the
word of God and one’s destiny: the image of God. Though humanity has strayed from
this, it is only with reference to it that we can make sense of ourselves. “Even as sinner
man can only be understood in the light of the original Image of God, namely, as one
who is living in opposition to it.”7
Rather than reaching beyond the fall to access some original description of the
human from which we have fallen marring that nature, Brunner sees sin as itself evidence
of what it means to be human. “Sin itself is a manifestation of the image of God in man;
only he who has been created in the image of God can sin, and in this in he shows the
‘supernatural,’ spirit-power, a power not of this world, which issues from the primal

5. Christof Gestrich, The Return of Splendor in the World: The Christian Doctrine of Sin
and Forgiveness (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1997), 57.
6. Barth comments similarly: “As the servant of God he can be essentially and perfectly
man according to the purpose of his creaturely nature, participating in the lordship of God as he
fulfills his determination as a partner in covenant with God. What a fool he is, fighting against
himself, when he refuses and tries to escape from this order!” Karl Barth, The Doctrine of
Reconciliation, vol. IV.1 of Church Dogmatics, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson Publishers, 1956), 435.
7. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 105.
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image of God.”8 This is in contrast to animals. “No animal is able to sin, for it is unable
to rebel against its destiny, against the form in which it has been created; it has not the
power of decision.”9 Pannenberg agrees: “But when it is a matter of the advantage of
humans over all other creatures, the emphasis is not on intellectual ability but on the
destiny of fellowship with God and the position of rule associated with closeness to
God.”10 Again, the standard of reference is not some fixed notion of human nature but
rather human potential, a potential that other created beings do not share: “Man must
never be understood merely in the light of his being, but also in the light of what he ought
to be.”11
Brunner goes so far as to claim that it is precisely because of being made in the
image of God that humanity is capable of sin. “But when you see sin you also see the
image of God. Only where there is the Imago Dei is there also peccatum; sin itself is a
testimony to the divine origin of man.”12 This is particularly true of the greatest of sins:
making oneself God. “The most daring of all sins, that of self-deification, is only possible
through the divine destiny of creation, which raises man above the whole of the rest of
the created world.”13 This tendency to self-exaltation above the divine that many have
noted in Genesis 3–11 is only possible because of humanity’s innate link with the divine.
“This sinful confusion, by which the copy makes itself the original, is only possible
because it is a copy.”14

8. Ibid., 133.
9. Ibid.
10. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 190.
11. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 80.
12. Ibid., 187.
13. Ibid., 173.
14. Ibid.
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Brunner importantly addresses whether sin abolishes the image or not. He rejects
those views that think of the imago dei in terms of super-nature. What he wants to avoid
is the suggestion that what post-fall humans share with pre-fall humans their human
nature while what was lost was a “super-nature.” “Man is fundamentally misunderstood
when, by a method of subtraction, that which is common to fallen man and to man as
originally created is contrasted as ‘nature’ with that which has been lost as
‘supernature.’”15 He says instead that “[t]hrough sin man has lost not a ‘super-nature’ but
his God-given nature, and has become unnatural, inhuman.”16 To be human is to be like
God. To the extent that we fail to image God, we become less human, we fulfill our
function less effectively or prevent others from doing so. But deviation from the human
destiny does not cut us off from it entirely. Pannenberg comments that, “Although misery
of this kind runs contrary to our divine destiny, it does not itself alienate us from this
destiny. That alienation takes place only when we live our lives in antithesis to our
destiny.”17 This was borne out in our reading of Genesis where even as humanity was
departing from the image it was progressing in it as well through various acts of
procreation and creativity.
Sin, then, is humanity’s deviation from, rejection of, or thwarting of the full
imaging of the divine in humanity. “Man is a rebel against his divine destiny; he is the
steward who pretends to be the master of the vineyard and then kills his lord’s
messengers.”18

15. Ibid., 111.
16. Ibid., 94.
17. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 178.
18. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 171.
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Bonhoeffer speaks of the sin as the act of exchanging imago dei—the image of
God—for that which the serpent offered to the human pair: to be sicut deus—“like God.”
Imago dei—Godlike man in his existence for God and neighbour, in his
primitive creatureliness and limitation; sicut deus—Godlike man in his
out-of-himself knowledge of good and evil, in his limitlessness and his
action out-of-himself, in his underived existence, in his loneliness. Imago
dei—that is, man bound to the Word of the Creator and living form him;
sicut deus—that is, man bound to the depths of his own knowledge about
God, in good and evil; imago dei—the creature living in the unity of
obedience; sicut deus—the creator-man living out of the division of good
and evil. Imago dei, sicut deus, agnus dei—the One who was sacrificed
for man sicut deus, killing man’s false divinity in true divinity, the GodMan who restores the image of God.19
This rejection of the human calling to be the image of God results in the human
being both more and less. As Bonhoeffer points out, humanity has lost its uncomplicated
relationship to its own identity as creature. “He is like God, and this ‘is’ is meant very
seriously. It is not that he feels himself so, but that he is. Together with the limit Adam
has lost his creatureliness. Limitless Adam can no longer be addressed in his
creatureliness.”20 We might say that Adam can no longer be addressed in his “humanity.”
In the grasp for powers, powers that will now be wielded problematically in the pursuit of
human identity, humanity lost the possibility of simply imaging God.

Sin, the Imago Dei and Conceptual Tensions

Indexing the description of sin to human identity and the image of God in
particular bears considerable fruit. In particular, it addresses some of the polarities and
tensions that arise in definitions of sin, polarities that the definitions of sin we saw from
both feminist and evangelical theologians answered in unsatisfactory ways.
19. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Interpretation of Genesis 1–3
[and] Temptation (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 71.
20. Ibid., 72.
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Vertical or Horizontal Sin

As we saw in our survey of feminist and evangelical theologians, one perennial
issue of definitions of sin is whether they place emphasis on sin being against God or
against fellow humans. One strength of describing sin with reference to the human
identity in the imago dei is that it stakes out a position between these two extremes. Since
the imago dei describes humans with reference to God, any sin against a fellow image
bearer is de facto a sin against the divine, an attack against one of God’s chosen
representatives. Similarly, any violation against the divine intention for the created order
is a violation of one’s divinely given stewardship responsibility and against the divine
word since all was created by the word of God. As we saw repeatedly during the reading
of Genesis 3–11 there was no sin that could be clinically excised from the nexus of
relationships and identity markers that are inherent in the description of humans in
chapters 1 and 2. Commenting on Genesis 3 in particular, Brueggemann ties together the
vertical and horizontal dimensions of sin. Brueggemann commented regarding the early
narratives of Genesis: “The issues which likely concern us are horizontal issues,
problems of human and social relations. Yet the primary thrust of the story is vertical,
trying to decide about the rule of God and the shape of human destiny. Clearly, our
horizontal propensity and the vertical agenda of the story belong together.”21
Indeed, with an eye to the narratives, it might be better to replace the concepts of
vertical and horizontal with those of centrifugal and centripetal. Sin is centrifugal because
it violates the inherent connections between humans and those outside themselves: God,
others, and even the world. It is centripetal insofar as the narratives portray that in any sin
21. Walter Brueggemann, Genesis: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching,
Interpretation (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982), 53 (Emphasis original).
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the sinning person acts against themselves in deviating from their own identity as an
image bearer or one charged with stewardship.
It is not sufficiently nuanced to say that these are vertical sins with horizontal
effects. In addressing Cain, God seems first to be concerned that Cain has sinned against
his brother and secondly that he has sinned against the ground. It is not so much that
Cain’s sin affects the ground but that his action indeed sins against it and the ground cries
out in testimony. Similarly, prior to the flood it is said that the land had been corrupted.
The devastation of the flood was not merely an effect of human sinfulness on the land,
but rather indicates that human corruption had defiled the land; humans sinned against
the land. Yes, all sin is against God, but the human identity and destiny is so tightly
linked with the divine identity that any attempt to separate them is artificial.

Individual Sin and Corporate Sin

Another of the tensions felt in theologies of sin is whether the definition of sin
emphasizes individual sin or sin’s corporate and systemic aspects. As we saw in chapters
2 and 3, feminist definitions of sin emphasize the latter and evangelical definitions the
former. Indeed, in both cases we saw that exactly this emphasis renders the definitions
inadequate to speak convincingly of sin. The feminist definitions veer dangerously close
to exonerating individuals (especially women) while the evangelical definitions give little
help in examining corporate and systemic evils.
These problems are ameliorated somewhat by indexing sin not to the law of God
nor to static definitions of human nature. Rather, as we have seen, the way human
identity and the imago dei are presented in Genesis speaks to both the individual and the
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corporate. Male and female were created in the image of God (1:28) and in Genesis 2 it is
clear that the man needed the woman to fulfill the destiny of humanity. What we need is
language that helps us hold together the individual and corporate aspects of our
humanness without privileging one or the other.
As we saw, the narratives of sin in those chapters depict both individual sin—
Adam and Eve, Cain, Ham—and corporate sin—humanity before the flood, and the
Tower of Babel. Prior to the flood the narrative employed the concept of corruption
which speaks of sin not as an individual problem but rather articulates eloquently the
atmosphere of sin, evil and violence between humans and against creation that
characterized that time period. Further, the narrative of the Tower of Babel shows
corporate humanity acting in unity and being driven by shared emotions of fear and
anxiety. The impression that one gets in both of these narratives is that the sinful whole is
more than the sum of the individual sinning parts.

Sin and Other Polarities

The depiction of sin in Genesis 3–11 complicates some of the other tidy
categories of sin as well. Is sin a spiritual reality or a physical reality? Genesis 3–11
would answer, “Both.” Clearly much of the sin is physical: eating, murder, voyeurism,
building. But in describing sin as “corruption” at the time of the flood, the narrator moves
toward something more sinister. Further, the image of sin as an animal crouching at the
door suggests a spiritual power more than just some physical act.
Is sin primarily an act or a disposition? Most evangelicals want to say that it is
both though their definitions tend to emphasize the former. Feminists lean toward the

259
latter. While there are several distinctly sinful acts in Genesis 3–11, the effect of the
narrative is to suggest an increasing tendency or disposition in humanity to sin. This
reaches a crescendo at the flood and again at Babel.

SIN, STORY, AND THE IMAGO DEI

Thus far, we have linked sin talk to self-talk or human talk by detecting in the text
of Genesis 1–11 a clear link between the depiction of the human and the depiction of
human sin. That is, that Genesis 1–11 tells the story of humanity’s failure to be the imago
dei, to be human. Though the term imago dei does not capture all that the narrative says
about what it means to be human, it is convenient shorthand to refer to the range of
descriptors involved in the human per Genesis 1 and 2: created, embodied, gendered,
sexual, verbal, relational, commissioned, etc.22 Some might argue that the concept of the
imago dei is not central to the Old Testament text. But as Stanley Grenz notes, “[T]he
imago dei plays a role in the Old Testament anthropology as well as in the New
Testament conception of the human person, which the Old Testament witness cradled. It
silently underlies the text even when the concept remains hidden from direct view.”23 It is
true that the words “image and likeness of God” are relatively rare in both testaments.24
22. Bonhoeffer even suggests that human bodiliness is related to the image. “He is image
of God not in spite of but just because of his bodiliness. For in his bodiliness he is related to the
earth and to other bodies, he is there for others, he is dependent upon others. In his bodiliness he
finds his brother and the earth. As such a creature man of earth and spirit is in the likeness of his
Creator, God.” Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 48.
23. Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of
the Imago Dei, Matrix of Christian Theology, vol. 1. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2001), 185.
24. The Hebrew word for “image” occurs with reference to the image of God in man only
in Genesis 1:28; 9:6. The term “likeness” in Genesis 1:26 and 5:1. In the New Testament the
word translated “image” is more frequent, usually with reference to Christ as the image of God (2
Corinthians 4:4; Colossians 1:15; . A few references concern humanity’s conforming to the image
of God or of Christ (Romans 8:29; 1 Corinthians 15:49; Colossians 3:10). Jesus’s commentary
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However, as Grenz says, the notion “underlies the text” throughout both testaments. The
calling of Abraham and Israel to be a unique people in the world, the depiction of the
king as divine representative, and especially the exalted anthropology of Psalm 8 testify
to the ongoing notion of humanity both individually and corporately imaging the divine
in the world. As we will see, the concept becomes more overt in the New Testament
where it finds its fulfillment in Christ as the “image of the invisible God” (Colossians
1:15). In fact, Grenz suggests that one can use the concept of the imago dei as one way to
structure the entire biblical narrative. “The phrase ‘image of God’ is shorthand for the
biblical narrative viewed from one particular metaphorical perspective.”25

Narrative and the Imago Dei

Before exploring further how indexing sin to the imago dei is fruitful for theology
of sin and beyond, it is important for us to underscore at this point that the notion of the
imago dei and of the human destiny more broadly must be thought of in developmental
terms, especially narrative terms. In chapter 2 we observed the feminist theologians tying
their definitions of sin very closely to an understanding of the nature of the human, the
self-naming human of Mary Daly and the relational human of Rita Nakashima Brock. We
faulted them, however, for too static a notion of the human, for failing to include some
notion of development, of narrative.26 We could be in danger of making the same misstep

about the likeness of Caesar on the denarius may be read as a subtle reference to the image of
God in humanity (Matthew 22:20).
25. Grenz, The Social God, 268.
26. Emil Brunner points to the relationship between faulty views of the relationship
between human nature and sin, the classic question of whether the imago dei is lost or merely
marred in the fall. “Man is fundamentally misunderstood when, by a method of subtraction, that
which is common to fallen man and to man as originally created is contrasted as ‘nature’ with that
which has been lost as ‘supernature.’” Brunner, Man in Revolt, 111.
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by indexing our description of sin to the notion of the human as imago dei depending on
how we construe it.
Stanley Grenz offers a survey of the history of the concept of the imago dei, a
survey dominated by the concepts of image as involving innate God-like capacities (the
substantial view) or the relational view. These ways correspond quite closely to those
implied by the evangelical theologians (substantial) and Rita Nakashima Brock
(relational).27 He then proposes a “third understanding that sees the image as the divinely
given goal or destiny awaiting humankind in the eschatological future and toward which
humans are directed ‘from the beginning.’”28 This is not a nature that one possesses from
the beginning and which the fall destroys or mars. Rather, it is a destiny that must be
worked out and which will find its fullest expression in the end; it is eschatological.
Grenz grounds this directly in the creation narrative. “Genesis 1:26-28 is not merely—or
even primarily—a critique of the ancient Near Eastern concepts that gave it birth. This
text stands within a narrative structure, and within that structure if functions as a prologue
to all that follows, rather than as an ontological declaration about human nature.”29
We have already had cause to reference Emil Brunner regarding the relationship
between the imago dei and sin. Even in several of those quotes there is the whisper of a
developmental, eschatologically oriented view of the imago dei in his repeated use of the
word “destiny” with reference to it. In a few places he draws out more fully this
developmental idea of the image of God. Though Brunner recognizes that it is difficult to
27. There is some sense in which Mary Daly’s approach to the human as self-naming
(though she doesn’t refer to it as the image of God) approximates Grenz’s third way. The act of
self-naming is a life-long process and therefore developmental and potentially narratival.
However, Daly’s view is completely self-referential; there is no transcendent ideal of humanity to
which one aspires. There is, in short, no end to the story.
28. Grenz, The Social God, 17.
29. Ibid., 201.
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draw a clear line at what differentiates humanity from animals as it pertains to capacities,
he contrasts them precisely on the basis of the developmental aspect of human nature.
“Figuratively speaking, God produces the other creatures in a finished state; they are
what they ought to be, and this they remain. But God retains man within His workshop,
within His hands. He does not simply make him and finish him; human nature, indeed,
consists in the fact that we may and must remain in the hands of God.”30
Christof Gestrich argues that this eschatological orientation is indispensable in the
formulation of the church’s anthropology and hamartiology. “Without certainty and
clarity in eschatology the church cannot speak of sin, for the concept of sin gains its
specificity and its content from the question of whether there is a clear destiny for us
creatures, a purpose we can fail to achieve.”31 One might say that it is the destination that
informs the trajectory as much or more than the point of departure. This assertion is
particularly interesting in light of Rita Nakashima Brock’s use of journey imagery for the
human experience, but a journey with no clear destination.

Narratival Imago Dei in Genesis 1–11

We saw that with respect to the human, careful attention to the text of Genesis 1
and 2 makes it clear that the concept of the human destiny as imago dei is not a static one.
Rather, it is a destiny that must be lived into, thus supporting Grenz’s third way. As he
points out, “Although the use of the two nouns [image and likeness] suggests that as the
divine image humans are to resemble their Creator, Gen. 1:26–28 only hints at the nature
of this resemblance. Consequently, the search for the full meaning of the imago dei—that

30. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 97.
31. Gestrich, Return of Splendor, 73.

263
is, the quest to understand how humans are to fulfill the role of being the divine image as
creatures who resemble the Creator—leads the inquirer beyond the first creation
narrative.”32 We saw this unfold in the drama of Genesis 1–11 in the various ways that
humanity imaged God: man’s naming of the animals, Eve’s getting a child “with the help
of Yahweh”, the cultural developments of husbandry, music and metallurgy, Noah’s
curse of Ham/Canaan, the use of language, and even the Tower builders’ endeavors.
Indeed, we argued that it is specifically God’s self-revelation as one who covers sin in
Genesis 3 that provides the reference point for Shem and Japheth’s imaging of God in
covering their exposed father (Genesis 9). God’s identity is revealed progressively and
so, what it means to image him develops over time as well. So Grenz concludes:
“Genesis 1:26–28 does not define the imago dei in detail but rather opens the door to the
possibility of the answer emerging from the broader biblical narrative in which the
creation story is placed.”33
This view of the human improves upon that offered by our feminist theologians
for whom human nature was found in the capacity to self-name (Daly) or relationality
(Brock). Rather than such fixed ideas, the understanding of a narratively developed
human identity is more flexible, not a nature but a role. Robert Jenson phrases it thus:
“For each of us to ‘have human nature’ is to play a part in the coherent history of
humanity, which is made one and coherent by the one determinate call of God to be his
partner.”34 This is a distinctly narrative understanding. Jenson sees that to be human is to
be caught up in the story of humanity, a story that is going somewhere. That call and

32. Grenz, The Social God, 202.
33. Ibid., 223.
34. Robert W. Jenson, The Works of God, vol. 2 of Systematic Theology (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 150.
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destiny is partnership, a partnership captured by the notion of creation in the image of
God. We critiqued the feminist theologians and Rita Nakashima Brock in particular for
having a far too presentist notion of humanity; our humanness being exhausted by the
reality and status of our relationships now.
What this means is that the identity of the human is, in a sense, a moving target, a
growing reality. That is, as God is more fully revealed, so what it means to be the image
will develop. We observed this within Genesis 1–11 as God was revealed to be one who
covers shame in chapter 3 and his example was embraced by Shem and Japheth and
eschewed by Ham in chapter 9. Similarly, as God was revealed as one who cursed and
blessed, so Noah both blessed and cursed his sons. This trend, which is seen perhaps only
in faint shadow in Genesis 1–11, can be seen as God and humanity are revealed
throughout scripture and beyond.

The Imago Dei and the Development of Sin

What this means further for our understanding of sin is that it too is a concept in
development. As humans more fully enact their destiny, more and different ways to sin
will become available to them. We observed this pattern in the Genesis narrative. Chapter
1 shows a God who names and designates the role and identity of elements of Creation.
In chapter 2, the man mimics this act of naming with divine approval (2:19). Yet,
immediately after the ‘fall’, the man once again applies this power with reference to the
woman, naming her identity with reference to just one of her human functions. In chapter
3 God reveals himself to be the one who covers nakedness. By chapter 9, Ham sins
against his father by doing the opposite. God revealed himself to be Cain’s avenger only
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to have Lamech misappropriate this aspect of the divine image for his own selfprotection. In chapter 3 God reveals himself as a God who uses language to curse the
ground and the serpent. In chapter 9, Noah appropriates this power in an ambiguous way
and applies a curse to a human, something God did not do. As divine and human powers
become increasingly known, new and different ways to diverge from the image of God
and destiny of humanity arise. Pushing further into the Old Testament we can see the
trend continuing with Abraham and then Israel. God’s decisive acts become new
information against which Abraham’s and Israel’s faithfulness to their calling is
evaluated.
To refine this point even further, we suggest that the very places where humanity
is exercising specific features of the divine image is where we are most likely to find the
potential for egregious sins. And further, that at moments of creative expansion in human
ability to enact the image the possibility to abuse those powers is most evident. In almost
the same breath with which musical advancement is narrated (4:21) the bellicose song of
Lamech is recorded. Noah’s advances in viticulture and viniculture soon bear bitter fruit.
Similarly, the technological comments regarding the materials used at Babel are put to
use in a project in violation of God’s commission to humanity. It is important to note that
the strength of this narrative depiction is that the text does not censure music,
fermentation, nor city-building but rather presents warning signs against the possible
misuse of these viable human advances. As we will see below, these sins will recur even
within the bounds of Genesis and the primeval narrative gives helpful perspective in
evaluating those stories.
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This understanding of a growing character of sin is in stark contrast to the linking
of sin to law-breaking. Those defining sin thus are plagued by questions regarding which
laws are binding. The definition of sin combined with biblical literalism forces them into
abstract discussion about types of laws and which ones are abrogated by Christ and which
ones are not. Even within the context of the Pentateuch the laws for Israel shift from
those most pertinent to their wilderness context to ones better suited to their settled state
in the land. The law and human destiny are not opposed to one another, indeed the law
provides some of the clearest descriptions of how one lives in harmony with God and
others. But the law cannot possibly cover the entirety of what living out that destiny
entails.

SIN, THE IMAGO DEI, AND CHRIST

So Genesis 1–11 depicts sin with reference to the description of humanity and that
humanity not as a nature but as a destiny, a story that must be lived into. Stanley Grenz
expresses most directly the principle upshot of this narrative understanding of the imago
dei and humanity. “The open-ended character of the text transfers the search for the full
meaning of the imago dei to the biblical narrative as a whole and hence opens the way for
a move from a creatiocentric to a christocentric anthropology.”35 That is, by recognizing
the developmental aspect of the human described as imago dei, it opens up a way to link
the meaning of the image not to a static, creational nature as is the case with views of the
image of God as capacity, rationality, or even relationality, but rather to the story-line of
humanity in scripture, and particularly how it finds its fulfillment in Christ. At creation
humanity was not all that it could or would be. It was to grow into its role and destiny and
35. Grenz, The Social God, 18.
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the New Testament uses the language of “image of God” with reference to Christ to
clarify and extend that destiny. This is in contrast to our observations of the
anthropocentric hamartiology of feminist theologians and the crucicentric soteriology of
evangelical theologians.

Christ and the Imago Dei

Grenz charts how several New Testament authors appropriate the concept of the
imago dei and apply it to Christ. He finds the transference of this idea from the first
testament to Christ in the discussion of Christ as both the glory and image of God as in 2
Corinthians 4:4. “Glory” connects to the aspect of rulership that is part of the imago dei.36
Particularly important in this discussion is the hymn of Colossians 1 where Christ
is referred to as “the image of the invisible God.” Grenz believes that the hymn can be
read with an eye to the entire narrative of human identity. “Taken as a whole, the hymn
carries a clear narrative tone. Indeed, it brings together the Old Testament creation story
with the story of Jesus’ passion, and it anticipates the future consummation when
creation’s goal as well as the Colossians’ glorification will be realized...It is Christ’s role
in this narrative that marks him as the manifestation of God and hence as the imago
dei.”37 This is true not in some abstract sense but as accomplished through his life
narrative. McClendon asserts that by his life, Jesus “proved himself true anthropos,
authentic homo, progenitor of a human strain that fulfilled (rather than once again

36. Grenz writes: “The divine kabod is connected with manifestation of God’s sovereign
rule over, or presence within, nature and history.” Grenz, The Social God, 206.
37. Ibid., 216.
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deflecting) the promise to Adam (“Earthling”) and to Eve (“Life”)—the promise that in
their human family God’s own image would appear.”38
Brunner agrees and likewise orients the concept of the imago dei in Christ to the
beginning and the end. “The goal which has been shown to us in Jesus Christ is indeed
also and first of all the restoration of that which was at the beginning, but it is much more
than that; it is the eternal consummation which goes far beyond the Creation. Thus also
that which is ‘proper’ to man, according to the Divine plan of Creation, can only be
understood in the light of the End which is disclosed in Jesus Christ, the aim of the
Kingdom of God.”39

Christ, the Imago Dei, and the Individual

The presentation of Christ as the true imago dei offers to the individual a new
reference point for understanding what it means to be human. Rather than a static notion
of human characteristics or even the developing idea begun in Genesis 1, the new
reference point is the life and person of Jesus Christ, which is, of course, in keeping with
the image as depicted in the first testament. The follower of Christ is “in Christ.” “Being
‘in Christ’ entails participating in the narrative of Jesus, with its focus on the cross and
resurrection. It involves retelling one’s own narrative, and hence making sense out of
one’s life, by means of the plot of the Jesus narrative.”40 This image and narrative is in
contrast with another one on offer, namely that of Adam. Grenz contrasts the image of
God in Adam and the image of God in Christ in terms distinctly amenable to narrative

38. James Wm. McClendon, Doctrine, Systematic Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1994), 123.
39. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 80.
40. Grenz, The Social God, 329.
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thought. “Consequently, rather than being merely Adam and Christ as representatives of
the two orders, the old human and the new human are two frames of reference from with
participants in each realm gain their identity, and out of which, on the basis of which, or
in keeping with which they conduct their lives.”41 That is, the image in Adam,
characterized by the failure to fulfill the image in the variety of ways detailed in Genesis
3–11 offers one possible narrative in which a person can fit themselves. The narrative of
Christ is another. “Moreover, the ‘old human’ and the ‘new human’ bring into view two
distinct narratives. The former looks to the story of the creation of the first humans and
their subsequent fall into sin, as well as the entire narrative of sinful humankind. The
latter, in contrast, draws into focus the narrative of God’s gracious saving actions on
behalf of humankind, the center of which is the story of Jesus, especially his death and
resurrection, and the ongoing story of Christ’s presence in the church through the Holy
Spirit.”42 We saw evidence of these two narratives in Genesis 1–11 particularly in the
paralleling of the genealogies of Cain and Seth.

Christ, the Imago Dei, and the Community

Importantly there are resources here to hold together the individual and collective
senses of the imago dei. As we saw in Genesis 1 and 2, collective nature of the imago dei
was captured in the creation of humanity in a sexual duality. Derrick Sherwin Bailey
comments succinctly, “The fact that God created Man as a sexual duality means that male
and female, as isolated individuals, have been given no fixed and clearly-defined social
status or function. They have simply been called to a life of partnership in all things—and

41. Ibid., 255.
42. Ibid.
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as partners, therefore, they must seek together in love and humility to understand and
fulfill their common destiny as Man.”43
But as Grenz points out, in the story of scripture, human marriage, though
fundamental, is depicted as a “penultimate reality.”44 The eschatological orientation of
the imago dei drives us beyond its expression “in the beginning” to its final chapter. The
ultimate expression of the image of God in humanity is not the individual, nor the couple,
but rather the community. As the image of God, Christ is depicted as the beginning of a
renewed humanity. “The humankind created in the imago dei is none other than the new
humanity conformed to the imago Christi, and the telos toward which the Genesis
creation narrative points is the eschatological community of glorified saints.”45 Believers
participate in this renewed humanity and in so doing more fully achieve their human
destiny. “Insofar as they reflect the new corporate reality in Christ, believers are in the
process of becoming the image of God and hence of fulfilling their divinely given, human
destiny.”46 Christ is the image of God and the church, the people of God, are the
corporate expression of that image. This is perhaps captured best in references to the
church as the “body of Christ.”47

43. The Man-Woman Relationship in Christian Thought, (London: Longman, 283-284),
quoted in Grenz, The Social God, 302.
44. “Although marriage is the primal male-female relationship, the biblical narrative
points to the eschatological new creation as the fullness of fellowship toward which human
sexuality has been directed from the beginning. For this reason, the image of God is not present
solely, or even primarily, in the martial union of male and female, which in the end belongs to the
penultimate age and not to the age to come.” Grenz, The Social God, 302.
45. Ibid., 18.
46. Ibid., 240.
47. As Grenz highlights, this also ties in the important relational components of humanity
though couching them in a grander context.
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Summary

Grenz ties all these elements together in a paragraph worth quoting at length.
Paul [adds] his voice to the chorus of New Testament writers who are
convinced that Christ’s preeminence among many adelphoi is nothing
short of God’s intent from the beginning. This eschatological purpose is
the goal that was already in view in the creation of humankind in the
divine image...In his risen glory, Jesus Christ now radiates the fullness of
humanness that constitutes God’s design for humankind from the
beginning. Yet God’s purpose has never been that Christ will merely
radiate this human fullness, but that as the Son he will be preeminent
among a new humanity who together are stamped with the divine image.
Consequently, the humankind created in the divine image is none other
than the new humanity conformed to the imago Christi, and the telos
toward which the Old Testament creation narrative points is the
eschatological community of glorified saints who have joined their head in
resurrection life by the power of the Spirit...As many adelphoi are brought
to glory (Heb. 2:10), Jesus Christ is truly the preeminent one and truly the
Son. In this manner, the narrative of the emergence of the new humanity
provides the climax to the entire salvation-historical story and becomes the
ultimate defining moment for the Genesis account of the creation of
humankind in the imago dei.48
The imago dei, the reference point for understanding what it means to be human,
finds its fullest expression in the incarnate Christ; he is the true human. The church, a
renewed humanity, finds its identity and calling in living in light of this new Adam.

Sin and the Image of God in Christ

What this begins to offer is a way to move with the story of Scripture to index the
description of sin to Christ, a shortcoming we observed in both feminist and evangelical
theologians. Several theologians, perhaps Karl Barth chief among them, express the
importance of understanding sin in light of Christ. “Had we not to speak first of the
incarnation and atoning death of Jesus Christ because the man of sin, his existence and

48. Grenz, The Social God, 231–32.
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situation and nature, is revealed and can be known only in the light of it?”49 Barth goes
on to declare: “[O]nly when we know Jesus Christ do we really know that man is the man
of sin, and what sin is, and what it means for man.”50 Christof Gestrich suggests the same
thing: “Christian theology must always understand sin (and the fall) ‘retrospectively’
from the vantage point of faith in the redemption won by Jesus Christ.”51
Emil Brunner agrees that static “nature” talk of humans is insufficient and must
be supplemented by recognition of human destiny. “Man must never be understood
merely in the light of his being, but also in the light of what he ought to be.”52 And, like
Barth, Brunner relates this to the issue of sin. “Only in this new existence—what the
Bible calls being ‘in Christ’—can man truly understand himself; since only in Him, in the
Word of God, man himself becomes true, can perceive the truth about himself, and also
the great lie which we call sin.”53 Again, the ultimate reference point for our
understanding of sin is not the law nor human nature per se, but rather the revelation of
the destiny of humanity in the incarnate Christ.
James McClendon, a more consciously narrative theologian than either Barth or
Brunner brings the point to its clearest expression: “By [his] faithfulness he [Christ]
unveils sin: Sin is whatever falls short of, whatever denies, whatever misses the way of
faithfulness to God’s rule embodied in Jesus Christ.”54 Rather than directing attention to
the law or to human nature or capacity, this description of sin focuses attention on a
person, Christ. Elsewhere McClendon articulates this point even more directly.

49. Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, 359.
50. Ibid., 389.
51. Gestrich, Return of Splendor, 83.
52. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 80.
53. Ibid., 81.
54. McClendon, Doctrine, 124.
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If the positive features of the received church doctrine of sin are to be
maintained while its dubious features are either reformed or discarded, it
will be necessary to make a starting point, not in Adam’s (or Eve’s!)
alleged act of sin on behalf of innocent babes and faithful believers born
an aeon later, but rather in the full faithfulness of Jesus of Nazareth, who
resisted the temptation that confronted him all the way to this cross, who
overcame the principalities and powers of his day even at the price of his
life, and who, risen from the dead, summoned followers to abandon every
sin and to follow in good faith the pioneer of their salvation.55
The final reference point for sin is the person of Christ, the second Adam, not the
supposed universal effects of the act of the first Adam.
Indexing sin to the person of Christ highlights the fundamental problem with the
law. The principal shortcoming of the law was not that humanity couldn’t keep it, but
rather that it was and is inadequate to portray the fullness of the human destiny.56 While
the law did articulate certain boundaries for human health and flourishing, it could not
cover the full breadth of what it means to be human, to be the imago dei. Only a person
living the image of God could do that, exactly what the New Testament claims of
Christ.57
Bonhoeffer articulates well the role of the law and its insufficiency to serve as the
ultimate reference for sin. “God preserves the world by affirming the sinful world and
55. Jr. McClendon, James Wm., “Sin,” in A New Handbook of Christian Theology, in A
New Handbook of Christian Theology, ed. Donald W. Musser and Joseph L. Price (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1992), 446.
56. This inadequacy is evident in scripture itself. Note the way the wisdom literature
supplements and “fills the gaps” left by the law on many questions of human life and behavior.
57. McClendon suggests that traditional definitions of sin and the human create some
tensions in the idea of the sinlessness of Christ. However, thinking of humanity as the image of
God and sin as deviation from that destiny ameliorates some of those issues. “Jesus’ sinlessness
(more appropriately, his unqualified faithfulness) simply indicates his lasting adherence to the
covenant God provided for Israel, a covenant foreshadowed in the patriarchs, fully tendered at
Exodus and Sinai, rehearsed by the prophets, and now renewed in the Messiah. In this case, Jesus
is not (as ‘sinless’ might suggest) humanly defective; rather he is the truly and fully human One,
the Son of man, and his faithfulness exposes any and all of our unfaithfulness as defects in the
humanity he realized.” McClendon, James Wm., “Sin,” in A New Handbook of Christian
Theology, in A New Handbook of Christian Theology, ed. Donald W. Musser and Joseph L. Price
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1992), 444.
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directing it into its limits by means of ordinances. But none of these ordinances any
longer have any eternal character because they are only there to preserve life.”58 The law
given in Scripture is there to preserve life and provide boundaries to keep the story going,
not as the final reference point. Rather, he points out, the laws themselves keep the story
moving toward Christ. “All the orders of our fallen world are God’s orders of
preservation on the way to Christ. They are not orders of creation but of preservation.”59
Karl Barth contrasts the focus on the law with the focus on the image of God in
Christ. Christ “is therefore the eternal brother and archetype of every man, the true and
living lex aeterna which is not enclosed in our hearts and consciences but closes in on us,
which does not acquire validity in our expositions but as a iudex aeternus—it is a person
and not an idea—expounds itself and creates its own validity.”60 The person of Christ
provides a more comprehensive presentation of the destiny of humanity than the law
could.
Furthermore, the focus on the image of God in Christ moves away from static
notions of the person and to one individual with a personal narrative but also embedded
in a narrative. Just as the stories of Adam and Abraham/Israel speak both of humanity
universally and to the specific narrative of Israel, so the gospel accounts (and beyond)
cleverly link the work of Christ to both the narrative of Israel and to that of humanity.
This is seen most clearly in the very “Jewish” genealogy of Matthew’s gospel which
tracks Jesus’s Israelite and royal pedigree through David to Abraham (Matthew 1:1-17)
and in Luke’s more universal genealogy with traces Jesus’s lineage back to Adam and
indeed, to God (Luke 3:23-38).
58. Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 88.
59. Ibid.
60. Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, 402.
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Summary

The observation that the narratives of sin in Genesis 3–11 have as their clearest
reference point the description of humanity in Genesis 1–2, and especially as summarized
in the imago dei provides a way to link the definition of sin to Christ. This is made
possible by a narrative understanding of the image of God as a destiny that humanity was
to grow into even as the full sense of that destiny was progressively revealed. The New
Testament depicts Christ as the apex of that destiny by labeling him “the image of God.”
Believers who are “in Christ”, therefore, participate in a renewed humanity whose
reference point is the entire narrative of the image of God but particularly how it came to
expression in the life, ministry and suffering of Jesus Christ. Sin, therefore, rather than
being violation of a law or deviation from a fixed notion of the nature of the human, is
deviation from the human calling to be the image of God and that image is made clear to
us in the person and work of Christ.

TYPES OF SIN

We have moved from the observation that sin in Genesis 3–11 is a violation of
what it means to fulfill the human destiny as the imago dei to consider how that
observation deepened the concept of sin and avoided some of the common pitfalls of
definitions of sin. We saw in particular that such an understanding of sin, story, and the
human provided a more natural way to speak of sin with reference to Christ. What
remains is to return to the narratives of Genesis 3–11 to consider how then they might be
accessed fruitfully in theologizing, not as a source for a definition of sin but rather as
patterns of deviation from the divine image.
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In our analysis of both feminist and evangelical theologians we faulted them for
theological appropriation of the Genesis narratives that was inattentive to their literary
features and narrative character. Our feminist theologians assessed the value of the
Genesis 3 narrative and found it (or at least traditional interpretations of it) wanting
because it failed to speak to their personal experience of sin. Furthermore, they tended to
approach it mythologically or symbolically with the man and the woman representing
maleness and femaleness as abstract concepts. For the evangelical theologians in view
there was a strong historicist tendency and an expectation that the discrete narrative of
Genesis 3 would illustrate the definitive essence of sin. The choices these two groups
offered us were experiential epistemology and mythological text or historical text and
propositional epistemology. In both cases, we saw that there was an attempt to get behind
the text to some other revelatory reality.
By contrast, our purpose is to read the narratives of Genesis 1–11 with attention to
their literary quality and then orient those texts within a broader narrative framework.
What we encountered is that there are tight textual connections urging the reader to read
these chapters together. Furthermore, as is the way with stories, we found that the details
resist tidy summary. As Walter Brueggemann says of Genesis 3: “The story is not
explained. It is simply left there with the listening community free to take what can be
heard. There is, of course, talk here of sin and evil and death. But it is understated talk.
The stakes are too high for reduction to propositions. The story does not want to aid our
theologizing. It wants, rather, to catch us in our living. It will permit no escape into
theology.”61

61. Brueggemann, Genesis, 50.

277
Rather than offering a single, clear definition of sin, what we saw was that the
narratives depicted humanity’s deviation from its destiny as the image of God in multiple
ways and for a variety of reasons. We observed that this is much more in keeping with
our own experience of human action. Accordingly, we suggest that the best way to
appropriate these narratives is not as illustrations of a reductionistic definition of sin, but
rather as parallel images of the variety of ways and reasons in which humans deviate
from their divinely ordered destiny. They continue to speak today as types that can be
used as lenses to evaluate personal and corporate behaviors and attitudes.

Narrative and Typology
In using the term “type” to describe these images of sin, we are employing one of
the key tools in reading scripture in a narrative mode: typology. David Ford explains
typology: “The working hypothesis of typology is God’s providence guiding the story.
This makes it normal for one event in the story to resemble and help interpret another
regardless of the intentions of the actors or the human author.”62 As Ford’s comment
suggests, the notion of typology and narrative thought as well, is a theological one first
and secondarily literary. That is, typology is a feature of the way the world works and
thereafter is encoded in texts. Michael Goldberg summarizes Hans Frei’s main point: “to
take the structural shape of biblical narrative seriously is to take it as the shape of
reality.”63

62. David Ford, Barth and God’s Story: Biblical Narrative and the Theological Method
of Karl Barth in the “Church Dogmatics” (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1981), 86.
63. Michael Goldberg, Theology and Narrative: A Critical Introduction (Philadelphia:
Trinity Press International, 1991), 162.
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Accordingly, Christopher Seitz can say, “The loss of figural reading is not the loss
of an exegetical technique. It is the loss of location in time under God.”64 Figural reading
or typological reading is rooted in a belief about the way God has ordered the world, that
certain human events and characters can relate to others across time and space. To lose
this view of the way the world works is first a theological loss that then cashes out in the
loss of hermeneutical options. The biblical authors may seek to highlight certain details
that sharpen the connections between texts, but it is fundamentally a feature of the world.
Of course, most typological thinking has focused on ways in which characters and
events from the first testament are related to characters and events in the second
testament, and principally in Christ and the church. However, as our earlier references to
the dueling images of humanity in Adam and Christ suggest, it is equally legitimate to see
Old Testament narratives setting up patterns which later biblical and extra-biblical
characters may echo or not.
Before considering how these narratives might function as types of sin for
theological reflection, we will survey the way that the narratives of Genesis 3–11 show
signs of typological functioning within the near and far biblical context.

Types of Sin in Genesis and the Old Testament

There is evidence within the book of Genesis itself that these stories are
functioning typologically. Cornelius Plantinga observes of the Cain and Abel narrative
that “[i]n telling us this tale, the writer starts a lot more business than he finishes. But of
one thing we may be sure: the story of Cain and Abel is not just a snapshot of an isolated

64. Christopher R. Seitz, Figured Out: Typology and Providence in Christian Scripture
(Louisville [Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), viii.
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incident. The story is rather a kind of paradigm, the first case in Scripture of a pattern that
will appear again and again. In this pattern, God surprisingly prefers one person over
another—typically the younger over the older—and then has to deal with the loser and
his lethal envy.”65 Of course, that pattern is seen repeatedly in Genesis itself between
Ishmael and Isaac, Jacob and Esau, and Joseph and his brothers.66 Similarly,
Brueggemann notes that Adam’s admission “I was afraid,” “is the same answer that will
be given by Abraham (20:11) and then by Isaac (26:9) and by all who cannot trust the
goodness of God and submit to his wise passion.”67
Just as there are similarities between Adam and Noah, a sort of second Adam,
there are connections between Noah and Abraham. Paul Borgman highlights the links
between Noah and Abraham. “Noah and Abraham are very much the same: the biblical
writer distinguishes each by paralleled terms, ‘righteousness,’ ‘wholeness,’ and ‘walking
with God.’ The similarity accentuates their striking difference.”68 What is more, there is
more than passing similarity between Noah’s inebriation and nakedness and Ham’s
violation and the later story of Lot and his daughters (Genesis 19). The sin of the sons of
God and daughters of men that precipitated the flood may similarly illuminate the evil
intentions of the residents of Sodom toward Lot’s angelic guests and the conflagration
that followed.

65. Cornelius Plantinga, Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 160.
66. Matthew Schlimm follows this fraternal trajectory in From Fratricide to Forgiveness:
The Language and Ethics of Anger in Genesis, Siphrut, Literature and Theology of the Hebrew
Scriptures, vol. 7. (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2011).
67. Brueggemann, Genesis, 49.
68. Paul Borgman, Genesis: The Story We Haven’t Heard (Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2001), 38.
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The typological function of these narratives extends beyond Genesis into the rest
of the Pentateuch. Sailhamer argues that “[t]he final shape of the Pentateuch reflects an
interest in reading the historical narratives both typologically and eschatologically.”69 In
specific he unpacks relationship between the sins of Genesis 3–11 and the purity code of
Leviticus 11–16. Furthermore, “the tabernacle is portrayed as a return to the Garden of
Eden. The instructions given to Noah for building the ark foreshadow those given to
Moses for building the tabernacle.”70
On the one hand, the narratives of Genesis 3–11 are rarely referenced directly in
much of the Hebrew Bible. However, Henri Blocher argues that there are more references
than is sometimes admitted.71 He points to the presence of Genesis language in the
prophetic literature some of which is quite direct. Hosea 6:7, for instance, compares Israel
covenant failure to that of Adam. Isaiah 65:25 echoes Genesis in speaking of a serpent
eating dust. Furthermore, the storyline of paradise lost and recreated is strong, especially
in Isaiah. In short, many of the sins of the patriarchs and later Israel as a nation bear
striking resemblance to the series of sins, both individual and corporate, that are
presented in the primeval narrative.

Types of Sin in the New Testament

Many have noted that the stories of Genesis 1–11 do not feature heavily in the
remainder of Scripture. One could perhaps argue that this is not because they are not
fundamental, but rather that they are so fundamental that their presence is assumed
69. John H. Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as Narrative: A Biblical-Theological
Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 38.
70. Sailhamer, Pentateuch as Narrative, 39.
71. Henri Blocher, Original Sin: Illuminating the Riddle, New Studies in Biblical
Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub., 1999), 43.
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throughout. That said, the references to these stories in the New Testament conforms to
their usage as types. Due to space we cannot treat these texts extensively.
Perhaps most familiar is Paul’s typological use of Adam in Romans 5 and 1
Corinthians 15. There the narrative of the first Adam is contrasted with the effect of the
life of the second Adam, Christ. In 1 John 3:11-16, the story of Cain is referenced as the
quintessential example of lack of love for one’s brother. The one who hates is a murderer
and abides in death. The contrast in the passage is with Christ, the one who laid down his
life. Two ways of living are offered, two narratives to inhabit. Jude 11, too uses Cain and
other Old Testament figures as representative of a way of life. “Woe to them! For they
walked in the way of Cain and abandoned themselves for the sake of gain to Balaam’s
error and perished in Korah’s rebellion.” By contrast, Hebrews 11:4 praises the better
sacrifice of Abel, suggesting it was offered in faith and Jesus suggests that Abel was the
first of the prophetic martyrs (Luke 11:51). In Matthew 27:37–39 Jesus uses the days of
Noah to describe the suddenness with which the judgment will come. In both 1 and 2
Peter Noah is referenced as exemplar of righteousness.
Types of Sin and Christ

We have already noted in several places the typological relationship between
Adam and Christ, a connection that is developed most specifically in Romans 5 but with
echoes elsewhere. Christ, like Adam, establishes the human race. Christ, unlike Adam,
does not deviate from the image of God. He accomplishes everything that his Father
sends him to do (John 17:4) and does not pursue his own agenda (John 8:50). This is in
stark contrast to the grasping human initiative of Genesis 3–11. More telling still is the
contrast between humanity’s pursuit of the name in Genesis 11 and Jesus, who like
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Abraham, receives a name from God (Philippians 2:11). Many have noted the various
ways in which Jesus recapitulates aspects of Israel’s history: sojourn in Egypt, crossing
Jordan, exile. The one history bears a typological relationship to the other.
One might expect types of sin to be in evidence in the climax of the storyline and
perhaps even to be supplemented. On this reading of Christ as the new Adam and founder
of renewed humanity, it is legitimate to read the temptations of Jesus as the establishment
of a new set of types of sin, ones that echo, clarify and expand upon those encountered
earlier in the drama. Jesus’s temptations cover similar conceptual territory as the Genesis
3 narrative in particular but other of the narratives as well. We will see this in the
summary that follows.

The Types of Sin in Genesis 3–11

Can we summarize any more tidily the types of sin that are on offer in Genesis 3–
11? Of course, with too much summary we stray into the definition and systematization
that narrative theology seeks to avoid. But we may improve upon merely restating the
narratives by articulating trends visible even in the brief space of Genesis 3–11. As we
have seen, we will articulate these trends with reference to the imago dei and the human
destiny.

Improving the Image

Several of the sins against the human identity in Genesis 3–11 involve attempts to
improve upon the image illicitly. The attraction of the fruit in Genesis 3 was in part its
ability to make the human pair wise, a perceived improvement on their current status.
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Similarly, Lamech’s foray into polygamy could be regarded as a human effort to improve
his chances of fulfilling the human mandate to be fruitful and multiply. We might also
detect the same impulse behind the uncertain behavior of the sons of God and the
daughters of men. Each of these cases suggests that boundaries inherent in the role of
image bearer are a hindrance to the full expression of humanity’s powers. Yet the counter
evidence of the narratives is that while there is considerable space in which humanity can
work out its identity as the divine image, there are types of knowledge that are harmful to
it and boundaries that once crossed cannot be undone.
This temptation is not unlike Satan’s offer of the world at the cost of false
worship (Matthew 4:9). The offer is to avoid the divinely ordained path to glory and
human destiny. Just as the serpent offered godlikeness—the destiny of humanity—via the
fruit, so Satan offered lordship of the earthly realm through false worship.

Overstepping the Image

Another set of these narratives suggest that one type of sin against the image is
overstepping the boundaries of the image. This interpretation of several of the Genesis
narratives is fairly common though it is often associated with one or two narratives that
we have classified above. In overstepping the image, the human characters arrogate to
themselves aspects of the divine character to image in the world that God does not appear
to have allotted to them. In this category we could include Cain’s use of lethal force
against his brother and Lamech’s usurping of God’s authority to exact vengeance. There
are at least two other ambiguous events that may fall into this category as well: Adam’s
second naming of Eve, and Noah’s curse of Ham. Within the narrow confines of these
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chapters it is difficult to decide on the moral quality of these actions. Naming of humans
and cursing seem to be divine prerogatives. Perhaps these two are concessions to the
reality of living in a less than perfect world, but features that one hopes will one day be
superseded.
Jesus similarly faced the temptation of the misuse of powers vested in him for the
pursuit of his destiny when he was tempted to turn stones into bread. To use his power
solely for himself would have been to decline or mistrust God’s gracious provision and
use for himself what was intended for the benefit of others.

Resisting the Image

Another view of some of these narratives reveals the category of sins against the
image through resisting the divine direction of human destiny. This can be seen most
clearly in the narrative of the Tower of Babel where for reasons of security and identity,
the community resists God’s call to disperse. This may also be seen in Cain’s choice of
settling down after being told he would be a wanderer (4:16). This redefinition of the
human goals can be seen to foreshadow several of Israel’s refusals of God’s destiny for
them. Their resistance to enter the Promised Land in Numbers 13 and their failure to
dispossess fully the Canaanites of the Promised Land in Joshua and Judges. Individuals
and communities are infinitely creative in redefining the direction and trajectory of
human destiny.
Abusing Image-Bearers

Of course, a repeated type of sin in these chapters is the breakdown of
relationships between image bearers. The chapters move from breakdown in the marriage
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relationship in the blame between Adam and Eve in chapter 3 which escalates to
Lamech’s boorish behavior toward his wives in chapter 4. Further abuse within the
human community is depicted in Cain’s murder of his brother which escalates to
Lamech’s violence and culminates in the description of the earth as “filled with violence”
(6:11). The cleansing effect of the flood is short-lived as family relationships are once
again compromised by Ham’s lewdness. John Goldingay comments on this trend in terms
that are amenable to narrative and typology. “I presume we are to continue to see this
series of parabolic stories as occupying parallel places in a montage. The story does not
suggest that first the marriage relationship is spoiled, then the sibling relationship, then
the parental relationship.”72 Rather, there is depicted the sinful tendency toward relational
and societal breakdown and that virtually all of humanity’s sins have just this effect.

THINKING WITH TYPES OF SIN

Robert Jenson says that the test of a theological claim is its hermeneutical value:
“The scriptural test of a theologoumenon is its success as a hermeneutical principle:
whether it leads to exegetical success or failure with mandated churchly homiletical,
liturgical, and catechetical uses of Scripture.”73 In the case of definitions or descriptions
of sin, we would ask whether the definitions of sin on offer provide the church with the
conceptual resources, the hermeneutical principles to speak prophetically to itself and the
wider culture. Our survey in chapter 1 regarding the loss of sin-language suggests that the
regnant definitions fall short. Further, our interaction with feminist and evangelical

72. John Goldingay, Israel’s Gospel, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1. (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2003), 185.
73. Robert W Jenson, The Triune God, vol. 1 of Systematic Theology (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 33.
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theologians, two theological traditions interested in sin-talk demonstrated the limitations
of their definitions in speaking creatively about sin. Does indexing sin to the meaning of
being human provide better resources?

Sin and Christ

As we have seen above, the single greatest achievement of this reading is a more
direct link between sin, humanity, and Christ. We observed in our appraisals of feminist
and evangelical definitions of sin that there was no inherent connection to Christ. For the
evangelicals, the heavy focus on law leads to a view of the incarnation and suffering of
Christ as a form of deus ex machina rather than as an intricately woven plot element.
Feminist theologians in particular fault traditional theologies for their dependence on an
incursion from outside of history for its resolution. For the feminist theologians, their
emphasis on experiential knowledge and the essence of humanity leave little room for a
significant Christology, quite apart from the problems that Jesus’s maleness causes them.
That is to say that for the evangelicals Jesus is the unique one which comes from outside
the system to redeem it whereas for the feminists Jesus is so embedded in the system he
can play no role more than exemplar and even that is undercut by gender considerations.
Conversely, orienting sin to the imago dei as a developmental concept that finds its
fullest expression in Christ allows one to integrate the story of Christ seamlessly with the
story that preceded it while at the same time highlighting it as a distinctive moment.
These details overcome the dangers of over- or under-realized eschatologies by giving a
meaningful ground in the present while still anticipating a fulfilled destiny in the future.
Robert Jenson articulates the tension well:
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Yet the future that moves a story must somehow be available within it if
we are to live the story while it is still in progress, as Israel worshiped her
God even while in exile awaiting his salvation or as the church tells the
gospel while awaiting the risen Christ’s advent. If prior to the closure by
which a narrated identity is resolved we can nevertheless recount certain
events as the story of the someone then to be identified, there must be a
way in which what will come ‘unexpectedly’ may nevertheless be told in
advance.74
In Christ we can “tell in advance” the story of our own destiny while leaving its full
expression for a later time. This ameliorates the over-realized eschatology of
evangelicalism which articulates a fully-executed soteriology and the under-realized
eschatology of feminism which sees salvation forever deferred.

Sin and Self

This way of talking about the human and sin conforms much more readily to
contemporary notions of self-hood than do those offered by either our feminist or
evangelical interlocutors. As many have noted, contemporary ways of thinking about
being human have moved away from concepts of human faculties or nature and even
beyond mere relationality to speak of the human self as an identity that is constructed in
the nexus of many factors but which is heavily narrative in its cohesion. As Grenz
comments, “The resultant postmodern condition retains a semblance of a ‘self’ that is
constituted by a narrative, that is marked by a position in a vast relational web, and that
looks to relationships for identity.”75 It is precisely the narrative sense that ties together
past and present and offers a trajectory into the future. “[A]ny semblance of meaning in
the present is linked to at least a rudimentary sense of narrative continuity with a
meaningful past and a conceivable future, which gives the impression that the person is
74. Robert W Jenson, The Triune God, 67.
75. Grenz, The Social God, 17.
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en route from somewhere to somewhere and hence that the persons’s narrative constitutes
some type of a whole.”76 Anthony Giddens agrees: “A person’s identity is not to be found
in behavior, nor—important though this is—in the reactions of others, but in the capacity
to keep a particular narrative going. The individual’s biography, if she is to maintain
regular interaction with others in the day-to-day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must
continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the
ongoing ‘story’ about the self.”77
Giddens speaks of selves as reflexively constructed, that is, “which are shaped
by—yet also shape—the institutions of modernity. The self is not a passive entity,
determined by external influences; in forging their self-identities, no matter how local
their specific contexts of action, individuals contribute to and directly promote social
influences that are global in their consequences and implications.”78 This is in contrast to
Mary Daly’s overly assertive self and Rita Nakashima Brock’s rather passive, relational
self. Interestingly, in this context Giddens suggests that shame rather than guilt is
predominant.79 This is in contrast to the strong emphasis on guilt in evangelical
definitions of sin and salvation and more consonant with the narratives of Genesis and
chapter 3 in particular.
By understanding human destiny as a whole as developing narratively and finding
its pinnacle in Christ, a connection is made with the narrative understanding of the self.
As we observed before, insofar as they are “in Christ” believers understand themselves
and their individual narratives with reference to the narrative of humanity as it finds its
76. Ibid., 135.
77. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern
Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 54.
78. Ibid., 2.
79. Ibid., 8.
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expression in Jesus Christ. Sin involves the various ways we attempt to construct
narratives of personal identity apart from the image of God as revealed in Christ. It
further involves the ways individual actions and systems thwart others in their attempts to
self-narrate.
McClendon suggests that understanding our personal narrative with reference to
Christ allows the story to change from the tragedy of Adam to the Comedy of Christ.
“We cannot say a good word for sin if we count its cost to Jesus the faithful One. Yet we
have to reckon that if his own life-story, marred by the sin of others, was finally not
tragedy but (in the classical sense) comedy; when that narrative of happy ending impacts
our own, our tear-stained, sit-marred tragedies are turned into comedies as well. By his
grace, there is laughter in the morning.”80

Sin and Systems

One of the undoubted strengths of feminist definitions of sin is the way they
highlight systems and institutions of sin in the culture. By linking sin to the full-humanity
of women they helpfully exposed systemic ways in which female flourishing is
prevented. However, their overly gendered and static view of the human blunted the
usefulness of this critique. As we saw with Mary Daly, her single-minded focus on full
womanhood failed to recognized how some of the same systems that thwart the full
humanity of women do the same to much of the male population as well. Again, part of
this problem was their static rather than developmental view of the human individual and
human society. James McClendon agrees: “A dynamic view of social existence—its
practices having an end, its stories a point or goal—requires a moving rather than fixed
80. James Wm. McClendon, Doctrine, 130.
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understanding of social sin.”81 This conforms with our reading of Genesis 1–11.
Humanity and human society is growing and changing. Innovations at one stage may
ossify and become oppressive in another. Viewing the destiny of humanity as
eschatologically oriented and narratively constructed yet at least partially present in the
narrative of Christ provides the space to think more richly about societal structures and
the ways in which they do or don’t facilitate the fulfillment of human destiny. Indeed,
positive developments in humanity can in time come to be used as efforts to resist or
overstep the destiny embedded in the image of God. Static views of the human or the law
are not flexible enough to keep pace with these sorts of shifts.

Sin and Salvation

We observed in our examination of both feminist and evangelical theologians that
the language of sin shaped the language of salvation significantly. For Mary Daly, being
human is to have the capacity to self-name, sin is having that capacity stolen, and
salvation is recapturing the radical power of self-definition. For Rita Nakashima Brock,
to be human is to be relational, sin is the brokenness we experience and inflict as a result
of our relationality, and salvation moving toward healthier relationships. For the
evangelical theologians, sin is violation of divine law that renders the sinner guilty before
God and salvation is achieved through the transference of that guilty verdict onto Christ
in his sacrifice. What these definitions do, however, is mute the rich theological language
for both sin and salvation. Their definitions tend to privilege one or another biblical
image. Brock privileges healing. The evangelicals privilege justification. But as we have
seen, as early as Genesis there is diverse language and imagery associated with sin: death,
81. Ibid., 133.
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corruption, shame, name-making, sin as crouching animal, violence, exposure. Other
images from both testaments could be adduced. As we have had reason to point out, the
diversity of images of sin are balanced by a diversity of language of salvation. To
paraphrase Gordon Fee, for every “type” of sin there is a corresponding “type” of
salvation.
Furthermore, the diversity for sin offered in the language of type combined with
the fulfilling of the image of God in Christ offers a better way to speak about how the
entirety of Christ’s life relates to salvation rather than focusing only on a substitutionary
atonement or moral example. Jesus’s recapitulation of the history of Israel and of
humanity is the required narrative antidote to the narrative of human sinfulness in the
beginning.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have attempted to move from the way in which sin is depicted
in the narrative of Genesis 3–11 to make some contributions to the question of sin in
Christian theology. We began with the observation that the safest way to summarize the
depiction of sin in Genesis 3–11 is by indexing it to the description of the nature and
destiny of humanity in the earlier chapters. By indexing sin to the rich concept of the
imago dei we were able to transcend a few of the tensions that weaken traditional
definitions of sin. Quickly, however, we strove to cast our understanding of the human
destiny in a narrative mode by recognizing that this destiny is something that was to be
lived out in time and space rather than a static nature. This allowed us to avoid the static
definition of humanity offered by our feminist conversation partners. More importantly, it
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offered a way to trace the trajectory of human destiny, the imago dei, forward through the
narrative of Scripture to its apex in Christ, thus offering a tighter connection between our
understanding of sin and the person and work of Christ. Since the New Testament depicts
Christ as the new Adam that inaugurates a new humanity, we could again pull together
both the individual and corporate aspects of humanity and sin. Finally, we returned to the
narratives of Genesis 3–11 to see how they might function in this narratively constructed
understanding of humanity and sin. We chose the concept of typology to describe the
relationship between these ancient narratives and the contemporary reader. The narratives
of Genesis 3–11, rather than offering illustrations of sin as violation of divine law, are
parallel images of a range of typical ways in which humanity deviates from the image of
God. These first testament images are amplified by many from the second testament,
most notably the images of obedience and conformity to the image of God found in the
person of Christ and especially his resistance during temptation in the wilderness. These
various ways of sin then provided us with better conceptual lenses for evaluating issues
like systems of sin and easier access to the rich language of salvation. This
conceptualization of sin also offered a more natural fit with contemporary ideas of the
narratively constructed self.
We have thus moved from the text to theology and back to the text. It remains in
the final chapter for us to summarize the entire trajectory of this study.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: SIN, STORY AND THE SAVIOR
Forty years ago Karl Menninger asked “Whatever became of sin?” raising an
important question for the status of sin-talk in the contemporary theological and cultural
milieu. Twenty years later James McClendon could still say: “The Christian doctrine of
sin is clearly one on which much work is needed at present.”1 To be sure, some efforts
have been made in the intervening years, but it is safe to say that the state of sin-talk in
theology and in the broader culture is an area in ongoing need of development.
Does the church have a robust language of sin with which to engage the
challenges of culture? This is the question with which we began. The loss of sin
language, we maintain, is of serious consequence due to how closely tied it is to other
aspects of theology: anthropology, soteriology, and Christology. As Alistair MacFadyen
worries: “Losing our ability to speak of the world’s pathologies in relation to God
represents a serious, concrete form of the loss of God that is a general characteristic of
contemporary, Western culture. The doctrine of sin is not so much an isolated case of
Christian embarrassment concerning anachronistic aspects of Christian faith, as a crucial
test of our ability to speak of God in relation to the world at all.”2 Much is at stake in the
loss of compelling sin language.

1. James Wm. McClendon, “Sin,” in A New Handbook of Christian Theology, in A New
Handbook of Christian Theology, ed. Donald W. Musser and Joseph L. Price (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1992), 446.
2. Alistair McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4.
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We suggested that the demise of sin-talk was due in part to reductionistic sin
language, language that failed to capture the richness of the concept of sin as encountered
in Scripture. Due to the aforementioned organic relationships among theological loci,
these reductionistic definitions of sin resulted in reductionistic depictions of the human
person and the nature of salvation.
We then observed that during the very time period that Menninger was lamenting
the state of sin language, there was a rise in the interest in both biblical narrative and in
the role of narrative more broadly in human reasoning and understanding. In biblical
studies, critical methods which attended to the literary features of texts took their place
alongside (and in some cases displaced) earlier forms of criticism which tended to
fragment texts. In theology, narrative was seen by some to be an important ingredient in
the way we understand and explain the world and ourselves, a way that served as a
corrective to some of the rationalist and totalizing epistemological options problematized
in postmodernity. These two streams have combined, in a way, in efforts to express the
whole of biblical witness in the form of a single, overarching storyline.
We suggested that one possible explanation for reductionist descriptions of sin
was a failure to incorporate narrative modes of thinking into the definition and
development of the doctrine. We then set off to determine more specifically what may be
missing from contemporary accounts of the doctrine of sin.

THE STORY OF SIN IN FEMINIST AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY

To diagnose the possible causes for the loss of robust sin language, we turned to
examine the theology of sin in two strains of Christian theology where sin remains a
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lively issue: feminist theology and evangelical theology. In both we observed an impulse
to define sin and build upon that theology. However, in both we also discovered a
problematic relationship to narrative and narrativity.

Sin and Story in Feminist Theology: A Review

The feminist definitions of sin, consciously reactionary against traditional models,
were developed off of prior epistemological and anthropological commitments. That is,
the feminist theological project employs an experiential epistemology and their
definitions of sin were based off of a prior definition of what it means to be human
derived from that experientialist epistemology. The human self and the self’s experience
were the controlling category.
We studied two examples: Mary Daly’s self-defining human and Rita Nakashima
Brock’s relational human. The conscious link to human identity offered a definition of sin
that served as a helpful lens to expose structures of sin, of which Mary Daly’s thorough
work is a prime example. Our principal complaint was that the view of the human and the
resultant definition of sin abstracted from the narrative of humanity and particularly from
the narrative of humanity sketched in Scripture. Daly, despite her desire to forge a
historically and culturally transcendent sisterhood offered an ahistorical and
individualized definition of the human in which the past offers no help and the future is
entirely of one’s own making. Brock’s relational anthropology and definition of sin
offered far more in the way of human unity by way of our relational connectivity and the
concomitant fragility. But we observed that this too tended toward the ahistorical and
non-narratival.
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Neither offered any sense of development. Mary Daly’s human is forever
deferred, an overly eschatological reality to use Thiselton’s term. Rita Nakashima
Brock’s human is forever mired in a state of relationality that both confers and damages
one’s humanity. There is neither escape nor development. We diagnosed both of these
problems using a category from Stephen Crites, that of abstraction from the narrative
structure of human existence. The critique can also be put in terms of over- or underrealized eschatology. Daly is all future and no past; Brock is all present.
Their commitments were clear in their handling of biblical narrative and in
particular the narratives of Genesis 1–11. Like many feminist theologians both Daly and
Brock are skeptical if not dismissive of the Bible. They approach the narratives of
Genesis with strong suspicion due to the manner in which these narratives have been used
against women. Often they seem to be reacting more to uses of the text than the texts
themselves. In sum, their approach to the Genesis 3 narrative was as a myth in need of
rejection or transvaluation. The literary features of the text were not observed nor was the
narrative assessed in its broader literary and canonical context.

Sin and Story in Evangelical Theology: A Review

Not surprisingly our two Evangelical interlocutors articulated definitions of sin
more in keeping with tradition. Unlike the feminists, their definitions of sin were
textually based, or we could say, dependent on a prior bibliological commitment (and an
equally epistemological one). This commitment is a combination of a construal of
Scripture and narrative in particular in principally historical terms and doctrine in
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propositional forms. A particular notion of scripture and scripture’s narratives was the
controlling feature in their theologizing about sin.
Wayne Grudem approached Scripture as a storehouse of theological information
and expected to find a definition of sin there. Indeed, he found a definition of sin and then
read that definition into the narrative of “the fall.” Grudem’s definition of sin is heavily
juridical—the violation of divine law rendering the offender guilty before God—and so
too is his soteriology. Marguerite Shuster offers a slightly more nuanced approach to
Scripture and sin and greater attention to Genesis 3. For all that, her definition of sin is
essentially the same. Like Grudem, she imports to Genesis 3 a definition of sin and a
theological structuring framework in the form of covenant theology that both strengthens
her approach and obscures aspects of the narrative.
Both theologians find a definition of sin in Scripture, see that definition borne out
in the originary act, and then carry the definition of sin across the whole of Scripture
without significant development. The definition of sin as law-breaking has a long history,
of course, and has its strengths, not least how directly it implicates the individual in sin.
However, we saw some limitations beyond those articulated by the feminist theologians.
In particular, we addressed the problematic depiction of the divine human-relationship
when cast primarily in legal terms.
These theologians’ commitments were equally evident in their handling of
biblical narrative. They were not especially attentive of the narrative’s literary features.
Nor did they attend to the literary embeddedness of the narrative of “the fall.” Though
Shuster took a somewhat looser stance than did Grudem to the historicity of the Genesis
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narratives, both of them were hampered by prior commitments in appreciating key
aspects of the narrative’s presentation of sin.
In at least two ways we found our feminist and evangelical thinkers suffering
similar shortcomings. First, both of their approaches were far too static. Their
presentation of sin, the self, and scripture offered little avenue for development,
particularly the type of development characteristic of narrative. Second, neither of the
approaches—the experientialist-anthropological approach of the feminists or the
propositionalist-biblicist approach of the evangelicals—offered any direct link between
sin-talk and Christ-talk. The feminists largely ignored or rejected Christ. For the
Evangelicals he functions a bit as deus ex machina. Neither of these streams of thought
take into account the recognition in recent years of the narrative structure of human
experience and identity and of Scripture itself.

THE STORY OF SIN IN GENESIS 3–11

We then turned to read Genesis 3 in the context of chapters 1–11with two
particular questions in mind. First, what is the reference point for sin in these narratives?
Is it some rendering of human nature as in feminist thought, the divine decree as in the
Evangelical rendering, or something else? Second, how, if at all, does the concept of sin
develop over these narratives?
What we observed is the tight literary artistry of these chapters that cautions
against their atomization. Genesis 1–11 is a tight literary and narrative unity which
connects with what follows but stands alone in important ways. Genesis 1–11 functions
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uniquely in the context of the book of Genesis, the Pentateuch and the canon. As such, it
warrants consideration as a literary-theological unity.
When we read these narratives attentive to their literary character and seeking
their depiction of the reference point for sin we discovered that it was neither specific
divine prohibitions per se, as in evangelical readings, nor a particular feature of human
nature as in the feminist rendering. Rather, we made the case that the various narratives
present the reference point for sin as the various aspects of the human identity and
destiny as sketched in chapters 1 and 2 of Genesis and developing through the following
narrative. The human being as made in the image of God, relationally situated between
God, others and the world, serves as the reference point for these narratives. In particular
we focused on the human as imago dei and observed ways in which within the narratives
of Genesis 1–11 the character of the divine was revealed and ways in which humanity did
or did not imitate the divine.
But further, we found the chapters to be a finely woven combination of the story
of humanity’s fulfillment of its identity and its deviation or distortion of that identity.
Importantly, we observed that these threads were inseparable and mutually informing:
success in fulfilling the human destiny as imago dei occasioned new opportunities to
deviate from it even as the aftermath of deviation opened up increased opportunity to
fulfill it. This is the principal way that sin developed.
At the close of our reading we were able to briefly summarize some of the
findings and bring them into conversation with some of the traditional emphases of
various doctrines of sin. What we observed is that the narratives of Genesis 3–11 portray
sin in diverse ways. Sin is against God, others, the world and self. Sin is individual and
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corporate. Sin is act, disposition and stain or corruption. The simplistic definitions on
offer cannot capture this diversity.

SIN, STORY AND THEOLOGY

Armed with this view of the human and sin, we turned to assess what such a
reading of Genesis 1–11 might contribute to a theology of sin. In moving from biblical
text to theology we wanted to avoid the same habits as our feminist and evangelical
conversation partners in defining sin too narrowly, or indeed defining it at all.

Sin and the Imago Dei

First, we discussed the advantages of indexing sin to the human as imago dei as a
way to bridge the tension between the anthropocentric hamartiology of the feminists and
the theocentric hamartiology of the evangelicals. Here we interacted with the work of
Emil Brunner on the relationship between sin and human as image bearer. This relation
of sin to the imago dei moves away from Grudem’s equating of angelic and human sin
and puts the story of sin more squarely within the human narrative. We also observed that
the multifaceted depiction of sin in Genesis 3–11 suggests a via media between several of
the other polarities commonly discussed regarding sin.
In relating sin to the nature of the human we were closer to feminist methodology.
Both Mary Daly and Rita Nakashima Brock developed their definitions of sin from their
understanding of what it means to be human. However, we improved upon the feminist
understanding of the human self by embracing a more developmental and narratival
understanding of the imago dei and the human person. The work of Stanley Grenz was
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helpful here in seeing the imago dei (and human identity more broadly) not in essential or
even relational terms but in eschatological ones as a story and destiny to live into. This
balances the capacity to make oneself more carefully than does Daly and also places
human relationality in a context better than does Brock’s anthropology.

From Imago Dei to Imago Christi

One of the main faults we found with our feminist and evangelical conversation
partners was the lack of a natural theological bridge to Christ from their definitions of
humanity or sin. The feminist theologian’s heavy emphasis on the distinction between
male and female humanity makes connection to the male Jesus difficult. Their definitions
of the human person as self-defining (Daly) and relationally constituted (Brock) offered
no inherent link to Christ. Further, their insistence that salvation come from inside the
human condition problematizes focus on Christ’s cross work as salvific. Brock stated this
most clearly: “I believe it is our damage—in which one major factor is patriarchy—that
has produced a doctrine of sin as a description of our original human state. The existence
of that category requires us to misplace divine incarnation and human redemption in
someone else’s perfection and heroic action, or in a power outside ourselves that helps us
transcend the concrete realities of life.”3 For Daly, the conviction that any act from the
patriarchally tainted past could hold present salvific value denied the theological
significance of Christ for the contemporary self.
Christ, of course, is integrally important to evangelical theology and soteriology
in particular. However, the heavy emphasis on law in the definition of sin we saw

3. Rita Nakashima Brock, Journeys by Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power (New York:
Crossroad, 1988), 9.
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narrowed the focus upon Christ to his cross work. From a narrative perspective we saw
his coming and sacrifice functioning as deus ex machina where the resolution to the story
is not well-integrated to it.
Still following Grenz, we made the most beneficial move of all in linking the
human destiny as imago dei with the New Testament depiction of Christ as the imago dei
and the church as the renewed humanity in the imago Christi. Connecting the destiny of
the human from Genesis 1 with the fulfillment of that destiny in Christ provided an
important link between the narration of the entry of sin in the human drama to the climax
of that drama in the person and work of Christ and beyond. If sin is indexed to the imago
dei and that as a narrated reality culminating in Christ, then Christ revealed and yet to
come becomes the new reference point for sin—success and failure as humanity. Again
in true narrative fashion, this development is both new and yet intimately connected to all
that has gone before in the narrative of humanity. This is a dynamic rather than static
view of the self, scripture, and sin.
In a way much more natural than either the feminist or evangelical paths, this
avenue offers a way to speak about the redemptive significance of the life and ministry of
Christ and not only his death. Jesus represents the second Adam and recapitulates Israel’s
history and offers the beginning of a new narrative in which humanity may live.

From Definitions of Sin to Types of Sin

Though linking our understanding of sin to the person and work of Christ as the
imago dei is high point of the argument, we made one final conceptual move which was
to return to the narratives of Genesis 3–11 to ask how they may be accessed theologically
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and practically in light of the discussion. Our conversation partners had approached them
mythically (feminists) or historically (evangelicals). In the case of the feminists they read
the myth as one of many illustrations of the patriarchal tendency to oppress women. The
evangelicals saw in the narratives a historical recounting of the origin of sin which
likewise illustrated the nature of sin as law-breaking. Both of these fell short of the
narrative ideal of setting the reader in a storied relationship with the narrative.
By seeing in these narratives a story both of development of and deviation from
the divinely ordained human destiny, a destiny culminating in Christ, we proposed that
the best way to relate to these narratives is through the mode of “type.” That is, rather
than being merely illustrations of the violation of divine law, these narratives present a
range of ways in which humanity strays from its identity as the image of God even while
increasingly living into that same destiny. Once a diverse range of types was presented,
the biblical narrative turned to focus in the narratives of Abraham and the other patriarchs
on the divine plan for restoration of the image of God in humanity.4
James McClendon puts the reader’s relationship to the primeval narratives in
distinctly typological and christological language: “Yet we approach all these narratives
with Christian eyes, or at least with gospel-influenced reading strategies. So read, they
are indeed types of the disobedience, human perversity, and false aims that were to
oppose Jesus when he appeared.”5 These types or images then offer a diverse set of lenses
for evaluating human behavior individually, corporately and systemically. We articulated
a variety of stances toward the imago dei that these narratives displayed: rejection, over-

4. Further work could certainly be done on the way in which Israel is depicted as the
renewed humanity and the ways in which they deviated from that calling.
5. James Wm. McClendon, Doctrine, Systematic Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1994), 123.

304
extension, attempted improvement upon. These images combined with the direction
provided by the overarching narrative of the image of God and its culmination in Christ,
provide us with a broader range of language to use in speaking of sin.6
By summary we may say that the depiction of sin in Genesis 3–11 is deviation
from the divinely ordered human destiny. This may be in act or attitude. It is individual
and corporate and may be enshrined in cultural practices and human institutions whose
structures and patterns work against human outworking of the image of God as often as
they enhance it. Since the story of human destiny finds its high point in the person and
work of Christ, he is the ultimate reference point for sin. The biblical narratives of human
behavior provide images of the interweaving of human expression of and deviation from
the divinely ordered destiny. We can use these images as lenses to evaluate current
human behavior.

CONCLUSION
In his discussion of sin James McClendon observes, “Every Christian doctrine
seems to require every other for its clear presentation.”7 We have discovered that sin-talk
relates to human-talk (anthropology), salvation-talk (soteriology), and Christ-talk
(Christology). Decisions made in one locus impact the options and emphases in another.
We charted some of these effects in the epistemological and methodological decisions of
6. The combination of the specific “types” of sin with the overarching narrative of the
imago dei brings together what Anthony Thiselton suggests about the function of the biblical
narrative and its discrete narratives. A ‘grand narrative’...may recount God’s dealings with the
world; ‘little’ narratives may also portray the appropriation of divine acts on the scale of
particular events and persons, with all the ambiguity and need for interpretation that characterizes
a journey or narrative en route.” Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 66.
7. James Wm. McClendon, Doctrine, Systematic Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1994), 123.
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the feminist and evangelical authors, decisions with detrimental effects to the relevance
and effectiveness of their theologizing. Based off particular views of the nature and
knowledge of the self, our feminist conversation partners generated definitions of sin that,
though they exposed certain aspects of the human character with laser-like precision
failed to offer a sufficiently rich and nuanced language for sin. For their part, the
evangelical theologians’ particular notions of the nature and function of scripture
produced definitions of sin equally well-tuned to expose aspects of the human
predicament. We have suggested that it is the grander category of story that bridges the
extremes of these two positions.
As we have shown, the Genesis narratives offer a range of ways in which
humanity has strayed from or rejected its identity as imago dei. They cannot all be
subsumed tidily under the heading of “pride” or “law-breaking.” But they may all be
summarized as types of deviation from the narrative presentation of the image of God as
revealed in Christ. Genesis 3–11 and the narrative of Christ offer two distinct ways of
life, two distinct narratives into which we may live. We may identify with the first Adam
and the series of ways in which he and his progeny inhabited and evacuated their call to
be image bearers or we may orient our lives in the narrative of the one who fulfilled the
image of God perfectly. The ultimate reference point for our understanding of sin is not
the law nor human nature per se, but rather the revelation of the destiny of humanity in
the incarnate Christ. The narratives of Genesis 1–11 serve as types of sin, pictures of the
manifold ways in which we deviate from Christ, the true humanity and the image of what
we are to be and one day will be.
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